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common substance. In view of this fact, it is readily understandable why, when the justice of matrilineal inheritance starts to be questioned by those whose economic interests are threatened by its provisions, it becomes the 'symbolic keystone' of matriliny, as it did in Kelapula (ibid.: 121). But the defining feature of matriliny is not a single social practice meaningfully informed by matrilineal ideology, but that ideology itself, i.e. the expressed kinship and descent principles, the kin categories which are recognised, and their accompanying norms and values. Analytically speaking, then, the defining feature of matriliny is the assignment of individuals to culturally recognised categories whose membership is defined by descent traced through females (Aberle 1961: 656; Douglas 1969: 124). It must follow that any explanation of the decline or demise of matriliny as such is adequate only if it accounts satisfactorily for the weakening or disappearance of the notion of matrilineal descent itself.

The explanation outlined above has been generally accepted to provide such an account; that is, it has been taken as accounting not only for the change in the transmission of property through inheritance but also for the general decline or demise of matriliny as a total system. In other words, it has been read as an explanation of the disappearance of matrilineal ideology or, more specifically, of the tracing of descent exclusively through females. We may ask what makes such a reading possible.

The answer to this question would seem to lie in the acceptance of a range of assumptions or presuppositions about the nature of social reality, facilitated by the fact that most of them have never been explicitly formulated but only tacitly entertained, and by the fact that in analysis they have frequently been treated not only as assumptions, which have a merely heuristic value, but as generalisations of empirical fact. One such specific assumption is that the regulation of economic relations is universally the most important function of a descent group. The outlined explanation can be construed as adequate only when this is accepted as a valid generalisation of empirical fact. If, however, it is relegated from its status as an empirical generalisation to its proper status as an assumption, the validity of the explanation need to be questioned, for there is no logical reason to assume that a change in the system of inheritance has invariably to be accompanied by a change in the conceptualisation of descent. Why can men not inherit property from their fathers while considering themselves members of a category of people who are descended in the matrilineal line from a common ancestress? After all, among the Tonga, Nayar and Minangkabau, the practice of the transmission of individually earned property to one's own children has not affected the tracing of descent in the matrilineal line (Colson 1980; Fuller 1976; Kato 1982).

A more general assumption underlying the acceptance of the received explanation of the decline of matriliny is the notion of the socio-cultural

common substance. In view of this fact, it is readily understandable why, when the justice of matrilineal inheritance starts to be questioned by those whose economic interests are threatened by its provisions, it becomes the 'symbolic keystone' of matriliny, as it did in Luapula (ibid.: 121). But the defining feature of matriliny is not a single social practice meaningfully informed by matrilineal ideology, but that ideology itself, i.e. the expressed kinship and descent principles, the kin categories which are recognised, and their accompanying norms and values. Analytically speaking, then, the defining feature of matriliny is the assignment of individuals to culturally recognised categories whose membership is defined by descent traced through females (Aberle 1961: 656; Douglas 1969: 124). It must follow that any explanation of the decline or demise of matriliny as such is adequate only if it accounts satisfactorily for the weakening or disappearance of the notion of matrilineal descent itself.

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## 3.3 The Creative Self as Other

In Chap. 2, I presented a framework of distributed creativity that operates with five key elements — actors, audiences, action, artefacts and affordances — and focuses on their inter-relation. This framework was grounded in the idea of difference, for instance the fact that actors and audiences occupy different social (even physical) positions. To understand this better consider a scenario in which self and other are not differentiated from each other. In this situation there is no possibility for diversity of action or opinion. Moreover, there would be no need to appreciate creative outcomes since views would never diverge (the 'ideal' case for the consensual techniques discussed before). Creative action and its social distribution are, therefore, facilitated by this 'confrontation' with otherness. Interestingly though, the other does not disappear when the creator is alone. If we go back to arguments regarding the extended mind (Chap. 2) we find a concern for coupled systems that include the person as an external element. According to the logic of cognitive science, if the external element is not readily available (Clark 2008) then no distribution takes place. In contrast, a cultural psychological approach argues that the social is not an on and off switch that one can operate at will (Gleiter 1991). The human mind itself is social and this means that the difference in social position and perspective mentioned above exists 'within' as well as 'outside' the person. In this sense, the creative actor is at once embodying other voices that contribute, in their polyphony, to the shaping of creative action.

The origins of this internal dialogue can be found in the acts of collaboration and co-creation discussed in Sect. 3.1. In fact, learning through apprenticeships, something that is not only specific for craft but marks the developmental trajectory of every human activity to some degree (see Rogoff 1995), fosters the emergence of a social mind. When the person is acquiring new ways of acting in the world or new knowledge, these skills and this knowledge remain imprinted by their social context. There is no knowledge creators use, for instance, that comes from 'nowhere'; it remains located within certain social positions or perspectives the creator is more or less consciously aware of. Against proclaiming the 'death of the author' (Burke 1992) by dissipating the mind into discourses acquired from the social arena and reproduced by the persons, the cultural approach considers the mind 'a hotbed of tactical and relational improvisation' (Ingold and Hallam 2007, p. 9). Being able to adopt certain social discourses and recognise the position they are 'speaking' from, the creative actor remains an agent capable of selecting, combining or denying certain perspectives (e.g., artisans can comment on how ethnographers see the craft without necessarily agreeing with their views). The psychology of creativity would benefit from taking into account the acquisition and transformation of social perspectives performed in creative acts.

The consequence of adopting a social mind view in creativity theory would be to recognise, together with Becker (2008, p. 200) that individuals 'create their world, at least in part, by anticipating how other people will respond, emotionally and cognitively, to what they do'. The craft of egg decoration illustrates very well

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of expression, new art forms without set conventions and entrenched practitioners also promised new opportunities for women. Despite revolutionary shifts in technology, there are continuities of person, themes, and practices between the live and analog art in the earlier period of media art and the digital interactivity of the 1990s to be discussed below.[4] Both second- and third-wave women in technology art have faced the difficulties of pioneers and transgressors in ideological and practical domains defined and controlled by men. Women encountering strong external obstacles and constraints are also likely to have internalized resistances and ambivalencies toward their own artistic means of production. Such psychic distancing is advantageous, for these tricksters and thieves of cool fire are more likely to produce metainteractive work that foregrounds the contradictions and mystifications of interactivity itself, while devising ways to animate its liberating potential.

Whatever it may be in the larger socioeconomic and cultural sphere, artists have chosen to inflect prosaic interactivity to their own expressive ends. Metainteractive aesthetic strategies — like poetry, with its rhythms, assonances, and figures — does not merely transport us to another scene or world but is itself an experience charged by semantic and formal values of expression. Interactivity is not just an instrument or a perhaps irritating interval between clicking and getting somewhere else but an event that brings corporeal and cognitive awareness to this increasingly ubiquitous feature of the contemporary world.

## DEFINING INTERACTIVITY NEVERTHELESS

Reception theory tells us that the reader of a novel and the theater- or filmgoer have always cognitively "interacted" with the text by filling in the gaps.[5] Audience studies tell us how fans of mass-culture print, sound recordings, television, and radio have actively received, revised, and extended texts without, however, changing the text itself in real time. However, the interactive user/viewer corporeally influences the body of a digital text itself — that is, a database of information and its manifestation as display of symbols[6] — in real time.

Inter — from the Latin for "among" — suggests a linking or meshing function that connects separate entities.[7] Unlike intra, a prefix for connections or links within the same entity, inter- joins what is other or

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reproductions of art works in movable fabric, magnetic or three dimensional components" (2002: 8), as well as "computer technology involving animation or the manipulation of images" (2002: 9).

## Constructivism and interactivity

The fourth pedagogical style, constructivism, has not been taken up as enthusiastically as the discovery model. This is not surprising given that museums deal with the material world and this is not easily reconcilable with an idealist epistemology. However, if one looks to the notion of interactivity rather than at interactives per se, it is possible to discern attempts at developing exhibitions that take constructivism and interactivity as their premise. Such exhibitions deploy what I have called "dialogic interactivity" (Witcomb 2003).

Dialogically interactive exhibitions tend to make an effort to connect with the visitor by representing aspects of visitors' own cultural backgrounds and using open-ended narratives. An example is the Eternity Gallery at the National Museum of Australia. This gallery combines traditional object displays, touch-screen computers, and video and oral histories (accessed through a phone) to provide an interactive space in which the viewer is invited to consider him or herself as part of Australian history through everyday activities. The everyday is, in a sense, lifted out and up, and made into the extraordinary.

Organized into biographies that represent emotions, attitudes, and experiences - separation, mystery, hope, joy, loneliness, thrill, devotion, fear, change, passion - the exhibition very simply presents aspects of people's lives through the use of photographs, a few objects, first-person narration, and the use of multimedia consoles to extend the narrative. There is also the opportunity for visitors to record their own personal story. Direct contact is established with each visitor through an appeal to their own human experiences. In this sense it is open ended, making no authoritative claims about defining what it is to be Australian. It allows visitors to make their own meanings and then encourages them to document those for others. The problem, however, is that the nation becomes nothing more than the sum of individual experiences. Taken too far, a constructivist approach to exhibition-making can result in an emptying out of meaning and a consequent loss of understanding of community based on commonality of experience.

There are, however, more complex examples of dialogic exhibitions that work with the idea of interactivity. Often, these spaces are also working with notions of "immersion" and "experience." They do so, not within a didactic framework, however, but through creating an aesthetic where there is a space for poetic, affective responses. Very often, this is achieved through a highly aesthetic form of exhibition-making. Examples are the Museum of the Holocaust in Washington (Appelbaum 1995; Freed 1995) and the new South African Museum of Apartheid (Till 2003; see also chapter 29). Both of these museums use the full range of the creative arts to construct a highly immersive, experiential environment. Unlike the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, however, their aim is to produce a dialogue. Strikingly, the Museum of the Holocaust does this by explicitly resisting the temptation to use emotive language.

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> Goddess, as they were the children of the women who headed the families and clans. And while this certainly gave women a great deal of power, analogizing from our present-day mother-child relationship, it seems to have been a power that was more equated with responsibility and love than with oppression, privilege, and fear.[14]

Others, including some feminist historians, have challenged Eisler's conclusions as too sweeping in suggesting that the Goddess-worshipping societies were all peaceful and egalitarian. Merlin Stone maintains that at least some of the Goddess societies were not only matrilineal, but as well matriarchal and reduced men to an inferior and dependent position. She points to evidence that through their control of the temple the priestesses controlled inheritance, "the urban activities of the craftsmen, the traders and the rural employment of farmers, shepherds, poultry keepers, fishermen and fruit gardeners,"[15] and the buying, selling, and renting of land.[16]

Stone cites evidence that in some societies, women arranged to take multiple lovers of their choice, often in the context of temple rituals, thereby securing their own sexual freedom, obscuring the paternity of their children, and thus creating a situation in which the line of succession could be traced only through the woman.[17] Later stories from the lands of Libya, Anatolia, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, and Russia also describe the Goddess as a courageous warrior and leader of armies.[18]

Millennia after the shift from partnership to domination, Diodorus Siculus (Diodorus of Sicily) wrote of his travels to northern Africa and the Near East forty-nine years before the birth of Jesus. Among his accounts are reports of women in Ethiopia who carried arms and practiced a form of communal marriage in which children were raised so communally that even the women themselves often became confused as to who was the birth mother of a particular child. She reported on warrior women in Libya who formed armies and invaded neighboring countries.[19]

Our concern here is not with whether women-led societies are always more peaceful and egalitarian than male-led societies, but merely to note the evidence of the rich variety of the early human experience, which included peaceful, egalitarian, highly accomplished societies of substantial size in which women had strong leadership roles.

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envy of femininity and/or maternity. Shamma Segal describes the process as follows:

> For the little girl, this first oral turning to the penis is a heterosexual move paving the way to the genital situation and the wish to incorporate the penis in her vagina. But at the same time it contributes to her homosexual trends in that, at that stage of development, the oral desire is linked with incorporation and identification, and the wish to be fed by the penis is accompanied by a wish to possess a penis of her own.
>
> For the little boy this turning to the penis of his father as an alternative to his other's breast is primarily a move towards passive homosexuality, but at the same time this incorporation of his father's penis helps in his identification with him and in that way strengthens his heterosexuality.[15]

Klein, who is more emphatic than Segal in her own observations and countertransference, proposes the following:

> In this phase [i.e., the "feminine phase"] the boy has an oral-sucking fixation on his father's penis just as the girl has. This fixation is, I consider, the basis of true homosexuality in him. This view would agree with what Freud has said in Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood. . . "
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> In the phantasy of the boy, his mother incorporates his father's penis, or rather, a number of them, inside herself, side by side with his relations to his real father, or, to be more precise, his father's penis, he develops a relation in phantasy to his father's penis inside his mother's body. . . . He wants to take by force the penis which he imagines as being inside his mother and to injure her in doing so. . . .
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female spirit, goddess, or totemic ancestor. But it is not so. Not only is the hero a male, personified by the shaman, as are his helpers, also symbolized through decidedly phallic attributes; but the very working of the incantation promotes the childbearing woman's identification with the male hero in his struggle with the villain (a female deity who has taken possession of the woman's body and soul). And, more importantly, the incantation aims at detaching the woman's identification or perception of self from her own body; it seeks to sever her identification with a body which she must come to perceive precisely as a space, the territory in which the battle is waged.[24] The hero's victory, then, results in his recapturing the woman's soul, and his descent through the landscape of her body symbolizes the (now) unimpeded descent of the fetus along the birth canal. In short, the effectiveness of symbols—the work of the symbolic function in the unconscious—effects a splitting of the female subject's identification into the two mythical positions of hero (mythical subject) and boundary (spatially fixed object, personified obstacle). Here we can again recognize a parallel with the double or split identification which, film theory has argued, cinema offers the female spectator: identification with the look of the camera, apprehended as temporal, active or in movement, and identification with the image on the screen, perceived as spatially static, fixed, inframe.

The extent to which such mythical positioning of the discursive agents works through the narrative form can hardly be overestimated. In a popular, illustrated medical text, for example, the human reproductive cycle is described as "the long journey," and the epic proportions of the narrativized account make it worth a brief digression, and a long quotation. After a preamble introducing the main actors of the s.c. sperm and ovum, the difference between man and woman is briefly set out. It "consists in their way of reacting as the pituitary sends out its stimulating hormones to the blood during early puberty. In him, balance and constant readiness; in her, a continuous swing between preparation and destruction."[25] Then the chapter entitled "The Long Journey" begins:

> Travelling over these two pages [an enlarged cyclic phase of sperm cells under microscope occupies the upper half of the pages] is an army of sperm, swimming eagerly in straight ranks. The tails stream behind and the heads show in the direction of movement as they swim through the glassy, fluid cervical mucus on about the fourteenth day of the

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more information on this). However, we can create a convincing result using the base software. Due to its motion effect, we're obviously going to use a particle system to generate the dynamics of the flame system; however, simply emitting the particles from a single source and exerting a Wind Space Warp on them isn't going to be enough, purely because the Space Warp in question doesn't simulate the desired turbulent motion. It's, however, good enough in this instance to affect the entire simulation to suggest a subtle external force to break up uniformity, creating a light breeze on the flame causing it to distort somewhat and also to be used to drag the particles vertically. The main body of simulation will lie in multiple particle systems. The initial Flame system will be used to position and scatter particles around the Geosphere primitive in the scene, with an PDeflector preventing these particles from intersecting the geometry as they pass around the surface. These particles will be attracted to one another within a small threshold radius, producing collations of particles. These particles will then be affected by a reduced number of particles born from the same location(s), which will produce larger collations and also interact with the main body of the system. Finally, to break up the effect and to design the turbulent refined patterns as seen in the reference material, a time-offset instance of the large influence particles will chase the flame particles, causing them to displace, simulating air rushing in, and producing loops and arcs akin to the reference. The simulation aside, the main crux of the design is shading the particles correctly. Actually we aren't going to render the particles but surface them using a Blobmesh Compound object, which will have a material assigned that uses fog density based on object thickness to drive the brightness of the flame as it progresses through the animation. In the "Taking it further" section, I've adapted this material even further, creating the falloff effect around the edges of the flames. Once you've finished this tutorial, feel free to have a look at this section and the accompanying Taken Further 3ds Max scene file.

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learning, and communal fellowship in the quest for knowledge that was simply divine. Nowadays our classrooms are more likely to be composed of student who are fixated on the main chance, the opportunity they see opening up in the future. Of course these students are obsessed with grades and willing to do almost anything to ensure that they will get the evaluation that most boosts their future chances of success.

As teachers we join them in this fixation on the future when we work for promotion, tenure, good evaluations. Academically, intellectually, much of the work we do invites us to engage in constant analytical processing. More often than not our thinking is aimed in the direction of the past or the future (especially as we work with ideas trying to discover original thoughts that will set us apart from our peers and advance our careers). This mode of thinking can be incredibly fruitful, but unless we can combine it with more passive forms, what Richard Carson and Joseph Bailey call "the free flowing mode," it can deaden our capacity to be in touch with the present. Carson and Bailey stress that when we are engaged solely in analytical thinking we are choosing the relationship to ideas that is most valued in conventional pedagogy. Explaining further they contend: "if you are actively thinking, you are in processing mode; if you are passively thinking, you are in the free flowing mode. When you are in the flow, it feels as if you are not thinking at all. The thinking seems to happen to you. Free-flowing mode thinking moves naturally, constantly bringing you fresh, harmonious, thoughtts. When you are in the processing mode, however, the thinking is originating from your memory." When I was in graduate school years ago, the classes wherein I truly learned were those where these two approaches were combined. Yet today's frantic need to push toward deadlines, covering set amounts of material, allows very little room, if any, for silence, for free-flowing work. Most of us teach and are taught that it is only the future that really matters.

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# Creativity and Art Education Gaps Between Theories and Practices

Jill Journeaux and Judith Mottram

## Creativity and the Education of Artists

This chapter reports on a study within the fine art field on whether models of creativity as described in other fields are reflected within university studio art teaching. As this discussion is located within a multi-disciplinary collection of essays on creativity we first highlight two points reflecting assumptions about artistic creativity held beyond the field and based on historically located perspectives no longer operational within the field. The first is the idea that art might have a concern with beauty, and the second that creative capabilities are a special gift. Both would be contested to varying degrees within the world of art in the university or contemporary gallery. We also note a range of different perspectives on creativity within the fine arts, drawing on assumptions not necessarily framed by an understanding of contemporary thinking about creativity.

In the 1990s, coming into art education with some familiarity with current thinking on organizational behavior, Mottram was surprised that theories of creativity were unfamiliar to colleagues. As artists were then being seen as key players in the "creative industries" so vital to city regeneration (Landry 1995), it was anticipated their education might be informed by contemporaneous thinking on creativity.

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figured. And so consequentiality, responsibility, and accountability take on entirely new valences. There are no singular causes. And there are no individual agents of change. Responsibility is not ours alone. And yet our responsibility is greater than it would be if it were ours alone. Responsibility entails an ongoing responsiveness to the entanglements of self and other, here and there, now and then. If, as Levinas suggests, "proximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility," then entanglements bring us face to face with the fact that what seems far off in space and time may be as close or closer than the pulse of here and now that appears to beat from a center that lies beneath the skin. The past is never finished once and for all and out of sight may be out of touch but not necessarily out of reach." Intra-active practices of engagement not only make the world intelligible in specific ways but also foreclose other patterns of mattering. We are accountable for and to not only specific patterns of marks on bodies – that is, the differential patterns of mattering of the world of which we are a part – but also the exclusions that we participate in enacting. Therefore accountability and responsibility must be thought in terms of what matters and what is excluded from mattering.

The point is not merely that there is a web of causal relations that we are implicated in and that there are consequences to our actions. We are a much more intimate part of the universe than any such statement implies. If what is implied by "consequences" is a chain of events that follow one upon the next, the effects of our actions rippling outward from their point of origin well after a given action is completed, then to say that there are consequences to our actions is to miss the full extent of the interconnectedness of being. Future moments don't follow present ones like beads on a string. Effect does not follow cause hand over fist, transferring the momentum of our actions from one individual to the next like the balls on a billiards table. There is no discrete "I" that precedes its actions. Our (intra)actions matter – each one reconfigures the world in its becoming – and yet they never leave us; they are sedimented into our becoming, they become us. And yet even in our becoming there is no "I" separate from the intra-active becoming of the world. Causality is an entangled affair: it is a matter of cutting things together and apart (within and as part of phenomena). It is not about momentum transfer among individual events or beings. The future is not the end point of a set of branching chain reactions; it is a cascade experiment.

In his autobiography Disturbing the Universe, the physicist Freeman Dyson takes up the haunting question of J. Alfred Prufrock – "Do I dare disturb the universe?" T. S. Eliot's protagonist holds the question at arm's length, afraid

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who played musical instruments.[91] It goes on to say that, in addition, "one saw a child of two years who held a brush in his hand and drew like a skilled person of this art." "The writing automaton," the letter points out, "wrote everything that one dictated" without a person's touching him "directly or indirectly."[92] Droz's description of the writer automaton's skills is interesting, since the expression "neither directly nor indirectly" is a direct quote from the brochure that the Jaquet-Droz firm printed about their three androids and the automaton theater. There is a whole history, which I tell at the end of this chapter, about how this brochure's text eventually became copied many times in various print media in the 1770s and 1780s. It becomes apparent here, in the context of Abraham-Louis Droz's communication, that the brochure enabled individual letter writers who had witnessed automaton showings to use the brochure's preproduced phrasing to describe the automaton's motions, instead of writing their own reports. This might be one of the reasons that we find so few individualized accounts of the effect that the Jaquet-Droz automata had on spectators. In Abraham-Louis Droz's letter, too, the phrasing about an automaton's writing what is dictated to him is almost identical to the phrasing in the brochure.[93] His letter also mentions, like Isaac Droz's, the distinguished personalities who saw the automata, and he closes this paragraph by saying that "the son of said lay judge Jaquet-Droz" left for Paris "with said pièce" to show it to the new king Louis XVI (crowned in 1774) and "also to go to London."[94] In the second paragraph, Abraham-Louis tells his brother about his desire to join the Jaquet-Droz family as a clock-maker and perhaps go to London with them, as he was hoping to spend some time there practicing his profession.[95]

A letter of 31 March 1776 from a Suzanne-Louise Nicolet to her brother, a pastor-in-training and tutor in Utrecht, mentions the Jaquet-

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the possibility of telling some of the stories, even though restoration would make the telling of the 'main story' much easier. A positive outcome of every case being different is that standard treatments are not applied as part of an unthinking routine. So both slogans provide very good ethical guidance.

When I first heard them, both expressions were spoken as if in inverted commas and with a certain mock solemnity. These days the solemnity remains but any sense of humour is long gone. A quick Internet search shows that 'part of the history of the object' is still current in conservation discussions. But it has evolved and taken on a range of connotations that would have been unusual in the early 1970s. Collections management considerations, such as object location, accession documentation and treatment records, are now all part of the history. In the Canadian code of ethics the expression 'part of the history' is used only about reports and documentation and not about the 'cultural property' itself.[24]

Because they are always employed with a minimum of variation in the words used, they appear to be quotations of readymade maxims. Yet they do not appear in discussions on the limits of restoration in any of the early charters or codes of practice on which current conservation philosophy is supposedly based. They do not appear in the classic writings on conservation practice or conservation theory. It seems unlikely that the idea that every case is different could be the basis of a universal theory. Indeed Joyce Plesters used it as proof that there could not be just one theory of conservation.[25] Not surprisingly, 'every case must be judged on its own merits' was not invented with conservation but is a long-accepted principle in law. Even there it carries some ambiguity, as law also requires the accumulation of legal precedent.

The observation that everything that happens becomes a part of history is a truism and obviously not limited to conservation studies. So it seems that two bits of guidance that steered my early thinking about conservation ethics, and are still used today and still valid, are examples of what Muñoz Viñas calls 'the revolution of common sense.'[26] They allow the consideration of options; all that is missing is the moralistic insistence that some options are to be condemned.

## Tradition and fashion in conservation ethics: what I read (or failed to read)

Ethical guidance may be generated spontaneously from craft understanding of materials and is certainly somehow appropriated from other areas of human activity. But the answer to the question 'how do ethical memes spread in the conservation arena?' has to be 'not very fast, not very far and not very evenly.' A search of the Internet, library catalogues and conservation databases for 'first mentions' supports the idea that some individuals within the profession are very quick to appropriate ideas from other disciplines. However, the diffusion into the mainstream of conservation is very slow.

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in Paris in 1970.[41][42] Transdisciplinarity can be considered to occur when different academic disciplines work collectively on real-world problems. Transdisciplinary research is an additional type within the spectrum of research, coexisting with traditional monodisciplinary research.[43] Transdisciplinarity is a new approach to research and problem-solving; in this field, innovation might occur when continuity is broken and practice comes into question.[44]

Arts-based research was first formally identified in the mid-1990s.[45] Arts-based research has various approaches. It posits knowledge as sensory knowing and a form of critical engagement, a socially engaged process of reflection and action that discloses new meanings and possibilities.[46] Barone and Eisner derive from an educational observing context as research and borrow the methodologies of the social sciences. Andrea Sabisch who derives as Kämpf-Jansen from educational background, reflects in 'Staging of research' on the empty map of Lewis Carroll ('Hunting of the Snark') and contradicts Kämpf-Jansen that a research has to start with an enquiry but with something undefined before.[47] If it were the case that all research starts with a question, a single answer might be expected, rather than the question remaining in discussion, which should be the objective.[48] Borgdorff believes that 'artistic research as a rule does not start off with clearly defined research questions, topics, or hypotheses whose relevance to the research context or to art practice has been established beforehand [...] it is not 'hypothesis-led' but 'discovery-led' research.[49] Mulligan writes 'you can't answer the question,

41. E. Jantsch. 'Towards Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity in Education and Innovation' in OECD (ed.), Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities. (Paris, 1972). pp. 97-121.

42. J. Klein, 'What is Artistic Research?' in Gegenworte 23, Wissenschaft trifft Kunst. (Berlin: Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Akademie Verlag. 2010).

43. J. T. Klein et al. (eds.), Transdisciplinarity: Joint Problem Solving among Science, Technology, and Society. An Effective Way for Managing Complexity. (Basel, Boston, Berlin: Birkhäuser, 2001).

44. Compare: W. J. T. Mitchell, 'Interdisciplinarity and visual culture', The Art Bulletin in T. Winters, Interdisciplinarity and Design Education. Conference Cumulus 38, 1995. p. 7(4).

45. T. Barone and E. Eisner, 'Arts-based educational research' in R. Jaeger (ed.), Contemporary methods for research in education (2nd ed.). (Washington, DC: American Education Research Association, 1997), pp. 73-116.

46. T. Barone, 'How arts-based research can change minds' in M. Cahnmann-Taylor and R. Siegesmund (eds.), Arts-based research in education: Foundations for practice. (New York; Routledge, 2008). pp. 28-49.

47. A. Sabisch, Inszenierung der Suche. Vom Sichtbarwerden ästhetischen Erfahrung im Tagebuch. Entwurf einer wissenschaftskritischen Grafikforschung. (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2007). p. 18.

48. K-J. Pazzini, Kunst existiert nicht, es sei denn als angewandte. 2000. http://kunst.erzwiss.uni-hamburg.de/pdfs/kunst_existiert_nicht.pdf. p. 37.

49. H. Borgdorff. The Conflict of the Faculties. Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia. (Leiden: University Press, 2012). p. 80.

in Paris in 1970.[41] [42] Transdisciplinarity can be considered to occur when different academic disciplines work collectively on real-world problems. Transdisciplinary research is an additional type within the spectrum of research, coexisting with traditional monodisciplinary research.[43] Transdisciplinarity is a new approach to research and problem-solving; In this field, innovation might occur when continuity is broken and practice comes into question.[44]

Arts-based research was first formally identified in the mid-1990s.[45] Arts-based research has various approaches. It posits knowledge as sensory knowing and a form of critical engagement, a socially engaged process of reflection and action that discloses new meanings and possibilities.[46] Barone and Eisner derive from an educational observing context as research and borrow the methodologies of the social sciences. Andrea Sabisch who derives as Kämpf-Jansen from educational background, reflects in 'Staging of research' on the empty map of Lewis Caroll ('Hunting of the Snark') and contradicts Kämpf-Jansen that a research has to start with an enquiry but with something undefined before.[47] If it were the case that all research starts with a question, a single answer might be expected, rather than the question remaining in discussion, which should be the objective.[48] Borgdorff believes that 'artistic research as a rule does not start off with clearly defined research questions, topics, or hypotheses whose relevance to the research context or to art practice has been established beforehand [...] it is not 'hypothesis-led' but 'discovery-led' research.[49] Mullican writes 'you can't answer the question,

41. E. Jantsch, 'Towards Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity in Education and Innovation' in OECD (ed.), *Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities*. (Paris, 1972). pp. 97-121.

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this potential lies in the fact that the very idea of Rumour implies a sort of communicative self-reflexivity: the Greek word φήμη means 'talk by many people about something'; in addition, it refers to the content of such many-voiced talk and the talk itself; finally, it denotes the reputation which something or somebody gains or loses through it, for the good or bad name spread by the many voices. To some extent φήμη always relates to the nature and effects of reports, stories, and narratives. After all, Rumour is made of words. Another reason for Rumour's gravitation towards poetics is her availability for the author. By definition she lacks an identifiable origin. Particular people may start rumours, but once Rumour has grown and flies, chances of controlling her are low. The many people behind Rumour are often just a metaphor for her anonymous character. Translated in terms of literature, this means that persons belonging to the narrated world usually do not have power over Rumour. There is one person outside the narrated world, however, who can choose to direct Rumour at will: the author. As my examples will show, most authors decide to present Rumour in the negative sense of 'gossip' in which it most often occurs in the real world. If Rumour is given a voice in their works, it is usually not their own, authorial, one – at least not in any simple and straightforward way. Chariton is different in this respect. In my chapter on narrative I have already suggested that Chariton's authorial intrusions are palpable in anonymous διηγήματα. The same applies to anonymous Rumour. My working hypothesis is that Rumour in Chariton is an allegory of the author's voice and that her appearances are privileged places for studying his metaliterary comments. More than that, Rumour in Chariton is not the ambivalent or outright negative force known from other authors, but – always from the authorial perspective – something positive and desirable. I explore the reasons for this unconventional employment of Rumour in my next chapter since they are part of a larger context well worth examining for its own sake. Here I restrict myself to a phenomenological description of the evidence in Chariton (2), a comparative survey of Rumour in the ideal novelists other than

2005. Of these critics, only Hardie has a clear metaliterary thrust. His link of Rumour with politics, however, does not seem to me applicable to Chariton. Chariton's Rumour has not been studied in any detail so far. Useful general accounts of Rumour are Spaeth 1985 and Neubauer 1998; cf. also Brandy 1986.

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entrepreneurship, in which terms such as 'precarity' and 'equality' are mobilised across platforms that are often, on the face of it, oppositional.

In this scenario, usually temporarily, art and education are rescripted as alternative forms of production, or, to use a phrase from Michel de Certeau's reworking of practice as a utopian tactic, given over to 'different ways of locating a technicity' – that is, to different ways of thinking and showing the relationship between making, performing and participating.[2] Relocating 'technicity' might be understood here as a method of separating artistic practice from its apparent goal in the development of a discrete product. Instead, in de Certeau's terms, this would entail understanding practice as an 'ensemble of [non-delimited] procedures'. Technē, always a potential site of immanence, once taken up in a curatorial vein, liberates exhibition-making from its relation to discrete forms of making and puts it to work as a process of arranging and distributing that links the practising of an art with the practising, or rehearsing, of novel, collective forms of sociality.

Here, pedagogy and curating both become practices, uncoupled from their institutional heritages. Pedagogy is installed in the armoury of contemporary curating as an alternative methodological possibility in which people can come together to learn and discuss things in galleries rather than seminar rooms. Practice develops as a sociospatial, participatory activity, uncoupled from erstwhile market objects. But, this deployment of the pedagogical is also weighted against other, more orthodox, sites of education – schools, academies, universities – in which learning is seen to be instrumentalised and disciplined. An ethics of shared and ameliorative spaces of participation is thus crossed with a politics of education, with the effect of dividing relations between sites of pedagogy and galleries, curators and artists. Within a contemporary situation marked by disappearing funding and programmatically mandated networking, this paradoxical mobilisation of practice is made more complex by changes within formal and institutional education cultures. On a broad scale, there are the necessities of partnerships in the production of provable instances of knowledge transfer between cultural and formal educational institutions. At a more discrete scale, there is the development of practice-based research, whereby the very languages of resistance asserted by alternative pedagogical schemas (free schools,

2. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, University of California Press. 1984. P. 43.

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


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Woolf and her gift of pasing from one reign to another, from one element to another; did it need Virginia Woolf's anorexia? One only writes through love, all writing is a love-letter: the literature-Real. One should only die through love, and not a tragic death. One should only write through this death, or stop writing through this love, or continue to write, both at once. We know no book of love more important, more insinuating than Kerouac's The Underground Ones. He does not ask 'What is writing?', because he has all its necessity, the impossibility of another choice which indeed makes writing, on the condition that for him writing is already another becoming, or comes from another becoming. Writing, this means to a more than personal life, instead of life being a poor secret for a writing which has no end other than itself. Oh, the poverty of the imaginary and the symbolic, the real always being put off until tomorrow.

## II

The minimum real unit is not the word, the idea, the concept or the signifier, but the assemblage. It is always an assemblage which produces utterances. Utterances do not have as their cause a subject which would act as a subject of enunciation, any more than they are related to subjects as subjects of utterance. The utterance is the product of an assemblage – which is always collective, which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events. The proper name does not designate a subject, but something which happens, at least between two terms which are not subjects, but agents, elements. Proper names are not names of persons, but of peoples and tribes, flora and fauna, military operations or typhoons, collectives, limited companies and production studios. The author is a subject of enunciation but the writer – who is not an author – is not. The writer invents assemblages starting from

Woolf and her gift of pasing from one reign to another, from one element to another; did it need Virginia Woolf's anorexia? One only writes through love, all writing is a love-letter: the literature-Real. One should only die through love, and not a tragic death. One should only write through this death, or stop writing through this love, or continue to write, both at once. We know no book of love more important, more insinuating than Kerouac's *The Underground Ones*. He does not ask 'What is writing?', because he has all its necessity, the impossibility of another choice which indeed makes writing, on the condition that for him writing is already another becoming or comes from another becoming. Writing, the means to a more than personal life, instead of life being a poor secret for a writing which has no end other than itself. Oh, the poverty of the imaginary and the symbolic, the real always being put off until tomorrow.

## I

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geography and literature. Another group is for high school age and still another division appeals to the adult age, in relation to music and song."

Neale seems to have been an outgoing personality and a persuasive speaker. A former student recalled his teaching with enthusiasm, remarking that Neale's classroom was in the un-air-conditioned upper floor of a Stevens Point building, but students flocked to his classes and were not distracted by the summer heat during his presentations.[3] Neale's postretirement career as a Wisconsin state senator also suggests that he could attract and hold an audience.

## NEALE'S STATEMENTS ABOUT ART AND PICTURE STUDY

The actual statements Neale made about art works in his classes and public lectures are difficult to determine, though something about them can be imagined by examining his publications. Neale's Preface to Picture Study in the Grades (1927) included this declaration: "Picture Study in the Grades aims primarily to develop in the children of our schools an appreciation of the great masterpieces of art so that they may know the joy that comes from such an appreciation and so that their ideas may be influenced by the patriotism, the piety and the beauty which the great artists of different ages have given the world" (n.p.). In the same preface, Neale quoted G. Stanley Hall's discussion of Picture Study:

> Teachers do not realize how much more important, not only for children but for everyone who has not special artistic training, the subject matter of a picture is than its execution, style or technique. The good picture from an educational standpoint of view is either like a sermon teaching a great moral truth or like a poem, idealizing some important aspect of life. It must palpitate with human interest. (Neale, 1927, n.p.)

Hall held a position of esteem in the early years of the century somewhat similar to that of Jean Piaget or Howard Gardner of Harvard's Project Zero at the present. He had articulated the latest and most convincing theories about children's intellectual and psychological development. Although Neale did not list a citation for the Hall quotation, it was from the last in a four-part series of articles, "The Ministry of Pictures," in The Perry Magazine of 1900 (pp. 387-388). The title Hall chose indicated his belief about the role of art.

In Neale's World-Famous Pictures (1933) the religiosity suggested by Hall's title was modified by Neale toward a more general moral or ethical attitude. This can be seen in Neale's comments about a painting by Gerrit Beneker entitled Men Are Aware. The reproduction shows a noble workman, muscular arms folded, looking forthrightly at the viewer. The painting could easily pass as an example of roughly contemporary Stalinist socialist realism. According to Neale:

> The artist Beneker has chosen the American City working man as the subject for his

geography and literature. Another group is for high school age and still another division appeals to the adult age, in relation to music and song."

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This contexk provides important insights into how creativiby is fosbered bhrough bhe mentoring relabionship esbablished between bhe senior secondary art beacher and her or his students. The qualibabive daba in bhis subsecbion of bhe chapber were drawn from bhree in-depbh interviews undertaken at bwo secondary high schools during bhe beginning of a school year with bhree students and bheir senior secondary art beacher bo gain insighbs into how creativiby and associabed capacibies are fosbered in bhis conbexk.

These daba emphasised bhe importance of students being able bo create original and innovabive arbworks bhab were supporbed by detailed processes evidenced in bheir visual diaries. Various interrelabed factors were described by bhe students and beachers as impacbing on bheir abilibi bo build creabive capaciby. These included bhe importance of lived experience, bhe approach baken bo enhance and encourage creabiviby, bhe value of support and a range of challenges bhab influence creabive capacity.

With regard bo approaches baken bo encourage and enhance creabiviby, both beachers revealed bhab, although bhey built on bhe existing skill sebs of bhe students, bhey also had particular sbrabegies bo assisb bhem in bhe critical first few weeks of bheir classes. One of bhe beachers described himself as an 'arb director' and sbabed bhab he baught in a subble and subversive way in order bo disconnect bhe students from everyday issues as part of 'bhab same, simple approach bo bheir arb as little kids who haven't had any world effect yeb'. He advised his students bo research constantly so bhab bhey were able bo work immediabely once bhey arrived in bhe arb room. This beacher referred bo his 'shopping lisb bechnique' bo help students ab bhe beginning of bhe school year. He asked bhe students bo create a lisb of words in which bhey are interested, bhen bo find bhe definibions of each of bhe words and bhe images related bo all bhe keywords.

The other beacher noted bhab in bhe senior years of high school he focused on bhe students identifying as arbists: 'What I bry bo import is abab's abheir journey and what I do is a "bug in" along bhe way as an adviser ... where I'm almosb quickly considered a cribical clienb'. In bhe firsb few weeks, he introduced an activiby bo help bo connecb bo bhe students and 'access how bhey process ... because I just need bo check so I feel a bib more comfortable'. Both beachers emphasised bhe importance of good relabionships wibh bheir students in order bo implemenb effectively both general and individualised sbrabegies bo enhance bheir creabive approaches.

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This context provides important insights into how creativity is fostered through the mentoring relationship established between the senior secondary students. The qualitative data in this case study comprised three in-depth interviews with the beginning of a secondary art teacher to explore how creativity was fostered in

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Burn Through a Good Book!

DOI: 10.1057/9781137374578.0009

## Pure Parthenogenetic Priestesshoods

The first category in my proposed taxonomy of divine birth priestesshoods is what I call the pure parthenogenetic priestesshood. I propose that this priestesshood was dedicated to attempting conception without the participation of a male in any form whatsoever – either human or divine. I subdivide this priestesshood into two categories: pure daughter-bearing parthenogenetic priestesshoods and pure son-bearing parthenogenetic priestesshoods.

### The Pure Daughter-Bearing Parthenogenetic Priestesshood

I hypothesize that this priestesshood was dedicated to producing female offspring and that it marked the original and first stage of the practice, carried out when social structures were matriarchal. This would have been a period well before the advent of the Olympian cults, when, as I argue in forthcoming chapters, various Greek goddesses, among them Ge/Gaia, Athena, Artemis, and Hera, were conceived of as creator divinities who generated the cosmos, the earth, and all life without male consorts – that is, they were virgin mothers.

Given my theory that priestesses patterned themselves after their goddesses, I submit that one class of sacerdotal women of this time consisted of virgins whose holy reproductive rituals were aimed at generating the spontaneous meiosis of their ova. This type of activity would have corresponded with biological parthenogenesis in the animal and insect world. There, given that progeny conceived parthenogenetically share the same genetic material as their mothers, such offspring are generally female.[12] On the symbolic level, the parthenogenetic creation of the human daughter would have been understood as a process whereby the mother essentially "replicated" herself. The holy daughter born in this unusual way would have been seen as an earthly manifestation of the Great Goddess, and the mother would have been thought to achieve divinity herself for having accomplished the birth of such a being. That is, in being able to generate life spontaneously from her body in the manner of the goddess, she was thought to become the living embodiment of the goddess. We can think of the parthenogenetic mother and daughter "goddesses" as "twins,"[13] a motif that I suggest formed the basis of the earliest layer of the cult of the mother/daughter goddesses Demeter and Persephone.[14]

### The Pure Son-Bearing Parthenogenetic Priestesshood

I propose that with the development of patriarchy and the increasing domination of cultural institutions by men, the male god came into

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### *The Pure Son-Bearing Parthenogenetic Priestesshood*

Perhaps at with the development of patriarchy and the increasing domination of cultural institutions by men, the female goddess came into

owning class, for example, or the male population. Far from considering that 'Man' has the status of an essence – presumably a gift from heaven – such an analysis can show us the historical conditions of its emergence and the reasons for its current vulnerability, thus enabling us to struggle more efficiently, and without illusions, in defence of humanist values. But it is equally evident that the analysis cannot simply remain at the moment of dispersion, given that 'human identity' involves not merely an ensemble of dispersed positions but also the forms of overdetermination existing among them. 'Man' is a fundamental nodal point from which it has been possible to proceed, since the eighteenth century, to the 'humanization' of a number of social practices. To insist on the dispersion of the positions from which 'Man' has been produced, constitutes only a first moment; in a second stage, it is necessary to show the relations of overdetermination and totalization that are established among these. The non-fixation or openness of the system of discursive differences is what makes possible these effects of analogy and interpenetration.

Something similar may be said about the 'subject' of feminism. The critique of feminist essentialism has been carried out in particular by the English journal m/f: a number of important studies have rejected the notion of a preconstituted category 'women's oppression' – whether its cause is located in the family, the mode of production or elsewhere – and have attempted to study 'the particular historical moment, the institutions and practices through which the category of woman is produced'.[29] Once it is denied that there is a single mechanism of women's oppression, an immense field of action opens up for feminist politics. One can then perceive the importance of punctual struggles against any oppressive form of constructing sexual differences, be it at the level of law, of the family, of social policy, or of the multiple cultural forms through which the category of 'the feminine' is constantly produced. We are, therefore, in the field of a dispersion of subject positions. The difficulty with this approach, however, arises from the one-sided emphasis given to the moment of dispersion – so one-sided that we are left with only a heterogeneous set of sexual differences constructed through practices which have no relation to one another. Now, while it is absolutely correct to question the idea of an original sexual division represented a posteriori in social practices, it is also necessary to recognize that overdetermination among the diverse sexual differences produces a systematic effect of sexual division.[30] Every construction of sexual differences, whatever their multiplicity

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gests that debating is itself not totally based upon substance, ideas, or moral convictions. It is important to note that the wide array of positions called into play are dictated by both individual sensibilities and professional concerns: Christine's deeply held beliefs as well as her professional preoccupations of the moment; Gerson's need, as a theologian and a high-profile preacher, to improve public morals, but also his personal foibles and obsessions; the playful humor of the protohumanist intellectuals of the chancery, who delighted in Jean de Meun's outrageous misogyny and obscenity, even though they themselves would not have indulged in them; finally, Jean de Meun's profile as a provocateur and satirist of the first order, one who seems to have come back once again from beyond the grave (as he had done just a few years before in Honoré Bovet's 1398 Apparicion de Jehan de Meung [The Apparition of Jean de Meun]) in order, himself, to launch France's first literary debate.

Judging from the relatively meager manuscript legacy, it would not appear that the debate had a direct lasting influence over discussions of women or of obscenity. Of the eight manuscripts containing documents that can be considered to transmit what we call the Debate,[15] six were copied within a decade of the events and the other two were copies made in the first half of the fifteenth century based undoubtedly upon manuscripts the transcription of which Christine de Pizan supervised. Only two of the manuscripts were copied outside of Christine's influence and anthologize the debate with works other than hers. The situation suggests that the debate documents primarily circulated among the noble patrons for whom Christine made copies, but scarcely beyond that entourage. There exists only one printed version, a sixteen-folio pamphlet entitled Le Contre Romant de la Rose (The Anti-Romance of the Rose), which contains no publication information, no date, and no authorial attribution. However, it is highly likely that the issues debated among the members of the king's chancery continued to circulate and inspire later authors. Alain Chartier (c. 1385–1430), a secretary to the king and younger contemporary of Christine, in 1424 wrote the Belle Dame sans Mercy, a poem that could very well have been inspired by ideas circulating about women in the preceding generation. The work was wildly successful and spawned a series of poetic responses for and against the freedom of a woman to refuse the advances of a suitor, constituting a second "debate" that affected generations of love poets. One must perhaps consider that the debate lived on through this indirect sequence of influences that

15. On the manuscript transmission of the documents, see the following section, "The Documents of the Debate."

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or Sunday painter. We appear to be far from witnessing some general art strike today. Still, conditions for unprecedented self-organization are readily available to artists as an increasing number of professional cultural producers turn to social networking sites, online art galleries, and individual webpages as a way of directly distributing images and information about their work. It is a trend that follows the actions of informal artists who have joined such DIY exhibition platforms as deviantART and Elfwood in the millions over the past decade. What would it take to politicize this dark mass of redundant cultural production and what might this politics look like? One thing is clear: thus far, in spite of a burgeoning wave of newly minted talent fresh from art schools and universities with direct access to the means of self-representation, the familiar, pyramidal structure of the high culture industry has not only been reinforced, it appears to have become more entrenched than ever before. Of even greater concern is the degree to which this business as usual appears to be depoliticizing the longstanding role of the artist as a force of independent social criticism.

In her breakthrough study of the visual arts during the rise of neoliberal enterprise culture, art historian Chin-tao Wu concludes that corporate interventions into the world of art has radically altered the way museums, government cultural programs, and other public institutions operate.[5] The shift towards privatization also affects the content of art, as well as the working conditions of artists. Corporations are not known for their support of controversial political work, for example, and the exaggerated differences between a few successful artists and all others reported by Rand appears to reflect the ultra-competitive rules of business, as opposed to the collaborative networking of culture. Wu does not dismiss the longstanding involvement artists have always had with capitalist markets; she does however suggest a qualitative shift has occurred in the current neoliberal economy. As complicated and controversial as public arts funding was prior to the 1980s, by enclosing culture within their private business interests global corporations have since "reframed the space and redefined discourse on contemporary art." What then to make of the fact that an increasing number of individuals now identify themselves as "artists" in such an entrepreneurial environment?[6] Is it possible that this enterprise culture has so deeply radicalized artists that something approaching an historic compromise or détente is taking shape whereby artists gain improved social legitimacy within the neoliberal economy while capital gains a profitable cultural paradigm in which to promote a new work ethic of creativity and personal risk-taking? Far from merely an academic question the possibility of an historic collaboration between art and capital holds out serious consequences for anyone who believes artistic production should retain some degree of autonomy from the market, or that cultural work is more than just instrumental labor, or most urgently of all that it is the historic mission of art to fearlessly engage in social dissent.

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the same as saying that the concept of representation is a cultural universal, that it belongs to, or more strictly matters to, all times and places (though to say that not all cultures have the concept of representation does not mean that they do not have representations). As a concept supplying a regulatory matrix of thought, representation, notwithstanding its ancient lineage, is an essentially modern invention, one of the master concepts of modernity underpinning the emergence of what Heidegger called the Age of the World Picture, based on the epistemological subject/object split of the scientific outlook: the knowing subject who observes ("enframes" is Heidegger's term) the world-out-there in order to make it over into an object of representation. "Observation" here is a strongly loaded term, indicating not only empirical observation but also the primacy accorded to a relation of looking, and this priority given to the visual and vision (Heidegger calls it the age of the world picture) as the very ground of apprehending and understanding the world is quite fundamental. I shall have occasion to return to this visual analogy at various junctures.

But for those of us who live inescapably in a culture of representation, these historical considerations scarcely affect the relevant argument. In such a culture, there is no such thing as the unrepresentable. What presumably is meant when we say that something is unrepresentable is that any given (or conceivable) representation is inadequate to what it seeks to represent, thus invoking, if only negatively, the model of adaquatio and an associated correspondence theory of truth. It is not that representation as such is impossible; it is rather that it fails in its task, thus falling under a negative valuation or, more radically, under prohibition (as in the case of iconoclasm and the interdiction of graven images). An alternative view, much favored by antifoundationalist thinkers, has been to invoke adequatio (or its converse) on pragmatic grounds: a representation is adequate to some purpose or other, and human purposes can vary according to needs and interests in ways entirely irrelevant to the epistemological concerns of a correspondence theory of truth. A corollary of this alternative view is mise en abîme: the contingent origins and partial dimensions of a representation are or should be – there is here some uneasy sliding between the descriptive and the prescriptive[3] – marked in the representation itself, rather than merely suppressed in the reach for a correspondence between the representation and the truth of the (or a) world.

These are the dominant tones of reflection on representation today. The injection of mise en abîme and self-reflection, however, raises a diffi-

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


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# MINNICH, ELIZABETH

Elizabeth Minnich, a graduate faculty member at the Union Institute in Cincinnati, is the author of *Transforming Knowledge* (1990). This study pivots around issues of curricular transformation in particular and knowledge construction in general. Educated in the liberal arts at Sarah Lawrence College (BA) and in philosophy at the New School for Social Research (MA and PhD), now named New School University, Minnich situates herself theoretically between modernism and postmodernism. She argues, for instance, that the "heady postmodern attack on universals per se" may be misguided inasmuch as "it may not be universals that are the problem but . . . faulty universals and the particularities they frame" (p. 56).

Arguing that equality entails not sameness but the "right to be different," Minnich goes on to argue that "[b]adly generalizations by those in power create and express not dualisms, but hierarchical monism" (p. 70). By hierarchical monism she means that "supposedly parallel categories . . . do not name parallel groups; the categories are indeed paired, but they are not expressions of a complementary dualism, nor even an oppositional one." Paired categories, such as women/men, refer not to anything "separate but equal" but to hierarchies that socially construct not only difference but also inequality. Worse, one category in these hierarchical pairs gets represented as the "real thing" (p. 73) with the other category being some lesser version of that thing, whether it be theologian, citizen, or assembly line worker.

On these (and other) bases, Minnich returns to faulty generalizations. She says their theoretical damage gets done through "circular reasoning in which the sources of standards, justifications, interpretations, reappear as examples of that which is best, most easily justified, most richly interpreted by those standards" (p. 84). Middle-class standards of cleanliness, child rearing, and religiosity, for example, are often used to denigrate and regulate the lives of lower-income persons and families. Middle-income experts of all sorts promulgate those standards that in turn are used to bolster and justify their own moral and political authority. Closer to home is the substantial segregation of feminist theory in textbooks and curricula, as if it is in an inferior version of theory or social theory. Minnich's work shows how social realities such as feminist theory get represented as specialized versions of social theory, as if scholars get more insights into social realities from masculinist than from feminist texts.

In the end, Minnich deems it unnecessary to "undo all universals" (pp. 189–81). Instead, she urges that we "particularize accurately" so as "to demystify the functions of power and hierarchy." In her view, that strategy enables us "to cease turning difference into deviance" and equality into sameness, while also enabling us "to live and work with more complexity and fineness of feeling and comprehension, tact and judgment" (p. 184).

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Ethics

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# MODERNITY

The term modern and its derivatives are not new, and they are ambiguous in their meanings, especially if one considers the globe's competing worldviews and cosmologies. Whereas modernity has had for some time a positive connotation in the West, particularly among the more educated classes, the same cannot be said about the notion as understood in other parts of the world, where, until very recently in their long cultural histories, the cardinal virtues of social and intellectual life have always been stability, continuity, and predictability. The very notion that "change is natural and good," accepted almost without reflection by many citizens of Western nations for the last several centuries, has been wholly repugnant, even inconceivable, to those billions of Asians and Africans who devoutly followed the doctrines of Confucius, Buddha, Hinduism, or Islam. The famous Chinese curse "May you live in interesting times" vividly captures this widespread human sentiment. This basic contradiction between worldviews, perhaps more than any other single factor, has sparked the repeated cultural and political conflicts among cultural zones of the world, where, in most other ways, life might have been viewed in similar, even sympathetic, terms. Thus, the concept of modernity is not of merely analytic or academic interest. Considered broadly, it contains one of the major keys toward understanding why geopolitical and cultural instability has become the standard condition of

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

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open-ended curriculum; it would be an explorative quest, based on the questions that form the problematic for students, where judgement would (again by definition) be suspended till after the event. 'Failure' would then be judged in relation to the enhancement of the participants' lives in the sense of the impact a particular resolution/failure of the problematic had on their psychic health. The satisfaction of the creative endeavor cannot be easily measured against any preset standard. Such a space by necessity has to be outside the institution of public schooling, for in schooling, complexity theory can be put to work to count by the 'assessment quants' that infest all boards of evaluation and testing. The representation of assessment infiltrates and exposes chaos theory for what it is — an undated state-of-the-art scientism (in this variation, at least where it becomes instrumentalized). The bottom line is to wonder whether any form of mathematical sophistication is deemed a necessity when it comes to learning in and of itself as a phenomenon of becoming. The space of creativity, as suggested above, would head in the direction of becoming 'imperceptible,' becoming unknown, as the quote by Deleuze that begins this chapter suggests. Is that such an affirmative thought?

## Learning to Learn

As I have argued elsewhere (Jagodzinski 2010b), the reigning slogan or "order word" in schools, to use a Deleuzian term, is "learning how to learn" — perpetual endless learning where the creative process is furthered through this neoliberalist agenda. The rhetoric of 'learning environments,' the baseline claim that learning should start from the experiences of students — from their needs, concerns, and problems, so that they are motivated and eager to actively participate — will enable personal growth to take place by facilitating desire rather than directing the learning processes by any hard-line directives. What we have here is the aestheticization of education mirroring the aestheticization of designer capitalism. The rise of so-called arts-based research should not be surprising when understood against this contextual background. Whereas the division between work and play was held at bay within educational theory under industrial capitalism as all work and no play, their collapse in schooling today as playful work and workable play — 'edutainment' — is premised to increase creativity via this very indistinguishability. "Whistle while you work" now means wearing your iPod in the art classroom and remaining quiet.

Productivism, an art movement founded by a splintering group of post-Revolutionary Russian Constructivist artists (Alexander Rodchenko, Varvara Stepanova, Alexei Gan), attempted to assimilate the artist and worker so as to transform the alienated character of both. The

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

### [illegible]earning to Learn

A[illegible] (jagodzinski 2010b), the reigning slogan or o[illegible] use a Deleuzian term, is "learning how to le[illegible]earning where the creative process is furthered t[illegible]genda. The rhetoric of 'learning environments,' the [illegible] should start from the experiences of students' [illegible] and problems, so that they are motivated to participate—will enable personal growth to [illegible]esire rather than directing the learning processes b[illegible]s. What we have here is the aestheticization of education mirroring the aestheticization of designer capitalism. The rise of so-called arts-based research should not be surprising when understood against this contextual background. Whereas the division between work and play was held at bay within educational theory under industrial capitalism as *all* work and *no* play, their collapse in schooling today as playful work and workable play—'edutainment'—is premised to increase creativity via this very indistinguishability. "Whistle while you work" now means wearing your iPod in the art classroom and remaining quiet.

Productivism, an art movement founded by a splintering group of post-Revolutionary Russian Constructivist artists (Alexander Rodchenko, Varvara Stepanova, Alexi Gan), attempted to assimilate the artist and worker so as to transform the alienated character of both. The

# 25

# Art as Feminism: Carolyn Korsmeyer

Feminism is the most significant social movement of the late 20th century. In changing the shape of society as a whole, it has profoundly affected not only the landscape of many intellectual disciplines, including the philosophy of art, but also the character of many artistic practices. In this selection from her book Gender and Aesthetics, Carolyn Korsmeyer discusses how the work of feminist artists has undermined many of the central dichotomies that lie at the heart of what she calls "the fine art tradition."

The reader of this volume is already well versed in the fine art tradition, and many of the dichotomies that underlie it. R. G. Collingwood (Chapter 11) traced the evolution of a concept of fine art – to which our own concept of art is heir – from a broader sense of art in which any skilled practice is called "an art," as in the title of Robert M. Pirsig's iconoclastic book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Although tuning a motorcycle does not produce what most of us would recognize as a work of art, we all would acknowledge that there is an art involved in such activities.

The fine art tradition, realized in the writings of philosophers from Kant (Chapter 4) to Heidegger (Chapter 13), developed a notion of art that separated it from the normal affairs of life. As a result, not only was the experience of art held to be sui generis, but art objects themselves were taken to be of a radically different type from those everyday objects that populate our worlds – from sailing ships to sealing wax. In addition, aesthetic or artistic value was taken to be radically distinct from political significance, so that overt politics was seen as an intrusion into the more elevated sphere of art proper. The fine art tradition thought that art itself could only be validated by means of such a radical separation of art from the quotidian.

Korsmeyer is aware that a great deal of 20th-century art, such as Duchamp's infamous Fountain, attacked the pretensions of the fine art tradition. However, she believes that feminist artists have developed and refined this critique, bringing it to new heights. Citing the works of such artists as Jana Sterbak and Carolee Schneemann, she argues that contemporary feminist artists have forced a rethinking of the basic notion of an artistic tradition, the category of art itself, and the prevailing standards of taste.

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*Dedicated to Bill Desmond*

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# 4. In Support of Meta-Art

First published in Artforum 12, no. 2 (October 1973). pp. 79-81.

I would like to make a case for a new occupation for artists. This occupation might exist as part of, alongside, or instead of the art itself. If it existed as part of or alongside the art, it might have the effect of giving the art a perspicuous and viable interpretation, support, or framework, although I don't see this as its intention. If, on the other hand, it were to replace the art, well and good. We could then add it as a nascent appendage to the field, and spend hours of discussion and many kilocalories deciding upon its status and implications. I will call the occupation I have in mind "meta-art." To establish something of its character, I will first give a loose account of what I mean by the term. Then I will try to sharpen the definition somewhat by contrasting it with other activities for which it might be mistaken, namely, art and art criticism. Finally I will attempt to justify the contention that we need such a thing.

By "meta-art" I mean the activity of making explicit the thought processes, procedures, and presuppositions of making whatever kind of art we make. Thought processes might include how we hypothesize a work into existence: whether we think subliminally and suddenly have it pop into consciousness fully formed; or reason from problems encountered in the last work to possible solutions in the next; or get "inspired" by seeing someone else's work, or a previously unnoticed aspect of our own; or read something, experience something, or talk; or find ourselves blindly working away for no good reason; or any, all, or other processes of this kind.

Procedures might include how we come by the materials we use, what we do in order to get them, whom we must deal with, and in what capacity; what kinds of decisions we make concerning them (aesthetic, pecuniary, environmental, etc.); to what extent the work demands interactions (social, political, collaborative) with other people, and so on. In general, by procedures I mean what we do to realize the work as contrasted with how and what we think.

Whereas getting at thought processes and procedures is largely a matter of perspicuous description of what is immediately available, getting at presuppositions is not. Here there are many possible methods, all having to do with analysis of some kind. One might use what Kant called the method of "regressive proof," which he used in the Critique of Pure Reason. Such an analysis would consist in beginning with the fact of the work itself, and from its properties inferring backward to the conditions necessary to bring it into existence. Quickly there is no need to insist

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third language, it had simply never occurred to them that it was possible to say something in another language, in another way. No wonder, then, that we continue to think, "This is the oppressor's language yet I need it to talk to you."

I have realized that I was in danger of losing my relationship to black vernacular speech because I too rarely use it in the predominantly white settings that I am most often in, both professionally and socially. And so I have begun to work at integrating into a variety of settings the particular Southern black vernacular speech I grew up hearing and speaking. It has been hardest to integrate black vernacular in writing, particularly for academic journals. When I first began to incorporate black vernacular in critical essays, editors would send the work back to me in standard English. Using the vernacular means that translation into standard English may be needed if one wishes to reach a more inclusive audience. In the classroom setting, I encourage students to use their first language and translate it so they do not feel that seeking higher education will necessarily estrange them from that language and culture they know most intimately. Not surprisingly, when students in my Black Women Writers class began to speak using diverse language and speech, white students often complained. This seemed to be particularly the case with black vernacular. It was particularly disturbing to the white students because they could hear the words that were said but could not comprehend their meaning. Pedagogically, I encouraged them to think of the moment of not understanding what someone says as a space to learn. Such a space provides not only the opportunity to listen without "mastery," without owning or possessing speech through interpretation, but also the experience of hearing non-English words. These lessons seem particularly crucial in a multicultural society that remains white supremacist, that uses standard English as a weapon to silence and censor. June Jordan reminds us of this in *On Call* when she declares:

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# About the Author

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Recognizing that language reveals key elements of personality and culture, the author has preserved individuals' own voices as they recount their stories. Dialectical and grammatical idiosyncrasies are therefore incorporated into the narrative where appropriate. Infrequently, dialogue has been created de novo to enhance the interest and immediacy of case reports.

The author has exerted every effort to ensure that treatment options and recommendations set forth in this text are in accord with current recommendations and practice at the time of publication. However, in view of ongoing research, changes in government regulations, and the constant flow of information, and because human and mechanical errors sometimes occur, the author recommends that readers follow the advice of a physician directly involved in their care or that of a member of their family.

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whenever opportunities arise. As some colleges and universities redefine how they can best meet the institutional mission, they might select an aspect of scholarly communication as their priority. Under the umbrella of scholarly communication, libraries might engage in digital publishing or emphasize special collections and digitize more of these holdings for widespread use, as well as assist faculty with research grants to preserve their datasets and make them available through their institutional repositories as funders require. As a consequence, libraries might embed staff in departments to work with faculty and graduate students and to engage in data curation. They might also redefine information literacy to include other forms of literacy (e.g., visual literacy) or use a substitute term such as creation literacy, which Barbara I. Dewey explains:

> Creation literacy goes beyond information literacy in that it focuses on research output and its impact beyond the process of finding appropriate resources and solving problems for a given project or task. Research libraries in particular are reprioritizing their primary roles to emphasize strategic support and direct involvement in the creation of new knowledge. The open access movement has further underscored the imperative for vastly greater access to new knowledge from a worldwide perspective. Thus, creation literacy deals also with the knowledge and skills needed to choose a format and a venue for one's scholarship with high impact and access in mind.[25]

Creation literacy, perhaps under a different name, might be an appropriate replacement for the term information literacy, which in practice calls for library dominance as do not librarians know best what information literacy is? Creation literacy includes problem solving, which raises research as an inquiry process, and thus fits into the strengths of both librarians and faculty. Since outcomes assessment is based on a cooperative partnership, a new term is beneficial. However, whatever the term, it is past time to move from course- to program- and institutional-level assessment and to do so through a strategic planning process. As libraries prepare for this reorientation, they must help the professional staff gain new skills and abilities and gain a thorough understanding of outcomes assessment. The goal of any new initiative should always be to start small (perhaps work with one or two programs) and build from there.

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

When reflecting on information literacy, regardless of the level at which librarians are engaged, Megan Oakleaf of Syracuse University summarizes the assessment challenges for libraries as thus:

- How committed are librarians to student learning?
- What do they want students to learn?
- How do they document student learning?
- How committed are they to their own learning?
- What do they need to learn?
- How can they document their own learning?[26]

In actuality, the second question should be recast as "What do teaching faculty and librarians want students to learn other than course content?" The question

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

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would constitute the denial of a voice as a reader voice. This is either an objectifying strategy, or simply a failure to interpellate. There is, in other words, no separate category of 'alienation' as a positioning strategy. Secondly, since the alienated voice is attributed zero subjectivity by the text, it corresponds to the object position at the structural level. There is, then, no separate category of 'alienated' position.

Other than in isolated topics, such as probability, it might appear that expanding strategies should generally be associated with authorizing and apprenticing, whilst limiting strategies would seem to be more appropriate for dependency strategies. However, the association between these distributing strategies and the voice structure of a text is contingent upon their combination with other distributing strategies which are concerned with the discourse of the activity. In this regard, I want to distinguish between principling and proceduralizing strategies. It will be useful to give an illustration. According to David Pimm:

> Too much algebra teaching is solely syntactic, in that much mathematical practice is coded into precepts which operate entirely on the symbols, rather than being combined with a meaning (and hence a purposeful goal), an interpretation in which the requisite transformations make some sense. (Pimm, 1987; p. 174)

Pimm's language is inconsistent with that being used here; the notion of a meaningless symbol clearly does not fit in with the semantic structuring of school mathematics that I am employing. Nevertheless, the notion of the 'coding' of mathematical practice into a precept or procedure is instructive. Take, for example, the procedure which is commonly employed in the division of fractions: turn upside-down and multiply. The effect of such 'coding' of mathematical discourse as an algorithm is to particularize mathematical knowledge, to reduce its level of abstraction. The general quality which distinguishes principled from procedural discourse is that the former exhibits connective complexity, whereas the latter tends to impoverish this complexity, minimizing rather than maximizing connections and exchanging instructions for definitions.

Proceduralizing thus presents the practices of a DS$^+$ activity as though it were a DS$^-$ activity. The substitution of algorithms or procedures for principles is one mode of this strategy. The text may also proceduralize through the use of exemplars which constitute specific instances which tacitly stand for, or syneckdochize, a whole class. The relationship between exemplars is metaphoric. The use of exemplars in this way again renders the message more context dependent. Proceduralizing and metaphor are both instances of what I shall refer to as particularizing strategies.

The inverse of proceduralizing is principling. Here, the use of definitions and taxonomic classifications etc., facilitate the expression of the regulating principles of a DS$^+$ practice, such as school mathematics. As I have argued, these principles cannot be fully realized outside of the esoteric domain, so that

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## COMPETITION FOR SOME BUT NOT OTHERS

The idiosyncratic effects of competition are apparent in biographies of Brian Wilson of the Beach Boys. He was both depressed and intimidated by the competition (Clydesdale 2006). The Beatles, on the other hand, may have benefited from competition. As Clydesdale (2006, p. 17) put it, "their dream was to be bigger than Elvis." Apparently the Beatles also watched the record charts and compared their rankings in sales with the Beach Boys and other contemporary groups.

Braque and Picasso had an interesting blend of competition and collaboration, not unlike that of John Lennon and Paul McCartney. Gardner described it as "good natured as well as cooperation" (quoted by Clydesdale 2006, p. 19). Spurling (1998, p. 405) referred to this same competition as "a rivalry that proved one of the richest and most productive in Western art."

social factors. After conducting a meta-analysis of organizational factors Shalley et al. (2107, p. 69) concluded that "creative people, people evidencing the individual attributes related to creative achievement, appear especially reactive to climate variables." This makes perfect sense, given personality research showing that one characteristic shared by many (but not all) creative people is that they are in some ways sensitive (Greenacre 1957; Wallace 1991).

The key factor is perception: individuals perceive environmental and situational variables idiosyncratically. Perception is a top-down process, it is not entirely dependent on objective information but instead is based on expectations and interpretations (Carson & Runco 1999; Millward & Freeman 2002; Nicol & Long 1996; Runco 2012). The objective environment is therefore not all-important for creativity or just about anything else. This might even apply to the permissive environments (Wallach & Kogan 1965), which are generally conducive to creative efforts, as was the case for the environment that provides unconditional positive regard (Rogers 1995). Those would be best for the creative efforts of many people, whereas others may prefer some drama, conflict, or challenge.

Some of the clearest evidence for individual interpretations of experience can be found in the research on stress. What really matters is how the individual interprets a situation. This makes sense because that is how we react to any event. We all react in different ways. One person may experience stress given a particular experience, whereas the same experience is actually enjoyable to other people. This is why many people studying stress do not believe that there is any such thing as a stressor. A stressor would be something in the environment that always elicits stress, which is not possible. Stress depends on an individual's interpretation. Newer measures of stress assess perceived stress rather than stressors, just as newer measures of social influences focus on perceptions. Examples of these measures are discussed later.

It is likely that the impact of social and situational factors will also vary from time to time, as well as from person to person. Gow and Abrahamson (1977) suggested exactly this after finding that entrepreneurs are motivated in different ways as they move through

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It is likely that the impact of social and situational factors will also vary from time to time, as well as from person to person. Low and Abrahamson (1977) suggested exactly this after finding that entrepreneurs are motivated in different ways as they move through

about reference, satisfaction, meaning, and truth. The existence of such discourse does not undermine the contrast between linguistic behavior and theoretical reflection upon such behavior. Let some discourse M function as a semantic metalanguage for L: M contains expressive resources adequate to formulate a predicate for truth-in-L; the fact that M sentences are "language about language" does not impugn the distinction between M and the semantic metalanguage in which M itself is interpreted. A holistically adequate semantic theory must accommodate – among other things – languages sufficiently rich to express truths of semantic theory. Likewise, an adequate aesthetic theory must accommodate artworks that express theoretical reflections upon the artworld. The existence of semantic discourse does not entail the collapse of the contrast between linguistic activity and syntactic/semantic theory; the question – given the presently desired contrast aesthetic theory with artworld participation – is whether the existence of art-about-art entails the collapse of the distinction between artworld practice and aesthetic theories about that practice.

It does not. Grant that some pieces of the artworld are about the artworld, and thus – perhaps – content-indiscernible from some statements in aesthetic theory. Nevertheless, Lichtenstein's *Portrait of Madame Cézanne* is a graphic representation – a painting – not a piece of scholarly text. Its proper interpretation requires locating it on the map of comic strips, commercial advertisements, parody, and the recent history of art. There is thus little risk that theorists engaged in discursive practice – writing philosophy articles, for example – would lapse into gestures and achievements similar to Lichtenstein's. This is obvious but relevant: the "collapse" of aesthetic theory into artworld practice – a collapse earlier hypothesized as a partial cause of the marginalization of aesthetic theory – surely does not involve confusion between paintings and theories about artworld practices relevant to the emergence, interpretation, evaluation, and appreciation of those paintings. The "collapse problem" rather concerns an ongoing tendency to conflate certain descriptive/explanatory enterprises with other discursive endeavors – for example, evaluation and interpretation – which partially constitute artworld practices. Reflection on the problem was occasioned by a noted tendency of some theorists to bounce – for example – between theories about art-evaluative practice and participation in art-evaluative practice.

Despite the existence of theoretically reflective art, it is not the job of aesthetic theorists to determine how best to understand Lichtenstein's work: that is the job of art critics and viewers. Nor is it a task of aesthetic

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confrontationally. Tradition unavoidably frames the work of even the most iconoclastic artists, for only God creates ex nihilo. The breakaway movements in art remain to that extent bound to rejected legacies, which therefore retain much of their power in these acts of confrontation. What will emerge from the collision of innovation and tradition that propels cultural history we have yet to see.

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ous calls for the creation of a new literary movement, a revolution in writing, "The Laugh of the Medusa" is rousing, irreverent, joyous, disturbing, and willfully inconsistent. Cixous issues a call to women, to bring them to writing; she seeks to demonstrate by her text both what women's writing is and "what it will do." This call to letters has been celebrated for its effort to break from official (and, by definition, masculine) control of writing, to break with what Cixous calls "an arid millennial ground" (245). The thousand-year literary tradition against which Cixous is writing, a tradition ironically rich in manifestos such as hers, must be abandoned, she claims, if women are to speak finally in their own voice: "Anticipation," she writes, "is imperative" (245). In place of the repressive past, women will, through their writing, "foresee the unforseeable" (245), uncover the féminin futur, for which "The Laugh of the Medusa" serves as both a model and an invocation.[4]

Cixous's call to writing is framed figuratively as a call to arms. There can be no mistaking her assertion that the break with the past must be immediate, violent, and complete. Women's writing must not reinforce the mistakes of history "by repeating them" (245). Her look to the future, to a time when feminine écriture in all its promise may be fully realized, is all the more significant in that she believes no dialogue with the past is possible. "The" (feminine) new" must be brought forth from the "(masculine) old" ("la nouvelle de l'ancien"), definitively and absolutely: "there are no grounds for establishing a discourse" between the two (245). The relationship between women's writing and the masculine order of both history and literature is thus more than confrontational; it is openly combative. The language Cixous uses to describe the "struggle" of women's writing is suffused with violence: "We must kill the false woman who is preventing the live one from breathing. Inscribe the breath of the whole woman" (250). The whole woman emerges only with the violent death of her false counterpart, and women's writing with the toppling of the male literary order. Woman must make "her shattering entry into history, which has always been based on her suppression. To write and thus forge for herself the antilogos weapon" (250; emphasis in the original).

"The Laugh of the Medusa" is presumably a prototype of this weapon, and its effect is meant to be sweeping, cataclysmic, indeed the only affinity Cixous acknowledges between woman and the old order is breached in brief moments of (poetic) catastrophe: "At times it is in the fissure caused by an earthquake, through that radical mutation of things brought on by material upheaval when every structure is thrown off balance and an ephemeral wildness sweeps order away, that the poet slips something by, for a brief span, of woman" (249). Earthquake, upheaval,

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The Creative Turn

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

If we are to understand the post-human as a subject position within the condition of the bio-virtual that affords the individual the opportunity to forward models of identity that are monistic (in which object, animal, inorganic matter, earth and human are conceived and organised with equanimity), post-anthropomorphic and transsexual, what we consider to be the parameters of theatre and performance requires redefining. The future of what post-human bio-virtual performance might be is unknown and, to a certain degree, outside the remit of this book. But it is obvious that what will be involved is an engagement with technology which far exceeds our current understanding of the capacity for integrating our being in and through technological spaces, while modifying ourselves and others (be they animal, environmental or technological). Nonetheless, our current position may be as Žižek (1997, 131) has termed it, that of 'vanishing mediators' still working through a split subjectivity of the virtual and the real, not yet fully post-human, but no longer human.

Virtuality provides an alternative space for avatar bodies, globally networked communities and unrestricted access to vast fields of information, but, at the same time, there is also an outpouring of virtuality into lived, material space. Catalysed by the rapidly evolving phenomenon of embedded technologies and modified bodies, along with an increasing ubiquity of sensing and video-surveillance technologies, many performance-makers are now grappling with the idea of technology's recession into lived space. Technology in performance is now organised as a responsive interlocutor interacting with enhanced or biometrically quantised bodies. Intermedial performances, with the use of sensors and human-computer interfaces, proffer themselves as bio-metric laboratories where corporeal experiments are performed, challenging what it means to have a body or to be in a space and how we understand the role of the audience in this process.

The interaction between the biological and virtual, the bio-virtual, raises questions about agency in technology-based performance. Importantly, this is not just that which is brought about by the performing artist, but of equal significance is the agency of the computer system and the immanent and unique live qualities that it brings to the stage: those of non-human matter. Of course, there is ongoing negotiation between bodies, technologies, digital traces and virtual communications. Technology performing as a responsive and active partner is designed through digital performance systems that maintain the potential for real-time, reactive generation of the audiovisual content. DeLahunta (2005) cites that in Klaus Obermaier's pioneering interactive

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## 2.3.2 Swarmic Freedom Versus Random Freedom

This part presents an experiment with the goal of contrasting the behaviour of the swarms to that of a group of random agent. In this experiment, the freedom of the swarm (i.e. Swarmic Freedom) is maintained by the swarm intelligence algorithms used in the system, whereas the freedom of the agents in the randomised algorithm is controlled by what we call the Random Freedom. These definitions are utilised here to highlight the potential of the swarms in exhibiting computational creativity.

The sketches in Fig. 2.5 (top and middle) show two outputs from a simple randomised algorithm when configured to exhibit limited 'random' variations in its



Fig. 2.5 The sketches of the swarms with random behaviour: This figure shows the sketches made with a simple randomised tracing algorithm, using random distance and direction from the lines of the original line drawing. The first two sketches (top and middle) use the same random distance (e.g. $d$) and the bottom sketch uses the random distance of $d \times 6$

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



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and allographic arts. He argued that there is a fundamental difference between arts that are forgeable by exact copying and those that are not. Arts such as painting and sculpture he called "autographic," in that, like an autograph or signature, no copy no matter how exact counts as an original unless it is the work of a certain hand (Goodman 1976: 113). This leads Goodman to his useful definition of a forgery as "an object falsely purporting to have the history of production requisite for the (or an) original of the work" (Goodman 1976: 122). A forged Lincoln signature falsely purports to have been produced by Lincoln during his lifetime when it was actually produced in the recent past by a shady local dealer.

By contrast, in poetry and music, any accurate copy of the original words or notes, even if recently produced by a shady dealer, is not a forgery but an instance of the poem or the piece of music. Arts of this kind Goodman calls "allographic," claiming that such artworks are identified by a document, performance or reading in which the right words or notes are presented in the right order.

In recent years Goodman's claim that music is not forgeable has been reexamined. Peter Kivy argues that someone could invent a slight variation of a specific Bach work and produce a forged score to back up the claim that this was Bach's own version (Kivy 2000: 233–35); this would seem to count as a forgery of a musical work, though, as Kivy acknowledges, it is a marginal case. Jerrold Levinson has argued, more broadly, that the history of production of a musical composition – that it was produced by a certain composer at a certain time – is essential to that work's identity (Levinson 1990: 95–98). If this view is correct, then one could forge a musical composition by forging an original manuscript score even if one kept every note and tempo marking the same; one might, for example, mimic youthful handwriting when copying a mature work. Merely misrepresenting the date or the maker of a musical work can change the way it is interpreted and performed even when every note remains identical.

Nonetheless, the autographic/allographic distinction points to an important difference in the way intentions are formulated and expressed in the creation of art. In some arts – painting, sculpture and printmaking – the artist's intentions are expressed in the production of a unique physical object or a set of works produced by such an object – a finished painting, a sculpture or a series of prints made from a unique etched plate. In other arts – musical composition, literature and dance – the artist's intentions are expressed by creating a kind, or type, of object or event – a score, sequence of words or directions for a performance. Of course, as Goodman recognized, performance arts usually are created in several stages: an opera is allographic in its initial stage yet each performance is a unique autographic event: no replica (perhaps by electronic means) of a Maria Callas performance of *La Bohème*, no matter how indistinguishable it is from an actual Callas performance, counts as genuine unless Callas is doing the singing.

As the Kivy and Levinson discussions of musical forgery show, the more closely we examine the details of artistic practice the more Goodman's distinction requires elaboration and qualification. Though Goodman claims that whether a work is forgeable or not determines an art form's allographic/autographic status, what his view seems to show instead is that how an artwork is created, whether in allographic (notational) or autographic (physical) terms, determines how (not whether) it can be forged. In arts in which a physical object is forged, forgery is a misrepresentation of

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task to say precisely what basic elements constitute a work of art. The answer depends upon such factors as the kind of art to which the work properly belongs, the historical period in which it was made, its style, its semantic or expressive functions, etc. So, for instance, depending on such circumstances we might consider the basic elements in a musical composition to be its themes, or motifs, simpler than themes, or dodecaphonic series, or even - e.g. in contemporary music - other elements, including individual sounds. A systematic analysis of factors which we take into account in the process of interpretation - while decomposing an art work into its basic elements or, inversely, constructing of those elements complex wholes - has not yet been carried out.[4]

The role the basic elements play in those arts which operate mainly with language signs is different from their role in plastic and visual arts, in ballet or music. Strings of inscriptions or their phonetic counterparts have an aesthetic value of their own, independently of their eventual meanings, as it was clearly manifested in Dadaist poetry. However, the main source of their aesthetic value lies in their semantic function. In other branches of art those basic, sensuous elements are a very important - sometimes the sole - underpinning for aesthetic values. Independently of this difference, the factor present in the interpretation of all kinds of art works consists in discerning their basic elements and the rules of joining them into complex structures. As examples of such structures, composed in accordance with rules characteristic of various styles, one could instance a dadaistic poem, a sonata in the classical style, an impressionistic painting.

In joining[5] the basic elements into complex wholes we assume definite presuppositions and rules. The problem why these and not other assumptions have been made does not, however, belong to interpretation itself, but to its substantiation. I shall later have occasion to return to this question. At this point it suffices to indicate that the operation of forming complex structures out of the basic elements may be governed by assumptions relating not only to the form of the art work, but also to its contents. However, the latter kind of assumptions are taken into account only in so far as they determine the form of the work rather than its semantic function. This can easily be seen from the previously given examples of complex structures. On the other hand, to identify certain complex wholes such as a realistic novel, a symphonic poem, or an impressionistic landscape, we would have to refer to some semantic rules as factors which determine the contents of those wholes.

With regard to contemporary art works the reconstruction of a complex

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# Mixing Telerobotics and Virtual Reality for Improving Immersion in Artwork Perception

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Abstract. This paper aims at presenting a framework to achieve a higher degree of telepresence in environments irich of artistic content using mobile robots. We develop a platform which allows a more immersive and natural interaction between an operator and a remote environment; we make use of a multi-robot system as the mean to physically explore such environment and we adopt virtual reality as an interface to abstract it. The visitor is thus able to exploit the virtual environment both for keeping the sense of direction and for accessing a high-resolution content, while the immersion is achieved through the robot sensors. This study represents a starting point for overcoming the limits of the current use of virtual technology associated with artistic content. Long-term results of such study can be applied to tele-didactics, remote tele-visits for impaired users and active man-machine cooperation for efficient tele-surveillance.

## 1 Introduction

Robots are entities being used more and more to both extend the human senses and to perform particular tasks involving repetition, manipulation, precision. Particularly in the first case, the wide range of sensors available today allows a robot to collect several kind of environmental data (images and sound at almost any spectral band, temperature, pressure...). Depending on the application, such data can be internally processed for achieving complete autonomy [1,2] or, in case a human intervention is required, the observed data can be analyzed off-line (robots for medical imaging, [3]) or in real time (robots for surgical manipulations such as the da Vinci Surgical System by Intuitive Surgical Inc., or [4]). An interesting characteristic of robots with real-time access is to be remotely managed by operators (Teleoperation), thus leading to the concept of Telerobotics [5,6] anytime it is impossible or undesirable for the user to be where the robot is: this is the case when unaccessible or dangerous sites are to be explored, to avoid life threatening situations for humans (subterranean, submarine or space sites, buildings with excessive temperature or concentration of gas).

However, any teleoperation task is as much effective as an acceptable degree of immersion is achieved: if not, operators have distorted perception of distant world,

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**Abstract.** This paper aims at presenting a framework to achieve a higher degree of telepresence in environments rich of artistic content using mobile robots. We develop a platform which allows a more immersive and natural interaction between an operator and a remote environment; we make use of a multi-robot system as the mean to physically explore such environment and we adopt virtual reality as an interface to abstract it. The visitor is thus able to exploit the virtual environment both for keeping the sense of direction and for accessing a high-resolution content, while the immersion is achieved through the robot sensors. This study represents a starting point for overcoming the limits of the current use of virtual technology associated with artistic content. Long-term results of such study can be applied to tele-didactics, remote tele-visits for impaired users and active man-machine cooperation for efficient tele-surveillance.

## 1 Introduction

Robots are entities being used more and more to both extend the human senses and to perform particular tasks involving repetition, manipulation, precision. Particularly in the first case, the wide range of sensors available today allows a robot to collect several kind of environmental data (images and sound at almost any spectral band, temperature, pressure...). Depending on the application, such data can be internally processed for achieving complete autonomy [1,2] or, in case a human intervention is required, the observed data can be analyzed off-line (robots for medical imaging, [3]) or in real time (robots for surgical manipulations such as the da Vinci Surgical System by Intuitive Surgical Inc., or [4]). An interesting characteristic of robots with real-time access is to be remotely managed by operators (Teleoperation), thus leading to the concept of *Telerobotics* [5,6] anytime it is impossible or undesirable for the user to be where the robot is: this is the case when unaccessible or dangerous sites are to be explored, to avoid life threatening situations for humans (subterranean, submarine or space sites, buildings with excessive temperature or concentration of gas).

However, any teleoperation task is as much effective as an acceptable degree of immersion is achieved: if not, operators have distorted perception of distant world,

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ments on children's adaptive-creative thinking during play. Further, there is considerable evidence that play during early childhood can predict later facility in divergent thinking (Russ, Robins, & Christiano, 1999). Children are very aware of social situations and can reenact them with considerable accuracy in their dramatic play.

Paley (1988) found this to be true in her work with four-year olds as she observed what she called their "fantasy play." In Bad Guys Don't Have Birthdays, Paley (1988) chronicles three themes that pervade the creative play in her preschool classroom: bad guys, birthdays, and babies. She explains her interest in children's dramatic play as her belief that it is their most significant way of making meaning.

Novelty is an intriguing and attractive aspect of play for children and, thus, highly motivational as a learning strategy in the classroom. Roskos and Christie (2002) emphasize that "much of play's delight is in the unfamiliar and unexpected ...children are challenged by surprising facts and puzzling, even shocking, ideas that invite adaptation and clarification of existing knowledge" (p. 47). Again, the emphasis here is on the fostering of creative and fluid thinking or, as Roskos and Christie so eloquently described it, "Play, in other words is a dynamic knowledge system that fluctuates at the edge of children's capabilities" (p. 47).

## The Role of Movement and Dance

Anyone who has ever worked with young learners is well aware that they are not stationary figures. They move! Sitting still for extended periods of time is not only alien to children, but it might appear that it is virtually impossible. Therefore, it is evident that movement can be an age-appropriate and effective educational tool.

For instance, it has been previously noted that Gay (2000) cites several research studies showing that music and movement enhanced the academic performance of African-American students. These activities included not only dance but also clapping and other movement activities. Further, acquiring spatial reasoning assists children in the study of geometry and other aspects of higher mathematics, and as Perret and Fox (2004) note, "learning to dance improves spatial reasoning" (p. 45).

Integration of movement and dance with other subject areas has proven to be an important means of helping all children learn. Smith (2002) writes of teaching narrative writing through dance. She worked with first graders using dance integrated with lessons across the curriculum. She maintains, "every child learns by moving... In dance, children interpret ideas and feelings through the use of their bodies in an open-ended search for a unique movement vocabulary" (p. 91). Smith, among others, advocates the use of a drum to assist in children's movement activities. Klug (Klug & Whitfield, 2003), who has worked extensively with children of poverty in both urban and rural settings and is committed to culturally relevant pedagogy, has found that moving to the beat of a drum has enhanced the listening

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

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## Writing through relationships

> On hearing the words "How would you like to contribute a chapter for the second edition of our department's custom textbook?" I felt both (a) overwhelming excitement and (b) overwhelming fear. As a graduate student, my publication experience at the time was limited to one book article. I was worried. How was I going to produce a chapter that would add value to the textbook and be of use to my fellow graduate teaching assistants? Even more important, in my mind, was the fact that the project came to me through my work in Lower Division Studies with Dr. Lynée Gaillet and Dr. Angela Hall-Godsey, and living up to their expectations mattered deeply to me. I needed to jumpstart this project immediately and, since the project came to me through relationships, I decided that writing through a relationship was the answer.
>
> A fellow graduate student, Stephanie Rountree, immediately came to mind as an ideal collaborator. We had much in common as pragmatic feminist scholars, and where we differed we were, in fact, strong complements. In practical terms, this meant that since we shared a similar work ethic, mutual respect, and a generous approach to scholarship, we could bring out the best in each other's ideas and more importantly, weave them together into a coherent whole.
>
> Over the course of two months, we wrote in coffee shops, collaborated on Google Drive, and drafted on our time while managing all the other commitments graduate teaching assistants face. One afternoon, over coffee, computers, and at least six drafts of our chapter, we found ourselves discussing future collaborative projects: a syllabus for first-year composition, a plan for collaborative teaching, and even a book proposal. This was when I truly understood the productive power of writing through relationships – creativity and potential multiply exponentially so that the current project is stronger than what could be produced alone.
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internal activities going on in the individual's mind. We hear ourselves as we speak publicly, and this generates inner responses to our own talk.

Thus, one can speak about the individual being engaged in auto-dialogue also while she is taking part in a conversation with others or indulging in monological speech directed to others (Markova', 2003a, p. 115). These cognitive 'auto-dialogical' activities take place before and after, behind and beyond what is made public in the individual's contributions to 'external dialogue'. In order to contribute to the outer dialogue, the individual must engage in responsive understanding of the other's prior or ongoing utterances. She is engaged in understanding his or her own prior or current utterances, and in particular, in anticipating the others' responsive understandings of them. Such responsive understandings of one's own are often externalized in the one's overt utterance; indeed, the latter are largely co-existential or intertwined with the responsive understanding. The processes involved are fast and immediate, and largely non-conscious, virtually automatic and next to 'reflexive' (reflex-like).

However, there are also 'reflective' ingredients, processes involving more of a conscious, inferencing and even calculating nature (Carston, 2005). 'Reflexive' and 'reflective' aspects mutually penetrate one another, but one might say that certain exchange types favor reflective processes more than others. Also, reflective processes may increase in importance, as the individual distances him- or herself from the ongoing exchange, for example, in moments or episodes when he or she is temporarily silent and takes more of an observer's stance. This is often more easy to do in a multiparty interaction than in an intense dyadic conversation. To put it in simple terms, one can think, while the others talk, which is one of the methodological arguments for using multiparty conversations like focus groups for studying people's thinking and arguing (Markova' et al., 2007). In the next section (§ 6.7.4), I will comment on a sequence from a focus-group discussion, in order to make the interplay between internal and external dialogues more concrete.

But before that, let me point out there is usually some fragmented auto dialogue going on also in those very moments when the individual himself is actually talking, for example, when giving a talk. As a speaker, you hear yourself giving expression to ideas, and almost simultaneously, you may have the experience of tacitly generating responses, 'second thoughts' related to what you have just said. You may now and then experience the appearance of inner responses that are not being disclosed to the audience, but sometimes retained in the mind for further elaboration later. This may be just an internal affair, an auto-dialogue not necessarily triggered by reactions from the external audience.

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The interplay between internal and external dialogue must also be invoked in the explanation of what we reveal and hide to others, what we

I am not sure whether I was able to explain to you how to struggle against the possibility of misunderstandings that provoke bad use of your proposals. For me, there is no solution. The answer is not to be angry but to be morally more clear. Sometimes the distortion is innocent, sometimes it is preestablished, it is programmed. In any case, we have the duty to clarify.

TF: The sort of distortion I am talking about, for example, relates to artists who go into a neighborhood to set up a "dialogue" and report back to their peers, without ever really leaving room for the people to speak for themselves. People employ the rhetoric of dialogue, but it's a false dialogue. For example, what if I went to an African American community to create a "dialogue," but I knew beforehand what I want the results to be?

PF: Yes, it is absolutely false. But look, I don't want to say that I am prevented from knowing what I would like to say before going there. Because, as a person, I am a project. If I am a project, it means that I have objectives, because if I did not have some objectives and some ends that I am fighting for, I could not be a project. And it is part of my project to conceptualize what kind of arguments I can use in order, for example, to work against racism. For me, this is legitimate. What is not legitimate is to try to impose on them precisely the arguments I thought of beforehand. It is not legitimate, because a true conversation cannot be preestablished. I cannot know beforehand what you will say to me in answering my question. I have to become engaged in order to follow our process of conversation. Do you see? Of course, I have to program my conversation. Nevertheless, I have to know that my conversation cannot be precisely as I planned it.

TF: When I came here today, and I have my questions...

PF: Yes. You have your questions, and you have anticipated a way of answering your questions. But these are not necessarily my answers.

TF: You talk about the "nuclei of contradiction" in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*: getting to these essential questions for a community.[21] Some artists, I believe, working in their studio, with no dialogical process, have the ability to reach these "nuclei of

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But no explanation has been given of these certain phenomena. Even the way that Dwelshauvers describes them is far from being satisfactory. We will try in our turn to expose the facts and, if possible, to explain them.

My eyes are open, I look at the index finger of my right hand, which is describing curves, geometrical figures in the air. To a certain extent, I see these curves at the end of my finger. From the outset, indeed, a certain persistence of retinal impressions causes a kind of wake to continue to subsist, there where my index finger is already no longer. But this is not all: the different positions of my finger are not given as successive and isolated. No doubt each position is a concrete and irreducible present. But these presents are not associated from outside as simple contents of consciousness. They are intimately united by synthetic acts of mind. Husserl has given a remarkable description of these particular intentions which, starting from a living and concrete 'now', are directed towards the immediate past to retain it and towards the future to grasp it. He calls these 'retentions' and 'protentions'.[33] This retention, which itself alone constitutes the continuity, is not itself an image. It is an empty intention which is directed towards the phase of the movement that has just been annihilated; we say, in psychological language, that it is knowledge centred on the present visual sensation, and which makes appear that now as also being an after of a certain quality, an after that does not follow any sensation except precisely the one that has just vanished. The protention, on its part, is an expectation and this expectation gives the same sensation as also being a before. Naturally this latter is not as strictly determined as a 'before' as it is as an 'after', since – except in the privileged case when we execute a movement defined beforehand – the sensation that will follow is not entirely known (connue); but this sensation is already prefigured by a very precise expectation: I expect a visual-sensation-produced-by-a-movement-of-my-index-finger beginning from a definite position. Retention and protention constitute, in every way, the sense of the present visual impression: without these synthetic acts, one could hardly speak of an impression at all; this before and this after that are correlates of these acts are not given as empty forms, as homogeneous and indifferent structures: they are the concrete and individual relations that the current sensation sustains with the concrete and individual impressions that have preceded it and that will follow it.

But we must be precise: all consciousness is consciousness of something. I earlier described retention and protention as aiming at impressions for simplification. What they really aim at are objects constructed from these impressions, which is to say the trajectory of my index finger. This trajectory naturally appears as a static form; it is given as the path traversed by my finger and, more vaguely, beyond its current position, as the path still to be traversed. The path traversed – or a part of that path – is presented moreover

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