ART, WORLD, HISTORY

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L*'histoire de la peinture est liée a celle de l'humanité* (The history of painting is linked to the history of humanity).
—Mohamed Khadda, 1964[1]

Postwar is more than Aftermath and Triumph, the most obvious traces of World War II in the view from Europe or the United States. The destruction, ruin, and then reconstruction of Europe, alongside or in conflict with the rising tide of American affluence and influence, is only one part of the story, the part that focuses on the shifting fortunes of the West. The destroyed cities to be reconstructed and modernized included Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo, as well as the Arab cities—Cairo, Beirut, Damascus—bombarded by colonial violence before and after the war.[2] Yet the tragedies of European cities are often cast as singular in art-historical accounts, particularly those written for exhibitions that tell and retell the story of Europe and/or the United States, with increasing detail or polemic.[3] In these accounts, even this story's other, more proximate side—the tale of Communist Russia and Eastern Europe, the West's competitors in the Cold War—was long in eclipse.[4]

In recent decades, however, historians *tout court* have aggressively questioned and reconfigured received accounts of the postwar period.[5] First came the revelations from Eastern European archives opened after 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Communist bloc, affording a much more detailed vision of Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the other Iron Curtain nations. A second wave of historical reconsideration looked at the so-called Third World; many political, social, and economic histories over the past two decades have discussed anticolonial struggles and new nationhood.[6] Still more recent accounts have traced the transnational ties of the pan-Arab and -African movements and the affiliations of the nonaligned nations. Many historians tackle the broader historical conundrum of the relation of these new accounts to the older ones that focused on the two superpowers and their Cold War, asking whether China, for example, or Asia broadly conceived, has a history incommensurate with that paradigm.[7] Others have countered the East-West narrative altogether, reorienting to North-South and arguing that the American and Western European perception of the threat posed by masses of poor people of color was equal to that of the threat posed by Communism.[8] Debates have arisen around the subject matter of history as well, around whether to emphasize the paper trail of foreign policy or the more nebulous category of culture.[9] And some, particularly postcolonial theorists, have questioned the very idea of world history as a linear development in which the world's cultures belong to a single master narrative.[10]

Art historians have not been absent from these disciplinary shifts. Scholars and curators have done much—though certainly not all—of the primary research required to write accounts of the artistic figures and institutions of new nations (although Western museums, particularly in the United States, have been slow to stage monographic exhibitions for postwar artists from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East).[11] The question of how such accounts might sit within, inform, or refigure a larger account of modern art, and of art history more broadly, remains far from resolved. Scholars studying the formerly colonized nations have produced penetrating critiques of the center/periphery account of modernism, with its implication of delayed or imitative versions in the non-West, and have developed subsequent debates about "alter" or hybrid modernities.[12] But no previous exhibition has attempted a global account of postwar art, staged from a perspective of interrelation.

A worldwide perspective is often seen as properly relevant only after 1989, when the end of state Communism created the conditions for a global art world. This change has been categorized as a shift from the "modern" to the "contemporary."[13] And in fact, contemporary art from the non-West seems an easier fit for the market than the work made earlier by "modern" artists in new nations, where stylistic choices were more obviously restricted by ideology (emphasized in many accounts of Chinese art) or seemed imitative to Western critics (as in many accounts of Middle Eastern art). Global art histories therefore rush to the post-1989 years, perhaps after a brief prelude, in order to leap over a moment—"the modern"—when much art is dismissed as being of questionable quality; as being marked by inadequate difference from other art sharing a seemingly belated style; or, conversely, as producing too much friction with globalism, thanks to a nationalist political orientation that now appears old-fashioned.

A few scholars have sought to rewrite the history of world art as a whole, producing radically reconceived survey texts or theoretical reconsiderations of historical models, epitomized respectively by the work of David Summers and Hans Belting.[14] The global survey begins at a moment well before modernism and attempts to locate universal features of art from different cultures and periods, allowing an art history that doesn't jump, as in the earlier survey model, from ancient Egypt to ancient Greece, as though art in Egypt simply stopped at a certain year. However well-intentioned, the approach can seem an art-historical analogue of the neoliberal "end of history," while its attempt at global comprehension through the quest for universals—often found in formal similarities—occludes appreciation of the material specificities, politics, and conflicts in and among different artistic cultures.

In other words, it occludes history itself—the relations and conflicts among nations and cultures that shaped the postwar world, with actors interacting intensely and in many directions on a global scale, well before 1989. (In fact, accepting 1989 as the crucial date presumes the centrality of the Cold War, a centrality that historians have recently sought to question.) It was in the postwar period that relations among artistic practices across the world became active and necessary, though not by any means equal.[15] After 1945, the world was united, not in the recurrent hope of a rational universalism in the

Fig. 1. Mohammed Khadda. *Alphabet libre* (Free Alphabet). 1964. Oil on canvas, 100 × 81 cm. Musée national des beaux-arts d'Alger, Algiers

interest of humanity as a whole, but by a new order based on continuous conflict among political and economic interests. This conflict both produced and was enforced by apocalyptic technology, mass production, endless war, new forms of economic empire and resistance, and global mass communication. *Postwar* seeks to explore—at least in a first draft—the artistic aspect of this situation, examining it in a way that is both global and historical, framed by the ambitious questions posed by historians and making use of the primary and critical work done by art historians in particular.

No exhibition, of course, even one on the scale of *Postwar*, can fully measure up to this task. Not only did we have to make choices about what to include, but our choices were of course constrained by the availability of particular artworks, a condition itself reflecting a whole history of valuation (entailing economics and even international diplomatic relations). But within the practical limits curators always face, *Postwar* has taken its cues, above all, from reconsiderations of the nature of global history. The exhibition rests on the shoulders of those who have done the demanding work of recovering and studying individual artists from around the world, and also on those of recent art historians who have looked at transnational connections among artists, including those belonging to pan-Arab and -African, South-South, and nonaligned networks.[16] It reflects an attempt to see the Cold War as one aspect of a global struggle for power; to see Europe as only one terrain of that struggle, and as itself provincial in this sense; and to look at history not as the unfolding of a single story, or as a fractured plurality of stories, but as a knot of mutually inflecting histories.[17]

This complexity was already sensed by the artist On Kawara in 1955, speaking at a roundtable, "*Atarashii ningen zō ni mukatte*" (Toward a New Human Image), in Tokyo:

> In our reality, we did not pass through an upwardly mobile time, or the best time, of modernity. Take, for example, capitalist production. We are already mired in late-stage ills of monopoly [without having gone through its earlier stages]. At the same time, feudal institutions and sentiments remain, permeating every aspect of our life. I suspect that these different historical stages are layered. When we try to transcend this, we cannot proactively change our reality, unless we shed a Westernized monolithic viewpoint and accept these contradictions as autonomous subjects in order to devise a method or plan for change based on the concrete reality.[18]

Kawara was speaking specifically about Japan, but his insistence that histories coexist, as historical strata, so to speak, has broad implications. Even though he uses the language of development—stages, modernity—he undercuts its reality. As we begin to see the modern, including its dominant iterations in the United States and Europe, as both local and a matter of mutual exchange, the obdurate centrality of this category to our thinking about the art of the period may begin to dissolve.

The starting point for most histories and exhibitions of the postwar period has historically been just that tale of Aftermath and Triumph—the art-world battle between the United States, newly ascendant politically and economically, and the damaged nations of France, Germany, and to a lesser degree England. In fact, however, the makers (and even many supporters) of the apparently new artistic modes in New York and on the West Coast were initially tentative in their claims for their work, and exhibitions of these modes included European, Mexican, and Cuban artists along with Americans. The only insistent note was the assertion that American art, long seen as provincial, imitative, and

Fig. 2. Wols (Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze). *Apatride.* 1944. Photography. Private Collection

primitive or even barbaric, might in fact be developing something of value.[19] Even within the United States, the art of Willem de Kooning, Lee Krasner, Jackson Pollock, Mark Tobey, and others that was later labeled "Abstract Expressionism" was only one mode among others; there were also realisms of all stripes, such as the identifiably American subjects of Edward Hopper and Andrew Wyeth and the popular leftist images of Ben Shahn (the last, famously, paired with de Kooning in the American Pavilion of the *Venice Biennale* of 1954), which, however, have come to be granted far less historical importance.[20]

Despite growing excitement about Abstract Expressionism, the market and general regard for it were weak both inside and outside the United States until the mid-to-late 1950s, and the attention it received was balanced by scornful dismissal of its outlandishness. Early "since 1945" accounts (such as *Documenta* II, in 1959, and various textbook surveys) placed the United States in a relatively minor role, and often reached back before the dark interlude of the war (and its attendant, questionable art) in an effort to cast postwar European artists as the heirs of earlier modernists such as Vasily Kandinsky—Hans Hartung, for example, or the politically blameless artist Wols (featured in *Documenta* I and II and in the 1958 *Venice Biennale*), a German resident in France who was interned in a French camp during the war and died six years after its end (fig. 2).[21] It was in this context that the exhibition *The New American Painting*, which circulated through Basel, Milan, Madrid, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, and London in 1958–59, accompanied by a Pollock retrospective, announced the newly uppercase, newly official label. Reviews were mixed, but regardless of their verdict critics often saw a battle between former national allies—a moment, as Lawrence Alloway characterized the 1960 *Venice Biennale,* when "[Jean] Fautrier slapped Franz Kline or Kline socked Fautrier."[22] American political and artistic ascendance would become much more truly joined in the 1960s, with Pop art, whose content seemed to anticipate this reception.[23]

By this time the territorial battles between New York and Paris had long taken their place in the context of the Cold War. From this optic the most obvious artistic (rather than territorial) issue was the apparently purely stylistic conflict between abstraction and figuration. This pair of categories—which became a cliché largely without passing through the stage of analysis—was described bluntly by the painter Georg Baselitz: "There was abstraction in the West and realism in the East."[24] At the level of official policy, prescription, and nationalist promotion of the arts, the line between the two was indeed drawn firmly, as in the United States famously advertising abstraction as democratic freedom and the Soviets mandating legible, uplifting images of the labor and health made possible under Communism. This institutional history, of diplomatic papers and museum correspondence, has conditioned art-historical accounts.[25] But in the day-to-day lives of artists, the practices were rarely as fixed as the names for them were in the discourse.[26]

Fig. 3. Wifredo Lam. *La Réunion* (The Reunion). 1945. Oil on paper, remount, white chalk, 152 × 212 cm. Paris, Centre Pompidou - Musée national d'art moderne - Centre de création industrielle

Although critics could be didactic about the historical necessity and definition of abstraction, many artists were not interested in it as an explicit program or supposed telos of painting. Abstraction as an absolute dictate—as it was for Ad Reinhardt—was rare, and to some seemed ridiculous enough that Elaine de Kooning parodied it in her spoof article "Pure Paints a Picture."[27] Her husband, Willem de Kooning, along with Wols, Tobey, Ernst Wilhelm Nay, Mark Rothko, and many others who were referred to as abstract painters rejected the term, linking it to the rationalism that in their eyes led to fascism.[28] Nor did they prefer its opposite, which artists like Norman Lewis and Francis Bacon

Fig. 4. Taro Okamoto. *My Reality.* 1950. Digital scan from silver gelatin print.
Taro Okamoto Museum of Art, Kawasaki

Fig. 5. Mathias Goeritz. *El animal del Pedregal*. 1951. Reinforced concrete.
Courtesy L.M. Daniel Goeritz & Galería La Caja Negra, Madrid

identified as "illustration," seeking instead an impure and active relation between the artist and his or her materials and in the specificities of the paint's speed and viscosity and color on canvas, whether it made a face or a squiggle (but, for these particular artists, no squares). Furthermore, artists were ambivalent not only about abstraction, which they linked to a discredited theoretical and ideological modernism, but also about the United States. Many of them were immigrants, Jews, gay, socialists, and African Americans, with cosmopolitan identities and experiences that put them at odds with any conservative posturing about the nation (making them suspicious of the Whitney Museum of American Art, for example), even as some found things to love in American culture: its informality, its music, its movies.

Representation too could be an engaged and personal practice rather than a socially dictated one. While the Communist regimes had mandates for political representations and acceptable subject matter, those mandates fluctuated through the thaw after the death of Joseph Stalin and during Mao Zedong's Hundred Flowers campaign.[29] Soviet painting had a range of styles, including "severe" and romantic, reaching back to nineteenth-century Russia, and Chinese traditional ink-painting techniques were sometimes forbidden and sometimes allowed, depending on the content and the artist. There was art in the "popular democracies" of Eastern Europe—by Vladimir Boudnik, Ivo Gattin, and Tadeusz Kantor, for example—that engaged gestural abstraction or that continued earlier geometric styles. Art by Communist artists varied throughout the world, as manifested in the work of the many socialist and Communist artists in the West, such as André Fougeron, Renato Guttuso, and Charles White, and in the widespread influence of the Mexican artist David Siqueiros (despite his own Stalinism) on the work of artists as varied as Kawara and Inji Efflatoun. In the United States, popular paintings and illustrations by Norman Rockwell were more than a match for Soviet art as realist propaganda.

Nonetheless, the tension between abstraction and figuration was real, and it is fascinating to see how it played out not only in the conflict between East and West, or between Communism and capitalism, but also as a way of figuring other frictions—most notably those aroused by decolonization, arguably the most significant political fact of the period. In this context it provided an artistic register for the revival of an earlier understanding of East-West conflict, that between Asian and Middle Eastern cultures on the one hand and Western on the other.[30] Here Western abstraction was often positioned against non-Western representational content, from rural scenes of indigenous life to political, ethnic, or religious imagery. Succinctly describing this conceptual structure as one that "divides art into form, which is learned and borrowed from the West, and content, whose raw material is abstracted from national cultures," art historian Shiva Balaghi finds this dilemma at the root of a forty-year-old question in her field: "Is this art modern and is it Iranian?"[31] The fact that a parallel question had been asked of American art in the early and mid-twentieth century, and in fact in many locations outside Europe, helps us to understand the divide as less between East and West than between modernism, as a provincial (and exceptional) European conceit, and the art of every other place in the world, especially the former colonies.[32] Even after World War II, the form of the modern, despite the putative triumph of American art, still primarily meant the modernism of the former colonial powers, whether known through the work of an early-twentieth-century artist such as Paul Klee (a sympathetic figure for many artists in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East because of some common feeling for nature and/or Klee's own reciprocal interest in arts of those regions) or through the academic, third-generation Cubism of colonial art education.

What an art historian might understand as an (unanswerable) question about style was experienced by artists as an (impossible) demand that the artist choose between social and artistic identity, as when Iba N'Diaye spoke of the pressure on Senegalese artists to "be 'Africans' before being painters or sculptors."[33] Referring to culture as broadly conceived, Aimé Césaire framed the dilemma neatly: "The problem is often summarized in the form of which option to take. A choice between autochthonous tradition and European civilization. Either to reject indigenous civilization as puerile, inadequate, bypassed by history, or else, in order to preserve the indigenous cultural heritage, to barricade oneself against European civilization and refuse it." He put the poisoned choice thus: "In other terms, we are summoned: 'Choose between fidelity and backwardness, or progress and rupture.'"[34] Looking at art through the lens of this opposition, "fidelity" could mean faith with the past, and with the legibility and familiarity of representation; "progress and rupture" would be the modern, and breaking with the familiar in favor of abstraction, the unknown.

The polarity of this choice could be reversed so as to obviate the presumed hierarchy of social value. In terms of anticolonial politics, this could mean reversing the opposites of barbaric and civilized, as in León Ferrari's 1965 condemnation of Western and Christian civilization: for Ferrari, the use of the atom bomb was not the necessary factor ending World War II but a prelude to the U.S. war in Vietnam, the latter event made still more malign by being broadcast to the world on television.[35] Writers such as Césaire and Frantz Fanon pointed out how the promises of empire as a modernizing regime had been broken, and noted the truly democratic, educational developments achieved by colonized peoples in resistance to both their rulers and selected traditional practices.

In some contexts abstraction could be found not as a rupture of local artistic practice but, in the guise of tradition, on its side. Contradicting the idea of abstraction as a fundamentally modern, Western phenomenon, spreading around the world like economic development, many Middle Eastern, South Asian, and North African artists, such as Mohammed Khadda, Anwar Jalal Shemza, and Jewad Selim, saw the historical arts of Islam as inherently nonrepresentational, abstract *avant la lettre*.[36] (Some Western artists, such as Barnett Newman, promoted the idea of non-European indigenous or traditional art as abstract, but tended to cast the makers of this art as admirable but

naive.) When the reference was to the graphic arts and Arabic calligraphy, a pointed dialectic could develop between the universal and the particular, as in the work of artists such as Sadequain, Charles Hossein Zenderoudi, and Shakir Hassan Al Sa'id.[37] For these artists abstraction functioned as a historical return, rather than a rupture; as Sylvia Naef frames it, whereas in Europe the modern meant breaking with the past, "In the Arab world (as in other non-European countries), modernity was, from the beginning, a way of reconquering the past."[38] (Some Japanese artists worked similarly with traditional Japanese calligraphy.)[39] Gestural marks and shapes drawing on Arabic or Urdu script could both be read with particular knowledge and appreciated broadly for their formal qualities. While respecting the differences between art that played with Arabic script and the concrete poetry widespread through South America, Japan, and Europe, we can nonetheless see a common wish to speak at once to the particular and to the universal.[40]

Fig. 6. Lee Seung-taek. *Hanging Oji.* 1960s.
Courtesy Gallery Hyundai, Seoul

Some artists of course did choose sides, whether owing to social pressure or to personal conviction, and hewed strictly to either programmatic abstraction or figuration. Others believed that highlighting the dichotomy would drive the conflict to a climax of contradiction. In a manifesto of 1949, Taro Okamoto explicitly sought to keep form and content, abstraction and figuration, and other terms on a list of dichotomies in active conflict; this meant, in his own early painting, the unreconciled coexistence of "a classical, static structure, and a romantic, dynamic structure. ... The result is a painting that generates an extremely intense dissonance," a dissonance capturing a conflicted social reality. Okamoto expressed the conflict most intensely in a performance of 1950, in which he slashed a photograph of his face into fragments (fig. 4).[41] That same year, in a conference in Darmstadt (at which artist Willi Baumeister and art historian Hans Sedlmayr represented the ideological extremes of abstraction and representation), Theodor Adorno similarly insisted that "harmony in a modern work of art rests in its uncompromised expression of the irreconcilable."[42] A decade later, Gerhard Richter (like Baselitz, an emigrant from East to West) developed a practice that alternated between or forced together the materiality of paint and representational imagery, so as to preserve the clash between them.[43]

Many rejected the opposition of abstraction and realism, condemning the terrible choices between East and West, academic convention and soulless modernism, local and modern, particular and universal, and often the very categories of the distinction. Their art represented less a moderate compromise than a refusal of the alternatives, a third way. For Ernest Mancoba, the distinction was symptomatic of all of the problems of modernity: "Our history has brought about, little by little, this dichotomy between abstraction and figuration which provokes, more and more, a terrible atomization in the very essence of life. In no domain more than in the arts has this systematic dichotomy caused such destruction of the very foundation to the human identity."[44]

Mancoba's complaint was echoed by many others through the idea of a missing center, with humanity as something pushed aside or explicitly denied by the two modernist extremes of ideology. Among the many events inspired by this question were the 1950 Darmstadt conference featuring Baumeister, Sedlmayr, and Adorno (*Das Menschenbild in unserer Zeit*, "The Image of Man in our Time"), the Tokyo roundtable at which Kawara spoke in 1955, art-critical debates in London and Paris, the publication of essays in such cultural journals as *Présence Africaine* and *Al-Adab* (Syria), an exhibition at New York's Museum of Modern Art *(New Images of Man)*, and the formation of an artists' group in Buenos Aires *(Otra Figuración)*. Some of this discourse was based on a humanism flowing from the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist writing on art, which saw the individual pitted against faceless social forces.[45] But what could sometimes seem like a generic humanism was often a claim to something more legitimate, because more specific, as in discussions that asserted a specifically Syrian humanism embodied in a cultural tradition stretching back to ancient Sumeria.[46] Much of this writing critiqued the West as the agent of World War II and of colonialism, as in Fanon's indictment of "this Europe, which never stopped talking of man, which never stopped proclaiming its sole



Fig. 7. Gazbia Sirry. *Hopscotch.* 1959. Oil on canvas, 100 × 150 cm.
Courtesy Zamalek Art Gallery, Cairo

concern was man; we now know the price of suffering [that] humanity has paid for every one of its spiritual victories."[47] Fanon might have been speaking for artists like Demas Nwoko, whose *Colonial Officers* (1960) condemns not humanity or "man" but European colonialism.

In texts such as Fanon's and the talks at the Tokyo roundtable, what was at stake was not a choice between humanist and antihumanist

Fig. 8. Theodoros Stamos. *Sounds in the Rock*. 1946. Oil on composition board, 122.2 × 72.1 cm. New York, Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). Gift of Edward W. Root. Acc. n.: 27.1947

positions (itself a dichotomy grounded in a Western perspective) but the recognition of a "new human," as both Fanon and Kawara put it.[48] Artists grasping to visualize this figure, including Baselitz, Mancoba, Fateh Al-Moudarres, Karel Appel, Magda Cordell, Antonio Berni, Ben Enwonwu, Alfonso Ossorio, Francis Newton Souza, and Jack Whitten, aggressively pushed abstraction and representation into each other, interrupting human images with lumps of oil paint, metal objects, charcoal, sand, detritus, and gestural marks. Though often seen as more battered and belated than avatars of the new, these figures arguably embodied the historical present as the result of war, anticolonial struggles, and fusions between humans and technology.

Artists weary of the fractures of modernity often looked back, whether to a moment before the disrupting of an earlier unity or to a space beyond the reach of culture, using a range of strategies art historians have commonly labeled "primitivism." In 1945, Césaire pronounced Wifredo Lam's totemic paintings free of the twin modern constraints—aesthetics and realism—and claimed that they called modern man back to the "first terror and passion" (fig. 3).[49] Many North American and European artists, including Baumeister, Jay DeFeo, Helen Frankenthaler, and Mathias Goeritz (one of a group of artists dubbed the "new prehistorics"), made pilgrimages to the prehistoric sites of Lascaux and Altamira and sought to emulate what they found there in their own work (fig. 5).[50]

While artists involved in such attempts were often trying to escape their own culture and history, they could also be trying to reclaim it. Amid China's civil war of the 1940s, Dong Xiwen went to study the Buddhist murals in the caves of Dunhuang.[51] In the early 1960s, Lee Seung-taek used stones and earthenware fermentation vessels to make sculpture, returning it to a time before the Japanese occupation of Korea, not to mention the Korean War (fig. 6).[52] In the Zaria Art Society in Nigeria at the end of the 1950s, Uche Okeke and Demas Nwoko studied traditional practices such as Nok sculptures and Igbo drawing. For these artists, of course, primitivism is not the relevant category; the sources they sought were not outside history but explicitly inside their national history, even if the handmade aspect or spirituality of the works seemed to provide alternatives to faulty aspects of the modern.[53] At the same time, paradoxically, the nationalist aspect of this work—the attempt to create a new Nigerian tradition—aligned it with modernity, once again overturning a dichotomy.

The image of non-Western art as shaped by fixed and timeless traditions beyond historical change was a false one; as many artists, such as N'Diaye, pointed out, they and their peers largely hailed from cities, not from traditional agrarian settings. On the other hand, many cast the Western tradition—supposedly the progressive term of the contrast, having broken with the past and hurtled forward—as ironically itself suffering from rigor mortis. Both Mancoba and Newman decried the rigidity of rules put forth by the ancient Greeks: the canon of proportion, which rendered African art "ugly," and the overrefined ideals of beauty and geometry.[54] (Both also, like many other artists including Okamoto, complained about the Western philosophical tradition, with its tyranny of conceptual structures over experience.) Their complaints resonated with Fanon's broad condemnation of Western civilization as inert, even dead: "All the Mediterranean values—the triumph of the individual, of enlightenment and Beauty—turn into pale, lifeless, trinkets."[55] All tradition, in fact, had the potential to be dead weight. Fanon was ruthless, condemning Western traditional aesthetics and modern "nonrepresentational" modes alike as models for the colonized artist, and also decrying the postindependence turn of African nations to "a point by point representation of national reality which is flat, untroubled, motionless, reminiscent of death rather than life."[56]

Many artists, in "advanced" as well as "underdeveloped" nations, sought to create an active relation between tradition and the modern—to find a dynamism that kept both living. They also sought a profound engagement with the material world. The will to animate material fueled the postwar stress on touch and performance; in Japan, for example, it was central—more so than the influence of European or American gestural painting—to the Gutai artists and critics, who viewed matter through the lenses of nature, artistic experiment, and socialism.[57] The widespread interest in chance and in the rule of natural physical laws downplayed human subjectivity (even among American painters, much criticized in later years for their supposed egotism).

This desire for active involvement with the world also colored the seeming opposite of materialist, gestural art: realist, socialist painting; in Guttuso's words, "This is the condition of the *engagé* artist. There is no other way for him to feel, to study, to imagine, to be affected than by seeing/finding himself permanently merged with life and engaged in the task of grasping the movement/vitality [before him]."[58] Gazbia Sirry wrote of her political and fantastic paintings, "I have had my own myths since my childhood. I feel I am fused into various elements of nature and life such as human beings, the desert, the sea, plants, and even manmade constructions. I strive to express the essence of humanity" (fig. 7).[59] By treating human subjects as objects among other objects, such work cast humans as belonging to the natural world, rather than as knowing subjects observing and controlling from outside it.

Sirry's statement and work speak of an empathy with the material world, one that both dialed down her own subjecthood and recognized the value and perspective of things we normally think of as objects. As the artist Sadamasa Motonaga said, "There is limitless emotion in nature. [It is] in every object, every person, every creature, even in a blade of grass, but most people have difficulty seeing it."[60] Everywhere, artists and writers—Wols in France, Theodoros Stamos in the United States, Léopold Sédar Senghor in Senegal—pointed to their connection to things like rocks or pebbles, mute, opaque, and ordinary (fig. 8). This active empathy could reflect an antimodernist return to nature, but did not by any means exclusively; as Sirry said, the connection could apply to manmade things as well. When Robert Rauschenberg told an interviewer, "I don't like to take advantage of an object that can't defend itself," he was speaking of the man-made and often industrially produced objects in his "Combines"—a car door, a stuffed goat, a photograph, a commercial label.[61]

This attitude of radical respect for things, a nonhierarchical attitude that could lend subjecthood to objects, verged on animism. Most common in materialist painting and sculpture, it appeared, surprisingly, in self-consciously transgressive art: David Medalla went so far as to call himself a hylozoist—a believer in the unity of life and matter—and the soapy forms of his "Cloud Canyons" visibly grow, bubbling over their frames and out into space.[62] Hans Haacke's early sculptures, while using a Minimalist/formalist vocabulary as containers, were also organic in the constantly changing condensation or growing grass contained within their Plexiglas cubes. What has been called vitalism (although that name ties it too firmly to Henri Bergson and specific philosophical traditions) could coexist with even the most apparently rationalist practice of the postwar period. Madí and Neoconcrete artists rendered geometry itself mobile and living, in paintings, books, and sculptures intended to be handled and activated by the spectator, who is in turn herself touched by them (fig. 9).[63] With their *Bichos* and *Bólides* respectively, Lygia Clark and Hélio Oiticica sought to enact a kind of healing, both psychological and social, by returning the participant to a holistic experience of body and soul. The aim of overcoming the subject/object divide becomes explicit: the subject must not just look at but work with the object to change it, and thus change her own experience.

Looking globally at postwar art thus helps us to go beyond adding names and works to canonical lists (although that is certainly important) to rethinking the category of art itself and reconsidering the criteria for understanding and evaluating it. Modernist art theory, its vision centered on the West, made abstraction the goal toward which the history of art seemed to move. Attending to the multiplicity of postwar art asks us to put aside the idea of a will to abstraction in favor of a more complex understanding of artists' practices, one that no longer separates their relation to their materials, emphasized by theory under the name of "form," from their relation to physical, social, and political realities. A blanket category like "representation," for instance, fixes an image and obscures the interactive aspects of the artist's relation to the physical world, whether scientific, natural, or animistic.

Again and again, the artists included in *Postwar* insist on the inseparability of supposedly purely formal qualities of their work from the subject matters with which they are concerned. It was possible to experiment with painting, and abstraction, without isolating the means as a value above all others. While waiting for a critique in a Washington, D.C., newspaper—anticipating Western judgments of quality and fetishization of form—Enwonwu remarked that his painting technique "may be disappointing to very good painters but technique in painting is not the criterion for knowing what is good, bad or indifferent in art."[64] The alternative was not to hew to either representational content or the *informe* but to undo the dominance and isolation of formalism, to revalue the political, the spiritual, the personal, the traditional, the popular, and the everyday, as dynamically manifested in material form.

Anticolonial writings, particularly by African and Caribbean authors, theorized this relation between art and world in varying registers. For Senghor, the dynamism was both aesthetic/epistemological and social, demanding a way of knowing that would acknowledge the division between subject and object and work to overcome

it. The divide could be bridged with empathy, revealing the political potential in a commonplace artistic act.[65] Senghor's criticism of the conventional Western individual subject—the European "first distinguishes the object from himself. ... He destroys it by devouring it"—resonates strikingly with that of Adorno: "the subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it is an object itself."[66] The hypersubject creates its counterpart, the pure object. This separation into extreme positions was something Césaire recognized in colonialism, calling it "*chosification*," a kind of Midas touch that turned people into objects.[67] Undoing this separation, whether through theory, art, or politics, held the potential for the object to become a subject again, to be unfrozen. Taking this sense of agency and mobility still further, Fanon, an adamant advocate of national liberation, did not equate national identity with nationalism, seeing it not as an end in itself—a formal, fixed thing—but as liberating the living consciousness of a people.[68] Despite their differences, these thinkers all spoke against the split of subject and object and its attendant immobility. If claims for intuitive and embodied knowing have been criticized as clichéd, even as themselves the product of colonial binaries (and founded on opposition to Western rationalism), today, when the West seems moribund rather than rational, they appear prescient, desirable, radical.[69]

Senghor's endorsement of empathy was just one strategy for the subject's engagement with its "other"; further possibilities included confrontation, related to the preservation of incommensurability and conflict so strongly advocated by Fanon (and Adorno), and also participation and communion.[70] Perhaps the most important thing was not the choice of strategy—communion or confrontation—but the fact of agency. Similarly, the most important facet of the animism that imbued certain artists' work was not respect for objects, or even a connection to nature, but the perception that we are none of us either alone in or central to the universe.

There is a negative aspect to dynamism, of course; despite the picture of stalemate and stasis implied by the idea of the Cold War, the social reality of the postwar period was one of constant intervention and change, as new political forces replaced the old empires.

Fig. 8. Lygia Pape. *Book of Creation Walking* (detail), 1959. Gouache on cardboard, 18 parts, 30 × 30 × 0.2 cm (each).

If Césaire's 1945 essay on Lam bemoaned the distance that money and machines had put between people, by 1965 a lack of distance was equally disturbing. Even the defenses once afforded by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans were disappearing. As Sukarno said, opening the Bandung Conference in 1955,

> [Man] has learned to consume distance. He has learned to project his voice and his picture across oceans and continents. … He has learned how to release the immense forces locked in the smallest particles of matter. … And do not think that the oceans and the seas will protect us. The food that we eat, the water that we drink, yes, even the very air that we breathe can be contaminated by poisons originating from thousands of miles away.[71]

We have seen these warnings—of the worldwide reach of atomic warfare, ideological broadcasting, and ecological disaster—all come true, even as the promise of nonalignment celebrated at Bandung has faded. But in trying to understand the art of a period that looked to the future at least as much as it reflected an experience of decline and aftermath, it is important to maintain its sense of possibility, to see the promise inherent in active engagement—in conflict as well as affinity. To look beyond the Cold War to the most pressing issues of the day: Kwame Nkrumah told the Council of Foreign Relations in New York City in 1958, "This attitude of nonalignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of our day. It does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern. The greatest issue of our day is surely to see *that there is a tomorrow*."[72] For postwar artists too, the refusal to line up—with orthodoxies of abstraction or representation, with purely objective or subjective views of the world—could mean an attempt to see and shape a history no longer dominated by the ideological or material structures of the past.

I thank my assistant Megan Hines for her extensive and expert research for this essay, and Hosam Aboul-Ela for his thoughts on broad theoretical readings.

1 Mohamed Khadda, "Élements pour un art nouveau," *Révolution Africaine* no. 74 (June 27, 1964): 22. To be repr. and trans. in *Modern Art of the Modern World: Primary Documents*, eds. Anneka Lenssen, Sarah A. Rogers, and Nada Shabout (forthcoming from The Museum of Modern Art, New York). Thanks to Lenssen for so generously sharing this material and her own insights with me throughout the research for *Postwar.*

2 Hassan Jabareen directly compares the Middle East and the Europe of 1945 as Tony Judt describes it in Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Penguin Books, 2005). See Jabareen, "Palestinians and Hobbesian Citizenship: How the Palestinians Became a Minority in Israel," in Will Kymlicka, ed., *Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 198.

3 Many admirable and important exhibitions nonetheless attend solely to Europe as the locus of the postwar, sometimes including Russia or the United States as foils. See, e.g., *Face à l'histoire (1933–1996)*, Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris, 1997, and *Be-Bomb: The Transatlantic War of Images and All That Jazz, 1946–1956*, MACBA, Barcelona, 2007).

4 In English, see the broadly read John Gaddis, *Now We Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

5 *Postwar* is shaped by the work of scholars too numerous to reference here. I single out the meta-historical writing of Dipesh Chakrabarty, Matthew Connelly, Paul Gilroy, Ranajit Guha, Heonik Kwon, Lydia Liu, Mark Mazower, Walter Mignolo, Vijay Prashad, Tuong Vu, and Odd Arne Westad.

6 The term "Third World" was coined in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy, in "Trois mondes, une planeté," *L'Observateur* no. 118 (August 14, 1952): 5.

7 Even among those nations that did enter World War II as combatants, it was common to characterize the conflict primarily as a territorial/local war; see David Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars': Historical Discourse and International Politics," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (January 2003): 29–44. For an argument positing the imbrication of the Cold War and the Third World see Westad's many publications, including *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For the argument that Asia has not only a different history but demands a different historical model see Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010). For the claim that "the vast epic" of Asia after 1945 is "ultimately the most significant of the postwar era" see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 246.

8 See Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 739–69, and Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007).

9 For the former see Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens"; for the latter see Vu, "Cold War Studies and the Cultural Cold War in Asia," in Vu and Wasana Wongsurat, eds., *Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology, Identity, and Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1–16.

10 See Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

11 Recent initiatives by Tate Modern and the Centre Pompidou are exceptions, with exhibitions on artists such as Saloua Raouda Choucair (Tate Modern, 2013) and Wifredo Lam (Centre Georges Pompidou, 2015). The museological history of Latin American art is quite different, with both The Museum of Modern Art and the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, undertaking major scholarly and monographic intiatives. Contemporary artists are also treated differently, with artists such as Walid Raad often featured in major monographic exhibitions.

12 For particularly rounded discussions among the many possible examples, see Salah M. Hassan, "African Modernism: Beyond Alternative Modernities Discourse," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 451–74, and the rest of this special issue on "African Modernism," and Partha Mitter, "Interventions. Decentering Modernism: Art History and Avant-Garde Art from the Periphery," *Art Bulletin* 90, no. 4 (2008): 531–74.

13 The most consistent writing here is Terry Smith's, as in *What Is Contemporary Art?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). One can see this supposed shift as a historical event or, thinking of the modern in its usual definition as a local (or, per Chakrabarty, provincial) European phenomenon, as a geographic one; this is explicitly true in the case of the United States and Japan, both of which posited the modern as European in the 1940s. For the historical approach see Katy Siegel, *Since '45: America and the Making of Contemporary Art* (London: Reaktion, 2011), and Richard Meyer, *What Was Contemporary Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2013); for the geographic see Reiko Tomii, *Radicalism in the Wilderness: International Contemporaneity and 1960s Art in Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2016).

14 David Summers, *Real Spaces: World Art History and the Rise of Western Modernism* (London: Phaidon, 2003); Hans Belting, *The End of Art History?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

15 Even if we think of modernity as always having been a world system, as Mignolo and Immanuel Wallerstein claim, in the late twentieth century relations became directly, furiously reciprocal, operating in all directions and all over the world. See Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1974), and Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

16 To name only a few, Hassan, Iftikhar Dadi, Nancy Jachec, Saloni Mathur, Ming Tiampo, and Bojana Piskur.

17 These are, respectively, the powerful and perspective-shifting insights of Connelly, Chakrabarty, and Guha. See Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens"; Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History.*

18 On Kawara, in Hamada Chimei, Kawara, Yamanaka Haruo, Ikeda Tatsuo, Kiuchi Misaki, Yoshinaka Taizō, and Haryū Ichirō (roundtable moderator), "Atarashii ningen zō ni mukatte," *Bijutsu hihyō*, July 1955, p. 47. Thanks to Tomii for translating this discussion and helping me to engage its nuances.

19 See, e.g., the 1945 exhibition *A Problem for Critics*, organized by Howard Putzel in his small New York City gallery, Gallery 67; reviewed, with a reprint of the press release, in Edward Allen Jewell, "Toward Abstract or Away," *New York Times*, July 1, 1945, sec. 2, p. 2. Many of these early shows and critical roundups were not exclusively American, including Europeans such as André Masson and Mexican or Cuban artists such as Rufino Tamayo and Wifredo Lam.

20 On U.S. art's multiple postwar styles see Mary Caroline Simpson, "*American Artists Paint the City*: Katharine Kuh, the 1956 *Biennale*, and New York's Place in the Cold War Art World," *American Studies* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 31–57.

21 The first textbook called *Art since 1945* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1958) had one chapter on the United States and twelve on European nations; the 1959 *Documenta* II, subtitled *Kunst nach 1945*, included only a few American artists and placed them at the exhibition's end.

22 Lawrence Alloway, *The Venice Biennale: 1895–1968* (Greenwich, Conn.: New York Graphic Society, 1968), p. 144. Contemporary and subsequent accounts from both "sides" have emphasized the combative institutional and discursive aspects of the situation rather than the art and politics of the artists. See, e.g., Irving Sandler, *The Triumph of American Painting* (New York: Praeger, 1970); and Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

23 See Catherine Dossin, "To Drip or to Pop? The European Triumph of American Art," *Artl@s Bulletin* 3, no. 1 (2014): 80–103. It is interesting that recent global survey exhibitions have focused on Pop art as an international phenomenon vigorously contesting the dominance of American culture. See *The World Goes Pop!* at Tate Modern, London, and *International Pop* at the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, both in 2015.

24 Georg Baselitz, in "Outcomes, Prospects, Bounces: Georg Baselitz talks to Rainer Michael Mason," in Rainer Michael Mason, *Georg Baselitz,* exh. cat. (Lugano: Museo d'arte moderna, 2007), p. 159. The East German/West German conflict is an exception and has been thoroughly studied, recently, for example, in Eckhart Gillen, *Feindliche Bruder? Der Kalte Frief und die deutsche Kund, 1945–1990* (Berlin: Nicolai, 2009), and Stephanie Barron and Sabine Eckmann, eds., *Art of Two Germanys: Cold War Cultures* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2009).

25 For less doctrinaire accounts of the American promotion of art as politics see Jachec, "Transatlantic Cultural Politics in the Late 1950s: The Leaders and Specialists Grant Program," *Art History* 26, no. 4 (September 2003): 533–55, and Dossin, *The Rise and Fall of American Art, 1940s–1980s: A Geopolitics of Western Art Worlds* (London: Ashgate, 2015). On the mechanics of the Soviet blockade on artistic interaction with the West see Antoine Baudin, "'Why Is Soviet Painting Hidden from Us?': Zhdanov Art and Its International Relations and Fallout, 1947–53," in Thomas Lahausen and Evgeny Dobrenko, eds., *Socialist Realism without Shores* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 227–56. Discussion of this subject has a long, contested, and often misleading history. Hilton Kramer, who was to become a notably conservative critic, was one of the first to remark on the use of American artists by the government, which he pointed out was done without their agreement: Kramer, "The Coming Political Breakthrough," *Arts* 34, no. 4 (1960): 12. Later accounts often elided the politics of the artists with those of officials, as in Eva Cockcroft, "Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War," *Artforum* 12, no. 10 (June 1974): 39–41. For some of the documents surrounding this circulation—including the 1956 exhibition *Modern Art in the U.S.A.*, the first show sent not only to Western but to Eastern Europe (notably Belgrade)—see Porter McCray, "American Tutti Frutti," *The Sweet Sixties: Specters and Spirits of A Parallel Avant-Garde* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), pp. 121–35.

26 As others have noted with respect to East and West Europe. See for example Siegfried Gohr, "Art in the Post-War Period", in Christos M. Joachimides et al., eds., *German Art in the 20th Century: Painting and Sculpture, 1903–1983,* exh. cat., London, Royal Academy of Arts (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1985), p. 466; and Giles Scott-Smith and Joes Segal, "Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West," in Peter Romjin, Scott-Smith, and Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds: The Cultural Cold War in East and West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), pp. 1–9.

27 Elaine de Kooning, "Pure Paints a Picture," *ARTnews* 56, no. 4 (Summer 1957): 57, 86–87.

28 Willem de Kooning, "What Abstract Art Means to Me," *The Bulletin of The Museum of Modern Art* 18, no. 3 (Spring 1951): 7.

29 See, e.g., Susan E. Reid and David Crowley's anthologies *Socialism without Shores* and *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (both Oxford: Berg, 2000). On Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign see Lu Peng, *A History of Art in 20th-Century China*, 2006 (rev. ed. Milan: Charta, 2010), pp. 465–69.

30 The older, Orientalist divide between East and West somewhat parallels the fear of the colonized and colored masses discussed in Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens," and Prashad, *The Darker Nations*. The Indonesian President Sukarno called it "the conflict between black and white, East and West, colonizer and colonized." Quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 83.

31 Shiva Balaghi, "Iranian Visual Arts in 'The Century of Machinery Speed, and the Atom': Rethinking Modernity," in Balaghi and Lynn Gumpert, *Picturing Iran: Art, Society and Revolution* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 24.

32 This intersection of the history and form of European modernism with American social history are the subject of my book *Since '45*, which deals not with the exceptionalism of the United States but rather with its specificity and, equally and conversely, to borrow from Chakrabarty, with the provincialism of Europe.

33 Iba N'Diaye, quoted in Elizabeth Harney, "Densities of Modernity," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 495. Similar conflicting pressures existed for African American artists, including Romare Bearden, Beauford Delaney, and Jack Whitten, and also for women artists around the world.

34 Aimé Césaire, "Culture and Colonization," 1956, repr. in *Social Text* 28, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 140–41.

35 León Ferrari, "La respuesta de la artista," *Propositos*, October 7, 1965, n.p. Thanks to Megan Hines for her translation of this text.

36 See Anneka Lenssen, "The Shape of the Support: Painting and Politics in Syria's Twentieth Century," PhD diss., MIT, 2014, pp. 289–90.

37 See Shabout, "The Arabic Letter in Art," in Shabout, *Modern Arab Art: Formation of Arab Aesthetics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), pp. 61–144.

38 Sylvia Naef, "Reexploring Islamic Art: Modern and Contemporary Creation in the Arab World and Its Relation to the Artistic Past," *RES: Anthroplogy and Aesthetics* no. 43 (Spring 2003): 167.

39 See, e.g., Takiguchi Shuzo, "Calligraphy East and West," 1957, repr. in Doryun Chong, Michio Hayashi, Kenji Kaiya, and Fumihiko Sumitomo, eds., *From Postwar to Postmodern: Art in Japan 1945–1989* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2012), 74–77.

40 There is a large and growing body of writing, addressing both art and literature, around these experiments with the Arabic alphabet and calligraphy. See Naef, "Reexploring Islamic Art"; Shabout, "The Arabic Letter in Art"; Dadi, "Ibrahim El Salahi and Calligraphic Modernism in a Comparative Perspective," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 555–76; Hassan in the present volume; and Robyn Creswell, "Tradition and Translation: Poetic Modernism in Beirut," PhD diss., New York University, 2012. Thanks to Lenssen for discussing this with me. On concrete poetry in Brazil and Japan see Pedro Erber's essay in the present volume.

41 Taro Okamoto, "Avant-Garde Manifesto: A View of Art," 1949, in Chong, Hayashi, Kaiya, and Sumitomo, eds., *From Postwar to Postmodern*, p. 38. On Okamoto's early paintings see Bert Winther-Tamaki, "Oil Painting in Postsurrender Japan: Reconstructing Subjectivity through Deformation of the Body," *Monumenta Nipponica* 58, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 347–96. I thank Rika Hiro for discussing her research with me; see her forthcoming "Walking out of Ground Zero: Art and the Aftereffects of the Atomic Bombs in Postwar Japan," PhD diss., University of Southern California.

42 Theodor Adorno, 1950, quoted in John Paul Stonard, *Fault Lines: Art in Germany, 1945–1955* (London: Ridinghouse, 2007), p. 258. On the Darmstadt conference see Hans Gerhard Evers, ed., *Darmstädter Gespräch. Das Menschenbild in unserer Zeit* (Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1950).

43 See Gerhard Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting: Writings and Interviews, 1962–1993* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 37.

44 Ernest Mancoba, quoted in Hans Ulrich Obrist, "An Interview with Ernest Mancoba," *Third Text* 24, no. 3 (2010): 381.

45 See Sarah Wilson's essay in the present volume.

46 See the poet Adonis's 1953 essay "The Meaning of Painting," as discussed in Lenssen, "The Shape of the Support," pp. 208–11.

47 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove, 2004), p. 236.

48 I am indebted to Reiko Tomii for translating the roundtable and discussing its nuances with me.

49 Césaire, "Wifredo Lam," *Cahiers d'art* 20–21 (1945–46): 357. Author's translation from the French.

50 On Mathias Goeritz see Jennifer Josten, "Mathias Goeritz and International Modernism in Mexico, 1949–1962," PhD diss., Yale University, 2012, p. 33.

51 Thanks to Neil Huang for drawing this to my attention.

52 Joan Kee, "Use on Vacation: The Non-Sculptures of Lee Seung-taek," *Archives of Asian Art* 63, no. 1 (2013): 103–29.

53 See Chika Okeke-Agulu, "The Art Society and the Making of Postcolonial Modernism in Nigeria," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 505–27. See also Okeke-Agulu's essay in the present volume.

54 Mancoba, in Obrist, "An Interview with Ernest Mancoba," p. 382; Newman, "The New Sense of Fate," 1948, in *Barnett Newman: Selected Writings and Interviews*, ed. John O'Neill (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990), pp. 164–70. Here Newman constitutes "the West" as Europe, situating the United States instead within the Americas and its histories.

55 Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, p. 11.

56 Ibid., p. 161.

57 See Natsu Oyobe, "Human Subjectivity and Confrontation with Materials in Japanese Art: Yoshihara Jiro and Early Years of the Gutai Art Association, 1947–1958," PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2005, and Erber, *Breaching the Frame: The Rise of Contemporary Art in Brazil and Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 62.

58 Renato Guttuso, "Del realismo del presente e altro," *Paragone* 85 (1957): 53–74, Eng. trans. as "On Realism, the Present, and Other Things," trans. Nan Hill and Marco Lobascio, in Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz, eds., *Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists' Writings* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996), p. 179.

59 Gazbia Sirry, quoted in Mursi Saad El-Din, ed., *Gazbia Sirry: Lust for Color* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998), p. xv.

60 Sadamasa Motonaga, "The Unknown," 1955, quoted in Joan Kee, "Early Gutai Painting, 1954–1957," *Oxford Art Journal* 25, no. 2 (2003): 126.

61 Robert Rauschenberg, quoted in G. R. Swenson, "Rauschenberg Paints a Picture," *Art News* 62, no. 2 (April 1963): 46.

62 See Jack Burnham, *Beyond Modern Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on the Sculpture of This Century* (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. 345.

63 See Mari Carmen Ramírez, "Vital Structures: The Constructive Nexus in South America," in Ramírez and Héctor Olea, *Inverted Utopias: Avant-Garde Art in Latin America*, exh. cat. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, and Houston: MFA Houston, 2004), pp. 191–201.

64 Ben Enwonwu, quoted in Sylvester Okwunodo Ogebechie, *Ben Enwonwu: The Making of an African Modernist* (Rochester, N.Y.: Rochester University Press, 2008), p. 107.

65 On Léopold Sédar Senghor's philosophical interests, particularly with regard to German ethnographic traditions, see Bennetta Jules-Rosette, *Black Paris: The African Writers' Landscape* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998), pp. 33–38, and Gabriele Genge, "Survival of Images?," in Genge and Angela Stercken, eds., *Art History and Fetishism Abroad: Global Shiftings in Media and Methods* (Bielefeld: [transcript] Verlag, 2014), pp. 43–45.

66 Senghor, "On African Homelands and Nation-States, Negritude, Assimilation, and African Socialism," 1996, summarizing a lifetime's view. Quoted in Frederick Ochieng'-Odhiambo, "Negritude: The Basic Principles and Appraisal," in Isabelle Constant and Kahiudi C. Mabana, eds., *Negritude: Legacy and Present Relevance* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), p. 71; Adorno, "Subject and Object," 1969, in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Continuum, 1985), p. 499. Both Senghor and Adorno summarized their long-running concern with the topic in these essays.

67 Césaire, *Discours sur le colonialisme*, 1950 (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1955), p. 22.

68 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 144. Fanon saw nationhood as a necessary step on the route to developing a still more radical liberation.

69 For the critique of Senghor within African intellectual circles of the late 1960s and '70s see Bennetta Jules-Rosette, "Jean-Paul Sartre and the Philosophy of Negritude: Race, Self, and Society," *Theory and Society* 36, no. 3 (June 2007): 274–76.

70 Senghor, *Liberté I. Négritude et humanisme* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964), p. 9.

71 Sukarno's welcoming speech at Bandung, 1955, repr. in Jussi M. Hanhimåki and Westad, eds., *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 351.

72 Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in ibid., p. 355.