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"As educators and learners, we need to continue to remain alert to what experience does and to wonder if we make the world with experiences, or because of experience."

The Turn to Experience in Contemporary Art: A Potentiality for Thinking Art Education Differently

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This article considers the turn to experience in contemporary art and examines its potentiality for thinking art education differently. This project should not be mistaken for what Hannah Arendt (1968) identified as "the extraordinary enthusiasm for what is new" (p. 176). Rather, its purpose is to pursue another possibility for art education that has the potential to shape the field in ways that correspond to the life worlds of individuals with whom we, as educators, work. In all that it enables and denies, the turn to experience in contemporary art has something to impart to teachers of art who, in their daily practices, are experience-producers as they define and regulate what is possible to teach and what is appropriate for their students to learn. Whether or not art teachers take up the potentiality of this turn to experience or translate it into art education practice is another matter. In the spirit of the artworks discussed, it is not the actuality of the potentiality that is of interest here. Rather, it is the very potentiality itself. The discussion of experience draws chiefly on the philosophical work of John Dewey and the artworks of Lee Mingwei, Carsten Höller, and Eddie Peake.

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In this article, I wish to consider the concept of "experience"—especially the manner in which it is pursued and given form in art practice and theory at the present time. For Michael Oakeshott (1933), experience is the most difficult word to manage in all of philosophic vocabulary; and, he said, it must be the aspiration of any writer uninhibited enough to use it, "to escape the ambiguities it contains" (p. 9). Of course, there is some merit in trying to live in and with these ambiguities rather than trying to escape them—something that many artists are increasingly doing. For that reason, I am interested in the ways in which these artists, many of whom are committed to collaborative and collective modes of art production, are conceptualizing and pursuing experience as a way of living in the world. It seems to me that they have become less interested in translating and conveying experiences through symbolic forms and more interested in creating experiences by putting in place conditions that lead to actual experiences. One might suggest that this practice and perspective is a radical turn away from the purpose that Leo Tolstoy (1898/1960) envisioned for art[1]—a purpose that has made its presence felt in art education for over a century. For isn't it fair to say that, for decades, many students in art education classes have been invited to represent an experience already had, which is an act that occurs independently of that experience and, for the most part, demands representational capacities that have little to do with it? The act of representing an experience experienced at another time is, of course, the living of an entirely new experience. If this turn to experience in contemporary art, then, is a radical turn away from a Tolstoyian notion of art, it is, we might say, a turn toward what art does best; that is, in the words of Nicolas Bourriaud (2005), "[it] restores the world to us as an experience to be lived" (p. 32).

Recent works by artists Marina Abramović, Ricardo Basbaum, Theaster Gates, Carsten Höller, Lee Mingwei, and Eddie Peake for instance are examples of the shift that I describe here. While the work and making practices of these artists are oftentimes identified as residing within the participatory art genre,[2] many of their works and the conditions of their production are concerned with being more than merely participative, interactive, and collaborative. It seems to me that much of their recent work, some of which will be discussed later, is concerned with the promise and potentiality of experience; that is, with what experience *does* and how it is and can be agentic in itself. Further, while much of this recent work (and especially the specific works that will be considered here) "lack[s] an independent, self-contained existence" (Barad, 2007, p. ix), it appears to me that it functions from the understanding that participation does something other than simply provide an experience: Participation activates a shift in the one who experiences at the moment of experiencing, with the result that one is made different or becomes other than one was prior to participation (Grosz, 2011; O'Donoghue, 2012). Of

course, it is not the case that one does not bring to experiential artworks certain expectations, sense-making practices, and analytical frames that shape—in part—how one will engage and interact with them. Rather, the point here is that one is made different by participating in such works that seek to activate an experience of one kind or another. Indeed, these works seem to function based on this very condition. Moreover, possibilities for existing and living in the world emerge when one is open to the possibilities that participation in these works offers. For that reason, we might say that experience-producing artworks operate in the realm of possibility and potentiality. To use the words of Maxine Greene (1991), we might even suggest that experiential artworks "may, now and then, move us into spaces where we can create visions of other ways of being and ponder what it might signify to realize them" (p. 27).

While such qualities place experiential artworks within the realm of participatory art practice, these qualities simultaneously set them apart from this genre. Specifically, while they share characteristics, for example, with the participatory artworks that Clare Bishop (2012) describes in her book, *Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship*, especially those produced in the last decade, these works that intentionally cultivate experience—and this movement toward experience—differ in several important ways. For example, it could be argued that the artworks that I will discuss in this article pursue the promise of an experience in ways that the artworks that Bishop discusses do not. Many of the works that Bishop brings to her readers' attention are works that intend to achieve certain and particular outcomes—develop new skills in a particular population or create additional networks and spaces of engagement for imagined communities, for example. Further, several of the artworks that I will consider here (all of which signal a turn to experience in contemporary art)[3] belong to genres that preexisted participatory art. And, such works have little to do with relational aesthetics. For that reason, I will not be engaging in a critique of relational aesthetics and its projects. Nor will I be revisiting old ground to rehearse arguments had elsewhere.

Acknowledging that much has been written about participatory art and its implication for practices of making, sensing, perceiving, and participating in the world—and mindful that, as Simon O'Sullivan (2001) said, "art outruns any discourse on it" (p. 115)—I propose that to think of some of these recent experience-producing artworks with the concept of experience opens them for further thought, and takes them out of the realm of participatory art to which they are frequently placed. Thinking of these experience-producing works with the concept of experience produces them in ways analogous to how material and interpretative practices have produced works of art of the past, and keeps alive possibilities for these works to appear again and again without being limited by previous and earlier interpretations. As Donna Haraway (2009) said, drawing on Marilyn Strathern's work, "it matters which concepts we use to think other concepts with." And yet, to think them with experience does not, to borrow the words of O'Sullivan (2001), "seek to colonize [them], but instead parallels in some way the 'work' of the art object" (p. 115). Further, given that artworks never stop being produced, that they continue to come into being in the situations in which they find themselves or through the discourses in which they become visible, or are denied visibility, it seems reasonable to engage in a project of thinking of these works with the concept of experience as it serves as a way of accessing or engaging them differently, perhaps.

Thinking of these works with the concept of experience offers an opportunity to build a relation with them and ask questions of them, which have the potential to increase their capacity to appear in the world. Further, as noted earlier, these works shape, in part, the manner in which one can address them, insofar as they call one to consider how experience itself becomes a way of

understanding their potential to suggest ways of dwelling in the world that may not always seem possible until lived. One might argue that the works that I will discuss here and the movement that I identify merely contribute to the growth of the "experience economy" of late modernity (Pine & Gilmore, 2011) and the rise of the phenomenon of the "experience" in many aspects of life in the 21st century (von Hantelmann, 2011). One might also suggest that these works are complicit with capitalist commoditization and provide nothing more than mere sites of entertainment that serve to commodify experience. While such an argument could be made, and while it is not my intention to do so, I believe that Irit Rogoff's (2003, 2006) notion of criticality is particularly useful for those of us who wish to think beyond—and indeed away from—the limits of such a critique. Criticality, Rogoff (2006) said, is:

> a recognition that we may be fully armed with theoretical knowledge, we may be capable of the most sophisticated modes of analysis but we nevertheless are also living out the very conditions we are trying to analyze and come to terms with. (para. 8)

Finally, while I do not address the social conditions underlying the production and reception of art, this ought not be perceived as an endorsement that these works can be accessed and processed in the same way and to the same degree by all who encounter them.

In what follows, I consider a selection of works that signal a turn to experience in contemporary art and think them alongside some of John Dewey's ideas concerning experience. I do this in an effort to work out, as much as one can, what the turn to experience in contemporary art might offer for thinking art education differently.[4] Speculating on what these artworks do, I consider ways in which they might be instructive to our thinking about turning to, or focusing on experience and its conditions in art education.

Artworks That Signal a Turn to Experience in Contemporary Art

At the Smart Museum, Chicago, as part of the exhibition Feast: Radical Hospitality in Contemporary Art (February – June 2012), Lee Mingwei reenacted his sculptural installation, *The Dining Project* of 1997. He invited three strangers (chosen by lottery) to dine with him, on separate occasions, on a dining platform in the museum after hours. *The Dining Project*, Lee tells us, originated during his first year at Yale University as an MFA student. He described the conditions surrounding the initial production of this work as follows:

> Feeling isolated, I posted hundreds of posters all over the campus, inviting anyone interested in "sharing foods and introspective conversation" to contact me. By the end of the first day, I had received approximately 45 responses to my invitation. (para. 1).

The Dining Project, whereby two strangers participated in what might be considered an intimate act—eating together—demanded that both participants (the artist and his guest) find ways to be with one another (and open to each other) while simultaneously maintaining and reclaiming their separateness as individuals. Anticipating what dining together as an artwork might bring forth not only preexisted and resided outside of the occasion itself, but it also provided little help in understanding what happened as the artist and guest lived through the work, producing it as they lived through it. It seems that the work was only possible if participants opened themselves to one another and to the many moments that made up the event, rather than being wholly concerned about what would happen in each moment or how each moment would shape the next or elaborate the previous. Peter deBolla (2001) would have called this "the materiality of the artwork," which he distinguishes from the artwork's materiality (p. 26). We might say that *The Dining Project* demanded that the artist and his guest be intensely present while simultaneously being

purely unaware of their individual existence in and outside of the moment.

In many ways, one could equate what occurred in this durational artwork with what happens when artists engage in making in the traditional sense. As any of us who have ever made material objects knows, one does not know in advance where one will end up after one begins. One never quite knows what one is making until one has made it. As described by Eve Sedgwick, in the making process, there are

> Second-by-second negotiations with the material properties of whatever I'm working on, and the questions "What will it let me do?" and "What does it want to do?" are in constant three-way conversation with "What is it that I want to do." (as cited in Goldberg, 2011, p. 83)

These tugs, pulls, pushes, and heaves; these acts of giving, receiving, taking, and being taken; these opportunities to go places conceptually, materially, instinctually, intellectually, and affectively, as suggested by Sedgwick, are what we might describe as the practice of making.

Among the many questions that might be asked of *The Dining Project* is: In what ways did it permit one to be other than (or more than) one was prior to participation? One of the three members of the public chosen to participate in this event, University of Chicago undergraduate student Dory Fox (2012), spoke to this question as she described her experience of dining with Lee, noting the intensity of the pleasure of being with another:

> I spent nearly the entire meal tracing circles in the beans [on the floor of the dining platform] with my feet, like a child playing in the sand at the beach... the beans... provided a constant sensory experience throughout the course of the meal. We are so used to the idea of hospitality through our sense of taste, but people rarely think of how hosts attend to the other senses of their guests... the significance of sharing a meal lies not only in sharing physical nourishment but also in sharing physical pleasure... this allows for a certain level of human recognition: your host or your guest, like you, has a human body that needs sustenance, and... that experiences pleasure. (para. 4).

Fox's (2012) account suggests that an experience includes an active element and a passive element. For Dewey (1916), the active is "trying" while the passive is "undergoing." As Fox's recollection of her experience suggests, when we experience something, "we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences" (Dewey, 1916, p. 133). For Dewey, the perceived relation between these two elements (active and passive) gives an experience meaning and determines the extent of value or "fruitfulness" of an experience. Furthermore, for Dewey, and as suggested by Fox's account, we learn from experience when we connect what we do to things with the consequences of doing. From this perspective, "doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction—discovery of the connection of things" (Dewey, 1916, p. 134). So, we might say, it is not enough to just do; it is important to make sense of what doing does, where it leads one, the things it activates, and the possibilities it actualizes. To read Fox's account of her experience (which is, of course, just that—an account—and, like all accounts, it is partial; unfinished; and limited by language, the ability to remember details, and the capacity to narrate in a manner that has the potential to be more than self-referential), one might say, is to witness the "experience of the learning self as a self not in compliance but *in transition* and *in motion* toward previously unknown ways of thinking and being in the world" (Ellsworth 2007, p. 16, emphasis in original). The next example that I consider elaborates this idea further.

At the New Museum in New York, as part of the Carsten Höller: Experience midcareer retrospective exhibition (October 2011 – January 2012), artist Carsten Höller invited viewers to float naked in a large bath of saline water (*Giant*

Psycho Tank, 1999); recline on their back under a fish-filled aquarium to observe fish swim (*Aquarium*, 1996); take a journey from the fourth floor of the museum to the second floor through an enclosed 102-foot tubular steel spiral slide (*Untitled* (*Slide*), 2011); take a ride on what appeared to be a swing ride from a fun fair or amusement park (*Mirror Carousel*, 2005); or traverse through parts of the museum wearing goggles that turned the world on its head (*Upside Down Goggles*, 2009). Some might suggest that these works provided little more than mere entertainment, or, that they simply offered an invitation to play, as they played on and with the body of the viewer. For instance, they tended to induce nausea and dizziness in the bodies of those who moved through the gallery wearing goggles that turned the world on its head (Upside Down Goggles), and arouse feelings of exhilaration, excitement, elation, and fear in the bodies of those who took the journey from the fourth floor of the museum to the second floor in the enclosed semitransparent slide [*Untitled* (*Slide*)]. Those who participated in *Untitled (Slide)* found that their bodies became an ensemble of the force of their bodies in motion and the force of the form they encountered, which, we might suggest, corresponds to Dewey's notion of the active and passive dimension of experience. Neither the individual nor the slide could have created the sensation or the experience without the cooperation of the other. And so the separation between subject and object—that preexisted participation—dissipated, and a unity emerged, which for Dewey (1934) is what gives an experience its form. This radical coming together aligns with Dewey's idea that "experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm" (p. 37). For Dewey, this unity is borne out of "a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of it constituent parts" (p. 37). This unity, also known as the dominant feature of the experience, is neither emotional nor practical, nor is it intellectual. Dewey suggests that these are categories of distinction applied in reflection as the experience is recalled, described, made explicit, or elaborated; these are evolved variants (Jackson, 1998).

For Höller's works in this retrospective exhibition, it seems that meaning took place through and as a result of participation. It did not reside in the works waiting to be excavated by a knowing viewer (Rogoff, 2006). Similar to Lee's *The Dining Project*, Höller's works offered an invitation to experience the world and oneself through them, and in relation to the conditions that they presented for living. As Ellsworth (2007), referencing Adrian Dannat, said, "the qualities of an *experience* of learning are crucial to *what* is learned" (p. 18, emphasis in the original). Further, rather than positioning viewers as spectators of the world, who view the world from a distance, Höller's works implicated viewers in the world insofar as they created opportunities for viewers to live through an experience that was only possible when they surrendered to the demands of the work. In doing this, Höller's works, it seems, undermined the diagnostic privilege that one oftentimes enacts, at a remove, in front of an artwork. Similar to Lee's *The Dining Project*, then, one can say that these artworks produced relations between people and objects, while proposing radical ways of inhabiting the world—ways that throw into question well-known habits of living in the world. Possibilities for living differently are, perhaps, prompted in the minds and bodies of viewers, in a manner similar to Greene's ideas quoted earlier. With and as a result of participating, perhaps what is brought into visibility is the fact that the ways we live life are just that—ways of living life—and that we make a life with the resources available to us. Yet, life could be thought up differently. It could be further argued that the works introduced viewers to the museum as a place with pedagogical possibilities that are emergent and not wholly contingent on the expertise of others. One could suggest that Höller's works offer the present moment as one that has transformative potential for life and reality. Afterall, they radically shift our notions of the possible and the real insofar as they present the possibility of

living differently, or at least behaving differently. Without doubt, by presenting other configurations of the possible, they prompted viewers to question the way in which they inhabited the world at that moment, as the following example shows somewhat differently.

At the Royal Academy of Arts, London, Eddie Peake brought together 10 men to play a 30-minute five-aside game of soccer in a work entitled *Touch* (2012). Wearing nothing but trainers and knee high socks, which distinguished team members, the game was played in front of a live audience. Viewers watched from the sideline as these almost-naked men engaged each other in offensive, defensive, and block tackles, as they passed, carried, and dribbled the ball up, down, and across the makeshift playing field in the museum. While it could be argued that Peake's *Touch*, along with the other works described here, introduce viewers to "a world beyond this world" (Dewey, 1934, p. 195)—a world apart, or a world outside the given world—Dewey would suggest otherwise. It is not, said Dewey (1938), that one finds oneself in another world; rather, one finds oneself in "a different part or aspect of one and the same world" (p. 44) just as the gallery-goer who participated in Höller's slide had at the point of exit to quickly recollect himself before "reentering" the world that he had never left. It is a world, Dewey (1934) suggested, that "is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live out our ordinary experiences" (p. 195). While Peake's *Touch* might be perceived as an occasion to advance "new modalities of social interaction" (Kester, 2011, p. 29), it also might be considered as presenting an opportunity to reconfigure existing ones (O'Donoghue, 2013). It is not that soccer players do not play soccer with and through their bodies, but they do not tend to do so with a mostly unclothed body.

The works discussed here, one might suggest, lead viewers into new thought spaces that belong to experiences had elsewhere and at another time. For example, before encountering these works in the museum, it is likely that many viewers had already experienced sliding down a slide, reclining naked in a bath of water, or watching a soccer game. And yet, to participate in these works was to act without fully knowing in advance the consequences of participation. So, while familiar, there was always the promise—even the expectation—that this experience would be new and different from previous and similar experiences, and that it could contain more than was immediately perceptible. For these reasons, we might suggest these works operate in accordance with Dewey's principles of continuity and interaction. For Dewey, continuity ensures that something is carried over from one experience to the next, and that all experiences connect to ones that have occurred previously and to those yet to come. Interaction, on the other hand, serves as a way of drawing attention to the external (objective) and internal conditions of an experience. Both are conditions of the works described, and of experiencing them. Any "normal experience" Dewey (1916) said, "is an interplay of these two sets of conditions [principles]. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a situation" (p. 42).

Furthermore, following Dewey (1916), we might say that the possibility of having an experience in these situations occurs "when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment" and is "integrated within" our larger well of experience built from previous experiences, and "demarcated" from other experiences (p. 35). These new experiences—in this case, watching men wearing only socks and runners play soccer in a gallery—while similar (but different) from previous ones, are made intelligible (in large part through previous experiences) and, while integrated, remain demarcated and have the potential to send experiences within one's well of experience in new and different directions in a way analogous to Bourriaud's (2005) theory of a radicant art or Charles Garoian's (2013) "prosthetic space of art" (p. 6).

Underpinning my discussion thus far, then, is the question: What new types of learning

situations does the turn to experience in contemporary art make possible, render intelligible, and promise? For the remainder of the article, I would like to consider this question particularly in light of Dewey's (1938) position that a primary responsibility of the educator is to be attentive to and aware of conditions (physical, material, and social) that "are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth" (p. 40).

Possibilities for Art Education

While the discussion thus far has identified several factors that might be considered in contemplating a turn to—or a focus on—experience in art education, it seems to me that the turn to experience in contemporary art cultivates an *attitude* toward and generates several questions to be addressed to current art education practice and theory, rather than prescribing a specific curriculum or set of pedagogical practices for teachers to use.[5] Following Foucault (1990), who invited us to think of an attitude as a means of "relating to contemporary reality... a way of thinking and feeling; a way too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task" (p. 39), we might consider, as I have done briefly in the above discussion of artworks, the promise that experiential artworks offer for learning about ourselves, others, and the world. Each of the above works, we might say, creates the conditions, for those of us who are open to the possibility of being seduced and cajoled and made different by them, to come to know ourselves in the strangeness of ourselves as we do things that we would not do habitually as we participate in the world with and through these works in ways that are not always available to us. Further, it could be argued that these works and our participation in them create an occasion for us to come in contact with, or encounter, our learning selves and to feel ourselves becoming and unbecoming. In other words, to recognize "the learning self as an emergence—as a self and an intelligence that is always in the making" (Ellsworth, 2007, p. 57). The discussion of what these works do suggests that new worlds are opened to us, and new tendencies and potentialities are actualized when we open ourselves to that which we encounter and pursue with curiosity. In short, it suggests certain things are possible when we cultivate an *attitude* of openness, curiosity, inquiry, delayed judgment, trying and undergoing, becoming and unbecoming, possibility and potentiality.

If a turn to experience in art education shifts attention away from equating art education exclusively with the production of objects of a physical nature (from which the initiated can make determinations and appraisals), it calls us to consider and imagine other ways of making and, therefore, it has the potential to engage us differently in thinking about making processes. For example, what if we consider carefully what making does—making art, making sense, making connections, making inferences, making meaning, making ourselves in the company of others? What if we consider making (in its many forms) as a site rich with possibilities? As we saw with Lee's *The Dining Project*, the "materiality of the artwork"—which is not reducible to the material qualities of the objects that we might consider art objects, but rather to the quality of what is brought into being in the process of producing the work—offers rich possibilities for forming a life and finding ways to live in a world that preexists us; a world into which we are born, but in which we make a life and form a world that is meaningful to us and others. It is in that spirit, or with that attitude, in the Foucauldian sense, that making is carried out. That is, within the space of what is already known and that which will only become known through the process of making. For that reason, one might say, the already known will shape to some degree the practices called into action in the making, but the making process itself, which is never determined by only known things, will create other things to be known.

Given this discussion on making, one question that the turn to experience in contemporary art might ask of art education (its practice, its conditions, and its capacity to form a way of

living in the world) might be: Is the "making" of objects of material properties the primary purpose of teaching art in schools, as current curriculum seems to suggest? The fact that the distinction between making practices in the studio and making practices post studio has become ever more blurred, less easily demarcated, and more difficult to defend in an age of participatory and experiential-based art practices makes this question ever more pressing. Experiential works are formed through practices of making; making practices of a very different kind from those with which many teachers are familiar. These emerging art practices, I suggest, demand that we find additional ways to talk about making and its possibilities. As alluded to in the earlier discussion, experiential artworks throw into question the traditional roles of maker and spectator. They integrate both roles rather than produce and maintain their separateness.

A further question that this turn might pose is: In a pedagogical relation, what might it mean to enact an attitude similar to the one enacted by Lee in his work *The Dining Project*? It could be argued that Lee immersed himself in the qualities, textures, and materiality of the exchange with his guest. By that I mean that he was both intensely present while being oblivious to his individual existence inside and outside the moment, and that he gave himself to the other without being conscious of what or how he was giving of himself. Might we say, then, that to focus on experience in art education is to immerse oneself in the qualities of the teaching and learning experience? And, that it is to pay attention to the possibilities, promise, and actualities of one's encounters and exchanges with others—objects, people, and processes alike—and to take on what Ellsworth (2007), citing Rajchman (2000), called "an experimentalist relation to the future" (p. 14). In other words, it is to pay attention to the experiences created and had under such conditions and configurations. As William James (1912) said, "*the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations*" (p. 42, emphasis in original). We might also say that to focus on experience in art education requires being attuned to how students engage and connect events with previous ones. Being attuned to these movements, as Lee was, ensures, to a large extent, continuity in the learning process. It suggests being conscious, in important ways, of the forces that surround the individual and the collective, as well as the forces of the individual and the collective, in addition to the forces generated by both in and through their involvement with the world.

One could argue, then, that to focus on experience in art education is to seek out and pursue other alternatives for living with art and learning about self, other, and the world through art and its conditions. It is to entertain notions of art as coming into being and transformed in the company of others, and of embracing art's capacity to appear again and again in places and situations impossible to predict at the time of its first appearance. Importantly, a turn to experience in art education would shift attention away from thinking about art perception as a practice of looking. Experiential artworks suggest that perception is invoked through several of the senses and that vision, while synesthetic (Bal, 2003), is embodied, situated, and locatable (Haraway, 2002).

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, we might say that a turn to experience in art education opens the world to us as a place full of curiosity and possibility, where questions that do not make much sense are worth asking, not for their efficacy but for the places that they may take us. It, too, invites us to consider ways in which we are constantly adapting and being adapted by our surroundings, our choices, and our practices of living, broadly conceived. Being attuned in this way might contribute in important ways to dismantling knowledge hierarchies between teachers and students. Dismantling such knowledge hierarchies, Garoian (2013) said, "are interdependent and necessary for their [students and educators]

mutual creative and intellectual development" (p. 46). The turn to experience in contemporary art presents a potentiality for entertaining other possibilities for art education, for what it does and can do. Whether or not art teachers, who in their daily practices are experience-producers as they define and regulate what is possible to teach and appropriate for their students to learn, take up its potentiality—a potentiality that is identified by asking what does this work do and what does it occasion in the contexts in which it appears—is another matter. However, by bringing one into the consciousness of the other and by understanding ways in which they connect and intersect, there are possibilities for expanding our vision for art in education. In closing, I should say, a turn to experience in art education returns us, as educators and learners, to Dewey's (1934) point that "the work of art is complete only as it works in the experience of others" (p. 106). As educators and learners, we need to continue to remain alert to what experience does and to wonder if we make the world with experiences, or because of experience.

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ENDNOTES

1 For Tolstoy (1896), the "activity of art" is "to evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by means of movement, lines, colors, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling" (p. 51).

2 Clare Bishop (2012) described participatory art as that which involves many people engaging in a work in the making. In such works, people "constitute the central artistic medium and material" (p. 2). The involvement of many people, as distinct from the one-to-one relationships of interactivity, avoids, she said, "the ambiguities of "social engagement," which might refer to a wide range of work, from *engagé* painting to interventionist actions in mass media" (p. 1). Participatory art is also known by other names, including socially engaged art, collaborative art, community-based art, dialogic art littoral art, and new genre public art (Bishop, 2012; Kester, 2012).

3 Irit Rogoff's (2010) thinking about what a turn might comprise is instructive to my argument here. For her, a turn is "an active movement, a generative moment in which a new horizon emerges… leaving the practice that was the originating point behind" (p. 33).

4 This is not to suggest that the concept of experience is being explored for the very first time in art or art education. There is a long tradition of thinking art and experience together as well as education. In our field, we are accustomed to hearing references to the experience of making, to the experience of perceiving, and to the aesthetic experience, for example.

5 Given that every teaching situation is different insofar as it is context specific and depends on a range of variables, what Dewey (1938) called "objective conditions" (p. 45), it is neither possible nor desirable to map out a "how to" approach to art education curriculum informed by the turn to experience in contemporary art practice. Dewey (1968) explained the idea of objective conditions in the following way: "it includes what is done by the educator and the way in which it is done, not only words spoken but the tone of voice in which they are spoken. It includes equipment, books, apparatus, toys, games played. It includes the materials with which an individual interacts, and, most important of all, the total *social* set-up of the situations in which a person is engaged" (p. 45, emphasis in original).