

## ARTICLE

**NODE: “NEW FEMINIST MATERIALISM: ENGENDERING AN ETHIC-ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY”**

# From interaction to intra-action in performing landscape

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**Abstract**

When we try to understand and articulate an artistic practice called performing landscape, it proves helpful to understand various (f)actors, such as, for instance, the wind, the tripod, the scarf, the body, and so on, as interacting collaborators within an assemblage of various materialities (Bennett, 2010). Prompted by Rosi Braidotti's (2013) overview of the discussions around the posthuman, however, we could ask whether it is possible to understand the interaction more like an “intra-action” (Barad, 2007), where the entanglement of the various components is a pre-condition, rather than a result, of the action. Perhaps the split of the artist into a performer in front of the camera and a witness behind it could be understood as an agential cut of sorts? In the case of a previous practice — performing with plants — intra-action is intuitively easier to assume, due to the symbiotic interdependence of animals and plants in their exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. But could we understand performing for the camera, with a small swing attached to a tree, as an intra-action as well? And if so, what would be the methodological advantages of pursuing such an understanding?

This case study set within the field of performance as research and artistic research is related to the mattering of the digital, since the practice itself is to a large extent digital, although the main focus of the paper is on methodological questions.

**Keywords**

intra-action, performing landscape, artistic research, performance as research, environment

*De la interacción a la intra-acción en la performance del paisaje***Resumen**

*Cuando intentamos entender y articular la práctica artística denominada performance del paisaje, resulta útil comprender varios (f)actores, como por ejemplo el viento, el trípode, el pañuelo, el cuerpo y demás, como elementos colaboradores que interactúan dentro de un ensamblaje de materialidades diversas (Bennett, 2010). No obstante, y considerando la visión que tiene Rosi Braidotti (2013) de los debates acerca de lo posthumano, podríamos preguntarnos si es posible comprender mejor la interacción como una intra-acción (Barad, 2007), donde el enredo de diversos componentes es un requisito esencial y no un resultado de la acción. ¿Puede entenderse la escisión del artista que es performer ante la cámara y al mismo tiempo testigo detrás de ella como un tipo de corte agencial? En el caso de una práctica previa —la performance con plantas— se asume de manera más intuitiva que se trata de una intra-acción, debido a la interdependencia simbiótica de animales y plantas que intercambian oxígeno y dióxido de carbono. ¿Pero podríamos entender la actuación ante la cámara, con un pequeño columpio sujeto a un árbol, también como una intra-acción? Y si es así, ¿cuáles podrían ser las ventajas metodológicas de adoptar esa perspectiva?*

*Este estudio de caso situado dentro del campo de la performance como investigación e investigación artística está vinculado a la materialización de lo digital, dado que la práctica en sí es en gran medida digital, aunque este artículo se concentra mayoritariamente en cuestiones metodológicas.*

**Palabras clave**

*intra-acción, performance del paisaje, investigación artística, performance como investigación, entorno*

**Introduction**

In a recent project, *Year of the Snake Swinging* (2014), performed for the camera once a week for a year on the same island, an aspen growing on the western shore of Harakka Island in Helsinki provided the setting and support for a small swing and served as a figure showing the shifting seasons and the weather. This was the last part in a series of twelve one-year projects, which I began in 2002 and finished in 2014, called *Animal Years*, based on the Chinese calendar and its cycle of twelve years, with each year named after a specific animal. The project explored the question of how to perform landscape today (Arlander, 2012), based on the traditions of performance art, video art and environmental art, and moving in the borderland between them. The most obvious layer of the work during the year of the snake was the movement of the swing, attached to other trees on other shores as well and explored by both visiting performers and myself (see appendix).

Jane Bennett, in her popular book *Vibrant Matter, a political ecology of things* (2010) asserts the agency of assemblages. She tries to develop a distributive agency based on Spinoza's "affective" bodies and Deleuze's and Guattari's "assemblages". Assemblages are,

for her "ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts" (Bennett, 2010, pp. 23-24); power is not distributed equally across their surface, nor does a central head govern them. The effects generated by an assemblage are emergent properties, with an ability to make something happen. Besides the vital force of each member there is efficacy proper to the grouping: an agency of the assemblage, she explains. An assemblage is never a solid block but an open-ended collective, a "non-totalizable sum" with a history of formation and a finite lifespan, she notes (Bennett, 2010, pp. 23-24).

The tree clearly has some agency in the assemblage of wood, rope and branch that forms a swing. And in this case we could add other (f)actors — like the sea, the wind, the cliffs, a human being, a scarf, a video camera on a tripod and more — as interacting collaborators in the assemblage. The agency of technology is evident; if the battery of the camera runs out, the productive capacity of the whole assemblage is affected — hence, no video. But the agency of the aspen is even more palpable — no tree, no branch, no place to fasten the swing. The strange form to the right on the shore in the image (see Figure 1) is the stub of another aspen that used to grow there, but died a few years ago, perhaps because of too much seawater at its roots. By growing next to each other they afforded the fastening of a hammock

between them. Now the other one still provides support for a swing. Acknowledging the agency of the tree suggests further questions. How could we expand our understanding of agency in performance as research? What would that mean in terms of methodology?



Figure 1. Year of the Snake – In the Swing (2014), video still. Camera and performer Annette Arlander.

## Intra-action

Thinking of the swing in terms of entanglement means that the interaction of the elements that form the swing (the small plank, the ropes, the branch of the tree) could better be conceived of as an intra-action, following Karen Barad, since the combination of those elements is a precondition for, rather than the result of, the action.

For Karen Barad, intra-action is a key element of her agential realist framework. It “signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies” and, unlike the ordinary term interaction, it “recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action” (Barad, 2007, p. 33). Moreover, they are distinct only in a relational sense: “agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglements, they don’t exist as individual elements” (Barad, 2007). In Barad’s account, phenomena (rather than independent objects) are “the basic units of existence” (Barad, 2007, p. 333). They do not simply mark the inseparability of observer and observed; rather, “phenomena are the ontological inseparability/entanglement of intra-acting ‘agencies’ [...]” (Barad, 2007, p. 139). In short, “phenomena are ontological entanglements” (Barad, 2007, p. 333). Phenomena are produced through intra-actions; as Barad specifies, “it is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the ‘components’ of phenomena become determinate and the particular material articulations in the world become meaningful” (Barad, 2007). Thus, “apparatuses are not mere observing instruments but boundary drawing practices — specific material reconfigurings

of the world — which come to matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 140). The differential boundaries between humans and nonhumans, culture and nature, science and the social are constituted through causal intra-actions (Barad, 2007). Entangled practices are productive and who and what are excluded through them matters; different intra-actions produce different phenomena, she notes (Barad, 2007, p. 58).

According to Barad, determinate entities emerge from their intra-action; the term intra-action refers to their ontological inseparability; this contrasts with interaction, which relies on the metaphysics of individualism. Thus we should understand phenomena as specific intra-actions, not as objects-in-themselves. “Since individually determinate entities do not exist, measurements do not entail an interaction between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge from their intra-action [...] A phenomenon is a specific intra-action of an ‘object’ and the ‘measuring agencies’; the object and the measuring agencies emerge from, rather than precede, the intra-action that produces them” (Barad, 2007, p. 128). Phenomena for Barad are physical-conceptual (material-discursive) intra-actions, and the term intra-action signifies “the mutual constitution of objects and agencies of observation within phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 197). She summarizes her point as follows: “Different material intra-actions produce different materializations of the world” (Barad, 2007, p. 380).

What does this mean with regard to our example of the swing? The swing emerges from the entanglement of rope, wood and tree — but do these things not exist as individual elements before being combined into a swing? Following Barad they do not, since they are all part of the world intra-acting with itself. Through the notion of intra-activity “a lively new ontology emerges” (Barad, 2007, p. 33), which is based on fundamental inseparability. Instead of looking at a swing as an assemblage of pre-existing elements like rope and wood and tree, should we understand the phenomenon of a swing as producing those elements? Perhaps the parts of the swing are parts of a swing only after the swing has come into being. Or, on a more material level, the plank has been part of another tree before being formed into a plank and painted blue. The plastic rope is made of oil, the remains of a forest millions of years ago. These seemingly individual elements are the result of previous intra-actions. The notion of intra-action changes our understanding of our relationship to the environment. Bodies are not simply situated or located in particular environments, Barad explains; rather, environments and bodies are intra-actively co-constituted. “Bodies (‘human’, ‘environmental’ or otherwise) are integral ‘parts’ of, or dynamic reconfigurings of, what is” (Barad, 2007, p. 170).

The relationship between “bodies” and “environment” becomes obvious when working with video imagery. The idea of intra-action as constitutive is easier to understand, because the elements in the image are produced by the intra-action of “measuring agencies” like the camera, the tripod, the framing of the image, and “objects” like the cliff, the sea, the tree, the stub, the swing and the performer. In

the image the swing and the tree form an environment around the human figure, whereas the swing moving on its own becomes a body in its own right, surrounded by an environment. And without the swing the tree and the nearby stub form the main bodies with the sea, the sky and the cliffs as their environment.

## Agential cut

Barad's notion of "agential cut" is useful in this context; according to her, the split into subject and object is enacted in each case, rather than given. "Intra-actions include the larger material arrangement (i.e., a set of material practices) that effect an *agential cut* between 'subject' and 'object' (in contrast to the more familiar Cartesian cut which takes this distinction for granted). That is, the agential cut enacts a resolution *within* the phenomenon of the inherent ontological or semantic indeterminacy" (Barad, 2007, pp. 139-140). Barad explains how the boundaries and properties of the parts of the phenomenon become determinate only in the enactment of an agential cut that delineates the "measured object" from the "measuring agent". Thus "a correlation between the "causal agency" (cause) and "measuring agency" (effect) is marked by the intra-action of one part of the phenomenon with another" (Barad, 2007, p. 337). And this is not restricted to human activities. "If a measurement is the intra-active marking of one part of a phenomenon by another, where phenomena are specific ontological entanglements, that is, specific material configurations of the world, then there is nothing inherent in the nature of a measurement that makes it irreducibly human centered" (Barad, 2007, p. 338).

In a simplified manner we can understand this through video practice. The camera produces the image by framing it, by creating a cut between what is within and what is outside the frame — between what is part of the image and what is not. This division does not pre-exist in the landscape but emerges through the action of video recording. And this intra-action involves material-discursive practices like the properties of the lens of the camera or my preconceptions of what constitutes a good view and so on. And these, too, are created through the intra-actions.

The notion of agential cut could be useful in describing the practice of performing for a camera on a tripod. The split of the artist into a performer in front of the camera and a witness behind it is an agential cut of sorts. By placing the camera on a tripod the same person can be split into photographer and performer. The camera can be put to record and so can function as a witness and the performer can enter the image, engage in the action and then return to behind the camera to control the result. Unlike with a still camera, the right moments can be chosen later while editing. And unlike with a film camera, the results can be seen at once and the material reused, with a possibility to correct mistakes and improvise.

Yet another kind of agential cut, or rather, measuring agency, is involved in the choice of time schedule. A temporal cut, or temporal framing, takes place when repeating the action once a week, picking "slices of time" in the landscape at one-week intervals. Another "temporal framing", like returning to the same place once a month, would produce another view of the changes in the landscape. Everything between the recorded moments is excluded from the video, a consequence of the cut or jump created by the schedule or the measuring apparatus.

Removing rather than adding slices of documentary material while editing produces an appearance of a new reality. In this case I use all takes in the order of recording, leaving out the sequences where the performer enters and exits the image. Thus, an illusion of continuity is created in the final work. If the performer sits or stands immobile in the landscape, an illusion of her being there while the seasons change is produced. In this example the rhythm of the swing strengthens the illusion of continuity.

Events during the video recording are not based only on human decision making. The light meter and white-balance calculator, automatic focus and other technologies included in the automatic functions of the camera are constantly reacting and readjusting to the changes in the environment caused by weather and wind, time of day and year, passers-by of all species and the actions of the performer. The editing process too — choosing what images not to use and what to use and how to combine them — is interplay (or intra-action) between human choice and the affordances of technology.

The framing of the image, the division into performer and observer and the schedule when to perform are comparable to agential cuts; they clearly make a difference. As Barad states: "Since different agential cuts materialize different phenomena — different marks on bodies — our intra-actions [...] contribute to the differential mattering of the world" (Barad, 2007, p. 178). She would not emphasize choice, however, since according to her "[c]uts are agentially enacted not by wilful individuals but by the larger material arrangement of which 'we' are a 'part'." We are responsible for the cuts that we help enact, not because we choose or are being chosen, "but because we are an agential part of the material becoming of the universe" (Barad, 2007). This also means that "'others' are never very far from 'us'; 'they' and 'we' are co-constituted and entangled through the very cuts 'we' help to enact", she notes (Barad, 2007, p. 129).

The tree and the swing are co-constituted and entangled in a way that changes over time. Is the branch of the tree that the swing is fastened around part of the swing? If the ropes were left around the branch, they would eventually be enveloped by the growing tree and be covered by lichen living on it. But how could the boundaries between the swing and the swinger change? However much I would feel at one with my surroundings, I am aware of what is part of the tree and what is part of me. How are we co-constituted and entangled, besides our constant exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide?



Perhaps this felt difference between us actually co-constitutes me as a person.

As Barad writes, “[a]gential intra-actions are specific causal material enactments that may or may not involve ‘humans’”, but the point is not only to incorporate “both humans and non-humans into the apparatus of bodily production” (Barad, 2007, p. 171). For her “[h]umans do not merely assemble different apparatuses for satisfying particular knowledge projects; they themselves are part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the world” (Barad, 2007). She dismisses both humanist and anti-humanist accounts; human subjects do not exist prior to their involvement in natural-cultural practices, nor are they the effects of human-based discursive practices. Human subjects are neither outside observers of apparatuses nor independent subjects that intervene in the workings of apparatuses, she explains, nor are they the products of the social technologies that produce them (Barad, 2007). Subjects and objects are constituted through specific intra-actions, which may range across traditional boundaries between humans and non-humans or between self and other, she notes (Barad, 2007, p. 342). For her “human bodies, like all other bodies, are not entities with inherent boundaries and properties but phenomena that acquire specific boundaries and properties through the open-ended dynamics of intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 172).

What would this mean in terms of my material-discursive and natural-cultural practice of performing landscape? Does it mean that I too, like the swing or the tree or the sea, acquire specific boundaries and properties through the intra-actions involved? That I change the environment through my actions, like when I create a path in the moss on the cliffs by repeatedly placing the tripod in the same place? That the environment changes me, like when I get concretions in my hands by repeatedly clutching the knots in the rope of the swing? That my ideas of what is an enjoyable temperature or a beautiful view change over time? That I change and transform together with the environment? Yes, indeed.

For Barad, humans are emergent phenomena like all other physical systems: “Parts of the world are always intra-acting with other parts of the world”, she writes, “and it is through specific intra-actions that a differential sense of being — with boundaries, properties, cause and effect — is enacted in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency.” Thus, “to the extent that ‘humans’ emerge as having a role to play in the constitution of specific phenomena, they do so as part of the larger material configuration, or rather the ongoing reconfiguring, of the world” (Barad, 2007, p. 338). This does not diminish our responsibility, however, since possibilities for intra-action exist at every moment that “entail an ethical obligation to intra-act responsibly in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is excluded from mattering” (Barad, 2007, p. 235).

For an artistic practice this means, on one hand, responsibility in terms of what to focus on and what to point at, and also to consider the material, affective and discursive effects of the artwork, as

Barbara Bolt has pointed out (Bolt, 2008); but, on the other hand, it also means responsibility for the doing, for the process, i.e., attending to what takes place during the practice, including the unwelcome side-effects.

According to Barad, “[I]earning how to intra-act responsibly as part of the world means understanding that ‘we’ are not the only active beings — though this is never justification for deflecting our responsibility onto others” (Barad, 2007, p. 391). For her, agency is an enactment, not something one has nor an attribute of subjects or objects, and she encourages us “to consider agency as distributed over nonhuman as well as human forms” (Barad, 2007, p. 214).

This distributed agency is evident in the practice of performing landscape. The swing, the swinger, the tree, the branch, the stub, the cliff, the sea — or clouds, snow, leaves, birds and human visitors — are all entangled parts of the same material becoming of the world in the image. And the agents only indirectly visible in the image — like the camera, the tripod, even the boat I row to the island with — have agency, too. In the video imagery, the boundaries between who or what is performing can shift — the tree or the swing can turn into the main actor. In terms of agency, in creating the image, we all have our part in the intra-action.

Barad summarizes her agential realism: “The world is intra-activity in its differential mattering [...] the primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but phenomena — dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/ (re)articulations of the world. And the primary semantic units are not ‘words’ but material-discursive practices through which (ontic and semantic) boundaries are constituted. This dynamism *is* agency. Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world. The universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 141). She defines agency in the following way:

Agency is “doing” or “being” in its intra-activity. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices — iterative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of spacetime-matter relations — through the dynamics of intra-activity. Agency is about changing possibilities of change entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices in the enactment of a causal structure. (Barad, 2007, p. 178)

Although this may seem much too complicated in terms of artistic practice, it could make sense. The repeated weekly visits to the same place, intra-acting with the same elements, fastening the swing to the branch, placing the camera on the cliff (with minute variations), could all be understood as “iterative changes to particular practices”. Recording changes in the landscape over the year could be called the registering of “topological manifolds of spacetime-matter relations”. Through this practice of “reconfiguring material-discursive

apparatuses of bodily production,” the changes in the landscape and the constant intra-action of the elements of the environment become evident for the observer-performer and later to other observers, albeit in an altered form.

According to Barad, we are responsible to others we are entangled with through the various ontological entanglements that materiality entails. What is on the other side of the agential cut is not separate from us, she claims; agential separability is not individuation. Ethics is not about the right response to a radically exterior/rized other, “but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part” (Barad, 2007, p. 393). These relationalities are too numerous to keep count of in most cases. This is evident when thinking of connections, as involved in this one example, which are not limited to visiting the island and recording moments in the life of the landscape there, but include all the relations the artworks might engender.

## Agential separability and artistic research

Barad’s idea of agential separability is interesting for artistic research in general, which often involves the entanglement of the subject and object of research. Barad tries to move beyond an epistemological conception of objectivity and replace it with an ontological one: “phenomena do not merely mark the inseparability of observer and observed; rather phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting ‘components’” (Barad, 2007, pp. 308-309). Furthermore, “[i]ntra-action enacts agential separability — the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena. Separability is not inherent or absolute, but intra-actively enacted relative to a specific phenomenon” (Barad, 2007, p. 339). For Barad “observer” and “observed” are merely two physical systems intra-acting in the marking of the “effect” by the “cause”. Human observers are possible, but not necessary, and objectivity is a matter of “accountability to marks on bodies.” She does not base objectivity on an inherent ontological separability but on an intra-actively enacted agential separability. Moreover, “[t]he reproducibility and unambiguous communication of laboratory results are possible because the agential cut enacts determinate boundaries, properties and meanings as well as the ‘measured object’ (‘cause’) within the phenomenon” (Barad, 2007, p. 340).

In artistic research, no “reproducibility and unambiguous communication of laboratory result” is strived for, although some kind of enacted agential separability could be helpful. The task for an artist-researcher would be, not only to acknowledge her subjectivity and entanglement with the object of research, but to enact some kind of separability with the phenomena at hand, perhaps even to split temporarily into observer and observed, as I do with the help of a camera on a tripod. But does this result in

a situation (criticized by Hannula et al, 2005) where the artist first produces artworks and then becomes a scholar who studies those artworks as if she had not created them, meaning that artistic research would have nothing new or special to offer? Perhaps we could think of the enactment of agential separability as an ongoing process or as a choice of focus: to experiment with and reflect on one aspect of the practice as a method, while leaving other aspects unexamined and “free”.

According to Barad, both experimental and theoretical practices involve intra-acting. For her “experimenting and theorizing are dynamic practices that play a constitutive role in the production of objects and subjects and matter and meaning... [they] are not about intervening (from outside) but about intra-acting from within, and as part of the phenomena produced” (Barad, 2007, p. 56). The same could be said of many art practices, as is evident in practices like performing landscape, where there is no possibility of “stepping outside” the environment (although that has historically been attempted by climbing up mountains to have an overview of the land). This is methodologically important for much artistic research, where the researcher is literally producing phenomena — artworks — and not only observing them. Or, in other words, the entanglement of the subject and object of study in artistic research is merely one obvious example of something that concerns all forms of research or all kinds of engagements with the environment.

“We are not outside observers of the world”, Barad points out. “Neither are we simply located at particular places in the world; rather we are part of the world in its ongoing intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 184). She explicitly states: “We don’t obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because we are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). Barad introduces the term *onto-epistem-ology* to describe the study of practices of knowing in being (Barad, 2007). For her knowing is not about ideation nor is it the exclusive birth right of humans. Knowing is rather a physical practice of engagement (Barad, 2007, 342). She summarizes as follows: “Scientific practices are specific forms of engagement that make specific phenomena manifest” (Barad, 2007, p. 336). And here we can add: artistic practices are specific forms of engagement that make specific phenomena manifest.

The fact that apparatuses are productive of the phenomena they measure does not mean that reality is a product of human concepts, Barad maintains; rather, concepts are specific material arrangements (Barad 2007, p. 334). For her, discourse is not a synonym for language and meaning or intelligibility are not a human-based notions. “Discursive practices are the material conditions for making meaning [...] [and] meaning is an ongoing performance of the world in its differential intelligibility” (Barad 2007, p. 335). That ongoing performance of the world I have tried to observe, record, participate in and intra-act with.

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## Appendix

### Swinging with the Snake

During the year of the snake, beginning in the Chinese New Year on 10 February 2013, I fastened a small blue swing onto an aspen that grows on the western shore of Harakka Island, next to the remains of the stone base of an old sauna. More or less once a week, I videoed myself swinging, wearing a light blue scarf, while keeping the position of the camera on a tripod and the framing of the image as constant as possible. On the same occasions, I also sat next to the stub of another aspen that stood nearby, looking out to sea with my back to the camera. And in another image I sat on a small pile of rocks looking at the expanding Helsinki harbour on the opposite shore. Thus I tried to produce "souvenirs" of what the landscape looked like during this year on the northern shore of the Finnish Bay.

*Year of the Snake – Swinging* was the last part in a series of twelve one-year projects performed for the camera on the same island and exploring the question of how to perform landscape today. The series, which I began in 2002, is based on the Chinese calendar and its cycle of twelve years, with each year named after a specific animal. Each year I chose a new perspective on the landscape, a new aspect of the environment and a new kind of relationship between my body and the place. This year I focused on the movement of a small swing,

a manmade element added to the landscape. Although a swing can be an impressive sculptural element — as in the works of Monica Sand, for instance — this swing is on a child's scale. The aspen on the shore is small of stature as well. The swing bore the weight of any visitors without problems, however. I experimented with sharing the experience of swinging and changing the performer in the image, by inviting colleagues from the island as well as temporary visitors to swing for a while. These performances I documented on video and in a trilingual blog, adding a still image from each performance — either of the visitor or of myself — to each blog note. By sharing an activity like swinging in order to end the series, with its focus on showing the passing of time, I chose a more light-hearted note. I took the swing with me on my travels, too, and tied it to trees growing on various shores.

After showing the works for the first time at an exhibition in Muu Gallery (Helsinki) in May 2014, I experimented with inviting people to swing on a number of occasions, and with projecting an edited version of that swinging later onto the same place, among other experiments.

### The following links give an idea of the original project and the works produced as a result

Functioning links to individual works: <<http://annettearlander.com> or <[http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/artists/annette-arlander\\_en/](http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/artists/annette-arlander_en/)>

### For a quick idea of the project, see the following links

Project blog: <<http://aa-yearofthesnake.blogspot.fi>>

Brief screening version of *Year of the Snake – Swinging*: <<https://vimeo.com/88325298>>

Brief version of collective variation of *Year of the Snake – Swinging Along* (mix) 2014 (3 min. 30 sec.) HD 16:9: <<http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-the-snake-swinging-along-mix/>>

### For information on the first exhibition showing these works

Exhibition at Muu Gallery 3 (25 May 2014), including a four-channel installation and some single channel works: <<https://www.facebook.com/events/1497104890509381>> and <<http://www.harakka.fi/arlander/muu-gal-2014/engl.html>>

### Works available for preview by the Distribution Centre for Finnish Media Art

*Year of the Snake – In the Swing* 2014 (16 min. 8 sec.) HD 16:9: <[http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-in-the-swing\\_en/](http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-in-the-swing_en/)>

*Year of the Snake – Swinging Along* 2014 (26 min. 30 sec.) HD 16:9: <<http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-swinging-along/>>

*Year of the Snake – By the Swing* 2014 (50 min. 41 sec.) HD 16:9: <<http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-by-the-swing/>>

*Year of the Snake – Watching the Harbour* 2014 (55 min. 3 sec.) HD 16:9: <<http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-watching-the-harbour/>>

*Day and Night of the Snake* 2014 (6 min. 46 sec.) HD 16:9:  
 <<http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/day-and-night-of-the-snake-swinging/>>  
 Information about the work (without a preview):

*Year of the Snake – Swinging* (installation) 2014 (36 min. 30 sec.)  
 HD 16:9  
 <[http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-swinging-installation\\_en/](http://www.av-arkki.fi/en/works/year-of-the-snake-swinging-installation_en/)>

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 <<http://journals.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/artnodes/article/view/n14-arlander/n14-arlander-en>>  
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## CV

**Annette Arlander**

Artist, researcher, pedagogue, a pioneer of Finnish performance art and a trailblazer of artistic research

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Trained as a theatre director, with a Master of Arts (philosophy) and Doctor of Arts (theatre and drama), Arlander was the first person to be awarded a doctorate from the Theatre Academy of Helsinki (in 1999). In 2001 she was invited as professor of performance art and theory to instigate the master's degree program in performance art and theory (or live art and performance studies, as it is called today), a position she held until 2013. Between 2007 and 2009 she was also head of the research department of the Performing Arts Research Centre (Tutke) at the Theatre Academy. She is member of the editorial boards of the JAR and Ruukku journals and a co-convenor of the Performance as Research working group of the International Federation for Theatre Research. Arlander's research interests are related to artistic research, performance as research, performance studies, site-specificity and the environment. Her artwork is focused on performing landscape by means of video or recorded voice, and moves between the traditions of performance art, video art and environmental art.