

Title: When space becomes art: making sense of a random world

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyse scenic performance within the concept of “social character” - as the materiality of the artistic discourse. In this paper, social space is considered as a scenic space, with the ability to trigger ephemeral events and to give us clues about the way individuals project and organize their personal path and make sense of their lives, by reinventing them. Today’s new artistic proposals give rise to a plethora of real and virtual spaces with the potential to become scenic spaces. In this sense, the social space has become a privileged place for artistic production and for theorization in the field of social sciences. There seems to be a semiotic correspondence between the concepts of “scenic space” (the physical space where performance takes place) and other “social spaces” where performance can take place. As such, space can be understood as an open narrative structure that reflects individual opinions and dramaturgies that, in turn, will contextualize a specific social moment. Thereby, we can put forward the idea that social and interpersonal memories play a crucial role in the creation of the scenic space. This is based on the assumption that the public space is a space where acting and performance in strict connection with the artistic discourse. Within this theory, we can argue that actions occurred in public spaces are subject to common rules that, in turn, are tied to series of performative rituals. In this sense, public spaces are spaces that emulate life and existence.

Image and social performance

Performing arts, as a cultural and artistic creation, structure and express the individual consciousness and specific social visions of the world. The performative phenomenon is, therefore, a symbiotic process that facilitates the articulation between the established knowledge and the existential experience (Goldmann, 1971; 1976). One of the privileges of artistic fruition is the possibility to experience a “double understanding”, i.e. being able to get lost in oneself and then to rediscover oneself through a cosmogonic reasoning that questions the world. Despite the scenic relationship established by space, it is the viewer who initiates “the game” and the said theatricality. When we attempt to analyse performing arts, and formulate proposals today, we must take two fundamental aspects into account: (i) the multiplicity of interconnected artistic identities; (ii) the growing specularization of social life in a “theatre of life” characterized by new paratheatrical rituals.

Nowadays, naturalism and expressionism are pushed to their limits. Human life (between the hectic pace of daily life and nightlife’s *reality show*) has become a potential scenic space. This attaches particular importance to the “social actor”, who takes up a similar role to that of the “scenic actor”. In fact, daily life and performance have never been so interconnected, hence our reference to two types of performance that use similar signs and conventions: the theatrical performance and daily life as a form of performance. To this extent, performance becomes a way of behaviour, a convergence towards the perceptual experience. In this way, the spectacle of the world is constantly reorganized according to individual perceptions and rationales. In other words, by attributing an image to the scenic processes, phenomenology becomes an action theory within the scope of the appropriation of the spectacle.

Phenomenological thinking is based on the premise that all phenomenological experiences organize “a whole”, with drawn contours hierarchically organized in relation to each other. According to phenomenology, the world’s unity, before being perceived by conscience as a reality or an identity, exists on its own, as a blueprint of the world that is not owned by the subject but to which the subject is constantly addressing. The most important achievement of phenomenology was, without a doubt, combining extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism in its notion of the world and of rationality. The phenomenological world is not the realm of the pure self, but rather one that emerges from the interception of the experiences of the self with other people’s experiences. Therefore, the “real” is something that is described, not built, therefore, perception cannot be assimilated through judgement.

Our perceptual field is subject to a plethora of fleeting tactile sensations, which should be analysed but not confused with dreams. The real is, hence, a solid fabric that does not depend on our judgements to exist and to make sense. Perception is not a science, nor a stand that is deliberately taken, but rather the foundation upon which all actions and phenomena unfold, which are then taken as assumptions by the Self. In this context, we should also talk about a multitude of other “selves”, who have different perceptions that result from sensorial experiences, the validity of which can never be demonstrated. As argued by Merleau-Ponty (2002; 2003), the spectacle of the world is constantly reorganized according to individual perceptions and rationales.

It should be noted that our perceptual presence in the world is beyond positive or negative judgement. As such, perceptual faith is older than any reasoning, it is how we experience the world with our body, it is an experience that we understand as “true”, regardless of whether it is visible or not. Therefore, perceiving and imagining are just two ways of thinking, and imagination not seeing or feeling but rather having an immanence of truth about what isn't seen nor can't be felt. The world is the same for everyone, to the extent that it is what we think we perceive and that, to us, that is the only truth. Perceptual faith is our surest form of contact and interaction with the world. As such, neither philosophy nor art can bring answers to the human anxieties. The questions they attempt to answer are older than our life and history, and most of them remain unanswered.

In this perspective, we don't need to experience things, the idea of having experienced them (the virtual image in its relation with everyday life) is enough (Levinas, 1991). Everyday life spaces become, thus, spaces of life simulacra. In other words, as the real social becomes a performance space, the social actor starts seeking a stage where he can create as many characters as he wishes. It is in line with these theories that Goffman (1974) refers to everyday life spaces as scenic spaces and to the social actor as a scenic persona. The social actor plays an “archetypal role” within a collective unconsciousness, (Jung, 2003) and is simultaneously a character (when moving about in a performative space).

Social actors are thus seen as interpreters who constantly recreate themselves through different characters (Goffman, 1974; 1993), similarly to the notion of the “theatre within the theatre” (Pirandello, 1990). In this perspective, Goffman (1974) argues that the notion of

social performance affects the subject's perception at two levels: (i) in the way space is perceived in its scenic logic; b) in the way space is sensibly inhabited.

Space configuration and everyday life aestheticization

The reflection on the creation of new scenic spaces is concurrent with the aestheticization of everyday life, which has begun to taking shape mostly after the 1970s, with the ritualization of production and consumption operations. In this "aestheticized reality", the artistic/cultural product operates as an essential symbolic element, that extends the limits of social behaviour by raising new aspirations, requirements and goals and by opening new doors into the future.

This phenomenon is inseparable from the influence of the *media* as new agents of socialization and cultural transmission. This seemingly simple realization has complex implications on the dynamics of aesthetical perception and on the uses of art in contemporary society since it creates new communication processes, which are increasingly developing in the public space. In his analysis of the power of the *media* Luhman (1982; 1990) states that, by operating as mediating devices, the media obtain an aesthetical and rhetoric power, acting as the designers of the public space where the actions and discourses take place. The media promote, therefore, the diffusion of contemporary society's aestheticization, in which artistic productions submerge. This means that Art is an important influence in the configuration of sociability. The ultimate goal — both for social groups (the viewers) and artists — is to build social, cultural and artistic identities simultaneously.

Art and culture play an important role in social life, where creativity is an ever-present cultural value and where being imaginative is a condition to be acknowledged as an individual. In fact, despite society's transition from a paratheatricity into a theatricality, the mechanisms remain identical, the difference is that in a (conscious) theatrical register the ability to transform reality is no longer experienced by the «social self» in action, but by the character created by the «actor self». The spectacular performance becomes a vehicle used by the individual to achieve another state of consciousness, to exorcize desires and to make sense of "the real". Nowadays, the social space has become a potential scenic place, subject to many representations.

As mentioned before, space can be treated as an aesthetic object, even without there being the slightest artistic intention. Space is a metaphor that promotes and influences an infinite number of intentions and acts, that depend on sociocultural conventions, discretion and taste. The social actor, as a body in action that inhabits a space, it is never the result of a conscious decision. We are not fully responsible for the Body image we create, it occurs randomly, it is shaped by external and circumstantial views. If we were responsible for our Body image, there would be no image, since it emerges, as argued by Jung (1998), from an unconscious representation. The image we project originates other images and this allows us to creatively develop our body image in daily life (Goffman, 1993). The aestheticization of everyday life spaces improves our knowledge of our body and about other people's bodies, within performance events that spark a representation of imaginaries.

The desire for interaction or life as a performance exercise.

The sociological discourse highlights two perspectives within the analyses of interaction. One perspective approaches interaction as the concrete expression of the global normative order, referencing the necessary adjustment among social roles (represented or complied with) played by social actors. The other perspective approaches interaction in a dramaturgical sense, where the social "inter-acting" operates through the reciprocal expression and negotiation of symbols.

In this perspective, social actors take on the leading role and create a "social order" within the restricted space-time limits. In both perspectives, there is a resource to the theatrical discourse in its dramatic sense. Social interaction acquires, thus, the value of scenic inter-acting, constituting an occasion to activate and create perception schemes of individual and social paths. This tends to renew the social order that was in the root of the acquisition of the dispositions. As such, all social interactions, from the most casual to the most complex, acquire a sense of "dramatic play", which is subject to specific rules. In that process, corporeality acquires a capital value, by bringing to the foreground the importance of the "happening", as a social practice that establishes a narrative between the social body and the event concerned.

Goffman (1974) argues that any social interaction involves an inter-performance (inter-

acting) of, at least, two social actors (socialized bodies), who build an interpersonal narrative in a dramaturgy based on pre-established settings, which, in turn, creates social logics, both synchronically and diachronically. These configurations and social constraints instil dialectical and ideological operators within the actors. They define the interaction context and the horizon of expectations and interdictions, with the resulting power logics and practical expressions of the representation of the game.

Peter Brook (1993) describes theatrical interaction on the same terms. In other words, if "the world is a stage", as Shakespeare put it, the model of dramaturgical analysis can be applied both to art and to social organization. In both fields, the individual consciousness of the performance act (and of the need of an audience to perform that act) is important. However, in the case of social performance, the audience is not only a spectator but also a witness. The audience, more than judging the actor's performance, will confer it an existence and, above all, it will confer a scenic presence to the actor.

The quality of our presence (whether social or scenic) is directly related to our horizon of expectations. Thereby, everything that happens at the performance level only acquires a mimetic and plausible sense through an articulation of significance. The articulation of significance attaches a meaning to the similarities with life, through the projection of meaningful schemes in the form of performance.

The desire for interaction (Goffman:1974), which implies a performer/character and a spectator/witness, produces a similar polarizing effect both on stage and in everyday life. There is always an exchange of roles between the performer (the promoter of the action) and the spectator (the witness of the action), and that inter-acting (interaction) is crucial for the development of a symbolic system.

Social actors, like scenic actors, don't just limit themselves to playing a role, they build a character as if it were their own existence; this implies that the character is a symbiosis between the role and the actor's materiality. In this sense, the character resides between the power of the act and the power of the action, and this tension is the force that defines the character's originality. In this process, space, as the primary place of performance, frees the social actor from life's implausibility.

Character: actants and actors

Performance contains, within itself, the mimesis and the catharsis, in the Aristotelian sense of the terms. In this perspective, the ritualistic and mythic art acquires a psychoanalytical status of "dream" and "imagination". To Ubersfeld (1998), performing arts are mimesis, since even in their distorted and abstract form they stem from everyday life and from the human being (imitating his passions, desires and fears), and, therefore, triggering the catharsis mechanisms.

Catharsis has the same function as dreaming; it bridges and exorcizes the desires and anxieties of the subconscious, as well as unresolved real life situations. This is without prejudice to those who "let themselves dream" because they know that a dream, just like a spectacle, is an illusion, they know they are safe even in the apparent face of danger.

Mimesis emerges from that abstraction, and it touches us because it is in the nature of human essence. This implies that the act of reception is not only complex but also dual. The spectator needs to constantly distinguish between virtual spaces of performance and real spaces of performance, in which he participates as a witness.

We can further add that, during the space/time span of a performance, there is another parallel coded reality that transcends fiction and the performance act (Pirandello, 1999). As such, characters exist in a different dimension, which are independent from interpreters and spectators but only are made possible because interpreters and spectators exist and validate that dimension. In this process, the first element of the (scenic and social) spectacular performance is the interpreter's presence. He is both an actant and an actor, and the character is at the origin of the entire discourse.

If we want to examine the character's path, we need to go back to ancient times. In Greek theatre, the *persona* is a mask. The interpreter and the character figures do not get mixed up. The character is independent from the interpreter, both in the text and in the author's mind. This is also Pirandello's (1999) point of view; in time, the character develops as a "psychologising" essence, and there is a growing unification between the character and the interpreter. Characters become perceived from a philosophical and idealistic human point of view.

Greimas (1973) also establishes a series of hierarchized and articulated units within the character, namely: actant, actor, role and character. The combination of these elements

governs the basic structure of the social and scenic performance. To Greimas (1973), interpreters are actants, in the sense that they are *mythemes*. This is related to the notion of archetype. By nature, the character plays an archetypal role while also being a social actor (when moving in a specific space and universe), who has to play a role.

Goffman (1974) argues that acknowledging the character as a social actor always implies the performance of other characters, which result from the interaction/inter-acting event. Social actors are, therefore, seen as interpreters who constantly recreate themselves through different characters (Goffman, 1974; 1993), which is in line with Pirandello's (1990) notion of "theatre within the theatre". It also becomes relevant to analyse how interpreters position themselves in this scheme since they operate on a dual and fragmented sense: as interpreters of a fictional space and as social actors - characters.

It is known that characters live in a constant emotional polarity, which drives their actions (just like in everyday life) and defines the multiple roles assumed by each character. The character is a "social actor" on a stage (whether scenic and/or social) playing one or several roles that, in turn, will determine the specific auxiliary functions of the action, just like in real life. However, these two situations are distinct, and the roles do not get mixed up.

According to Ubersfeld (1998), the contemporary notion of "character" is in crisis. This is partially related to the confusion that exists between the concepts of actor, actant and role, and to the fact that the character has become a conflux of functions, with no specific identity or autonomy to act. Since the beginning of the 20th century, we have seen the character being treated at an unconscious level, always maintaining the notions of "shadow" and "archetype". However, there has been a shift into a "representation of the unconscious", which was reflected in writing, performance and, clearly, in the act of reception.

In the 21st century, we returned to a catharsis tradition, to a performance that seeks mitogenesis, to the unconscious human shadow and archaeology, to a definition of art as a mechanism that structures the collective unconscious. Nowadays, characters are based on the notion of "social actor" and develop themselves within the psychoanalytic model – ego, alter-ego – which, in dramaturgy, translates as text – subtext. To analyse the contemporary social and scenic characters, we need to take the most subjective and affective possibilities into account (Pavis: 2000).

Ubersfeld (2001) puts forward a scheme to analyse the character, based on the assumption that the character is an intersection of lines and references that can only be analysed in light of a specific referential system and in a global interaction context. The author defines the following functions in the analysis of a character:

- (i) Syntactic function – characters are part of a syntactic structure that has a grammatical function, they always have the function of structuring the action;
- (ii) Metonymic and metaphoric function – characters can be a metaphor of several domains of reality or express themselves at a metonymic level;
- (iii) Connotative function – characters connote a series of meanings;
- (iv) Poetic function – characters are always an important element of theatrical poetics and the paradigm of that same poetics.

Ubersfeld (2001) also points out that characters (elements of differential semiotic determinants) always have two types of discourse: what they say about themselves and what others say about them. What is “said” is part of a psychological discourse, it lies between what it is said it “is” and what really “is”, between what we think others think of us and what others end up verbalizing about us. In this sense, it can be argued that the character, as the subject of enunciation, uses a semiotically coded - verbal and physical - language.

There are different types of discourse upholding a scenic relationship: the intra-scenic discourse (interpreter-character), the scenic discourse (inter-action between characters) and the extra-scenic discourse (interpreter/character-spectator/witness). The scenic enunciation comprises, thus: (i) a producing discourse (whose sender is the author) and (ii) a produced or reported discourse (whose announcer is the character). Two enunciation conditions can also be distinguished: (i) the real conditions of the scenic enunciation and (ii) the imaginary conditions of the enunciation, created within the performance. This process is true for both artistic and social performance.

We can also add that the process of getting to know the characters’ life is long and complex (Steiner, 1995); and we believe that, as characters grow older, i.e. are played more often, our knowledge about them increases. This means that characters are complex and, just like in real life, on a mortal plane, they need time to express themselves.

The moving body

Within the scenic context, the body has an infinite combination of possibilities and is permanently exploring the images it can create. This is the body's biggest secret on scene: by exhibiting itself in front of the other (the mirror) it becomes exposed and transitions into a representation. Although it is hard to separate representation from reality, and fiction from "the real", the fact that both universes follow similar rules, we should pay attention to the fact that the body, in a scenic context (even if it is a public space), is a body "on exhibition". The body "on exhibition" represents our desire to cross all established borders, by accepting new coded ways of being. In this sense, the act of exhibiting is an achievement of the body's possibilities, exacerbating to the limit all its performance meanings within the space.

As noted before, the body is used differently in everyday life and in scenic life. In everyday life, the body is constrained by social rules, and added techniques come mostly from the unconscious, with a functional purpose. Therefore, different cultures entail different body techniques and different memories. By contrast, in a performance, all natural and daily life gestures acquire an artificial nature, since they shift from an unconscious to a conscious and deliberate register. On stage, there is a constant worry about the dramaturgic sense.

As time passes and their practice evolves, interpreters acquire a sort of second nature; they develop a different neuromuscular structure that reflects a "scenic body". The power of the interpreter's movement comes from the energetic concentration of the elements that are fundamental to carry out actions, within a limited space and time. This necessarily results in disposing of all secondary elements. When the interpreter faces an audience, he feels the need to create a sense, to act something out, and he uses his body to do so. That behaviour-desire is referred to as scenic presence.

Regarding perception, the interpreter works with tangible and concrete tools – the body and the voice – but he also works with energy, something inherent, that pulses in the stillness of silence, a "though-power" that grows without a tangible expression in space. Interpreters have the inherent ability to expand the dynamics of their bodies, to build and recreate the body according to the scenic fiction in which they take part in. The same

process occurs in everyday life (Goffman, 1974).

Social actors create a scenic presence that is instrumental to the development of their characters. According to Gillibert (1993), in daily life, at an intrapersonal level, each gesture and action are linked to the truthfulness of the emotion that originated them. We believe in others for the truthfulness of their emotions, but the source of that truth is our own faith and, naturally, the degree of honesty that the other brings into his "acting". In other words, when in a performance space, the social actor (as well as the scenic interpreter) acts deliberately and according to the presence of an audience.

Performance involves two movements: perception and fruition. The interpreter/scenic space relationship is measured by a sensorial and fruition logic. "Social interpreters" are individualities who wish to communicate their inner world to the Other. In this process, the public space is an element of otherness that facilitates the meeting of the distinct interlocutors. Space sends "social interpreters" to a different inner dimension; this always involves a movement of connection with a certain Other (someone who crosses the same space) whom they do not know but who inhabit the same external universe. The greatest challenge is making the Other connatural to the "social interpreter", which will necessarily imply a movement of returning to oneself, a movement in fruition (Levinas, 2000).

The social interpreter/space relationship is a relationship of anticipations, of acting out roles, that only lasts for the duration of the performance. Social interpreters cannot describe their relationship with space, and they will never be able to project a future, because that same space-scenario is constantly changing, which is why the scenic appropriation of space is experienced as a fruition.

In this context, Pirandello (1974) conceives art as an extension of life. The author sustains that the illusion of a real world is as important as reality in a world of illusion. The spectacle (scenic or real) becomes an experience identical to Levinas's (2000) concept of fruition. Reality and fiction coexist, side by side, with no boundaries, in a conflux of imaginary and real spaces. In this process, the body is an important element since it is a symbolic, significant and semiotic manifestation.

The common belief that words can lie but not the body, is somehow *untruth* because by acting out we end up building a character that uses the body as a code (Goffman, 1993).

From this point of view, the body can also lie. However, the body in movement is, quintessentially, the space of stereotypes and no language functions without the stereotypes and clichés expressed by the body. These pre-coded gestures are the very thing that allows us to express our emotions. Since emotions are stronger, we have a greater need to use the body to express them. In fact, the body allows us to bridge the gap between what we feel and the limits of what we can express by words.

Stereotypes are, thus, a way of ensuring that others understand meaning. Even knowing that body stereotypes "steal" our individuality and the uniqueness of our feelings, by recreating clichés we are able to create a dramaturgy of affections and social interactions. The body is a screen that mirrors the Other, and this interaction becomes a "secret body". This phenomenon creates a "social body" that changes in collective interaction events, which asserts both its existence and its expressive potential.

In sum, the scenic presence of the body is a phylogenetic memory of the symbolic and cultural universe that takes part in the construction of an identity. The assertion of the stereotype in daily life's performances becomes an "aesthetical order". Through the dynamics of repetition and its consequent collision, body images become stereotyped, which allows the expansion of their semiotic and semantic potential (Jeudy, 1998). The body stereotype can, thus, be considered as the very foundation of aesthetics.

As mentioned above, the body is an aesthetic object that draws our attention to a continuous and revived illusion of performance. Even if it is commonplace, what we call aestheticism always brings us to a *habitus* of the body (in its interaction with space), as if the body was the very establisher of the subject-world interaction aesthetics. The assumption that the body is aestheticized in the social space is inseparable from the fact that the body is considered a semiotic system, given its ability to send scenic signals. As pointed out by Jeudy (1998) the body is constantly moving, with an aesthetic purpose.

Conclusion:

Intra-scene and Inter-scene

Western culture is dominated by the imperative of image: the conscience, as self-analysis,

seen as a mirror, involving reflecting mechanisms that are based on images. This mirror can, potentially, return less interesting images, however, it is our ability to act out what we are, and what others are, that makes the “real” plausible.

Image is an indispensable element of intelligibility, a requirement to live in society, and this is how we resist the *virtuality* of the real. The phenomenological becomes a full aesthetic fruition. If «seeing living» was, in its origin, a universalizing aesthetics; nowadays «seeing living» has become a practice that makes us believe that true fruition comes from the spectacularism of the world, more from a cognitive image of the real than from sensorial manifestations.

It is in this sense that Husserl (1992) speaks of an «ego-man» restricted by a body that perceives things. It is in the game of power between “body – emotion – thought” that the basic principles of the sensorial body reveal themselves. In fact, the body has an infinite combination of possibilities and does not limit itself to the “real” that is reflected by the mirror. The goal of the aesthetic exhibition of the body is to communicate and to enable, through performance, an intellectual reflection about fiction. In this sense, “exhibition” is an achievement of the body’s possibilities, exacerbating to the limit all its performance potential.

The aestheticization of the body in everyday life creates a body that seeks the casual look of the passer-by (the other). This demonstrates that there are multiple daily life events participating in the creation of the collective ideal of “the pleasure of being a spectacle”. There is no sociability without seduction and, consequently, without the acknowledgement of the body as an aesthetic object (our body and other people’s bodies).

In line with Goffman’s (1974) thoughts, we can claim that all our forms of representing the body reflect our way of life, as if the body were an independent character at the service of the subject who inhabits the character. The ways in which the body is aestheticized in daily life are implicitly determined by acquired cultural habits and by the repeated perception of works of art. At the same time, the images resulting from the everyday life experience of the body are the ones that, accidentally, interfere with the depiction of the body in the artistic discourse. Consequently, artistic representations of the body do not depict an isolated body but rather a vision of the world. This is why the body, as an object of art, is always a reference to stereotypes. The intention is not to “demonstrate” but rather to bring

forward all the contradictions that result from the tension between images and their depiction according to the common principles of an aesthetical ideal. The real becomes a symbolic operator and art becomes an object, which is open to a multitude of senses and uses (what we should see; what we want to see).

The plausibility lies in the “real” production of “fiction”. Everyday real life has become a transcendental and metaphorical object. Art has become a polyphonic document within a social world that is overwhelmed by images. We do not even need to experience things, the idea of having experienced them (the virtual image in its relation with everyday life) is enough. In this context, art frees itself from being a simulacrum of life and takes up the space of illusion and imagination, where a new human is reinvented without metaphors. The body “on scene” is interpreted as an aesthetic means to recapture a space of intervention, underlining the disjunction between the “real” and the “scenic”. A new way of thinking the phenomenon of the spectacular has emerged, where performance is not about representing reality but rather about an ideal everyday quest for the unsaid, through a deconstruction of life. The chronological order is belittled in favour of a logical order. There has been a shift from a system that imitates nature into a system that recreates the “thought system”.

This «everyday life art» comes in two perspectives: one that formally seeks art in everyday life; and another that seeks to transcribe everyday life in a linear way, as a raw material that is not subject to metaphors. The purpose now is that the artistic object becomes more like a realistic mirror of interpersonal relationships than of the space-time narratives. The narratives of the subject and his social interactions give place to new inter-subjective and intra-subjective narratives. The Aristotelian concepts of mimesis and catharsis are thus revived, not in a social dimension, but in a private and biographical sense. This is assuming that the traditional concepts of dramatic collision dissipate in the contemporary artistic creation, giving place to new the conception that the spectator should see the artistic object «as if it were real» and the creator should assume the artistic object as a «fictionalized reality».

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of space as a site of ephemeral representations, giving us insights about random artistic performances. In this sense, one can conceive space as a representation of social relationships between people, which are mediated by images. Consequently, it is through a physical space that people organise their personal trajectories.

From this point of view, the actions that occur in public spaces are subject to shared rules within a known set of applications. Hence, the polarisation effect that happens on a stage also happens in daily life: there is always an interchange of roles between the performer (the promoter of the action) and the spectator (the witness of the action), and that interchange is crucial to the creation of a symbolic system.

There seems to be a semiotic and meaning correspondence between the scenic space (the physical space of performance) and other social spaces of representation. This paper proposes a phenomenological and aesthetic approach to "performative spaces", suggesting implications and

discussing the various performative places (concrete and fictional) as scenic spaces of symbolic interaction.

In doing so it confronts social-philosophical theories and multiple theatrical practices, proposing different ways of understanding the concept of performance as a phylogenetic and cosmological experience. It also questions artistic performance as an event that promotes an interruption of daily routines and creates different perspectives on how life can be interpreted.

Keywords: scenic space; performance analysis; performing art; semiotics; dramaturgy